08LONDON929     2008-04-01 09:09     2010-12-02 21:09     CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN     Embassy London

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000929

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EO 12958 DECL: 03/28/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, IZ, AF, IS, IR, PK, UK
SUBJECT: DAVID CAMERON TELLS JOHN MCCAIN TORIES WON’T BREAK
WITH HMG WHERE TROOPS ARE CONCERNED

Classified By: Ambassador Robert H. Tuttle for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C/NF) Summary: Conservative party leader David Cameron told Senator John McCain the Tories won’t break ranks with HMG on policies affecting British troops in battle. Cameron and Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague told McCain and Senators Joseph Lieberman and Lindsey Graham that Prime Minister Gordon Brown had no political support to increase British troops in Iraq. McCain said Basrah was “quiet for all the wrong reasons.” (This conversation took place March 20 before the recent surge of violence in Southern Iraq.) McCain thanked Britain for its support. The Senators also discussed Afghanistan, Pakistan and Israel with Conservative leaders. End Summary.

Participants
------------

¶2. (U) Senators John McCain, Joseph Lieberman and Lindsey Graham, accompanied by the Ambassador, Senate staff Richard Fontaine and Dan Serchuk, and Poloff Kirsten Schulz met March 20 in David Cameron’s House of Commons office. Cameron had assembled an eager group from his front bench including Hague, Shadow Chancellor George Osborne, Shadow Defence Minister Liam Fox, as well as Chief of Staff Edward Llewellyn, former party leader Michael Howard, and Dame Pauline Neville-Jones. The room was packed and the atmosphere collegial.

McCain’s Assessment of Iraq
--------------------------

¶3. (C/NF) Senator McCain said the situation in Iraq had improved. He warned that Al Qaeda would put up a fight in Mosul and the Iranians were “not going to go quietly into the night.” Maliki, McCain told the group, was weak but getting better. In Anbar province, he added, there was a demand for elections. McCain praised General Petraeus and the quality of the military leadership and mentioned Petraeus’ upcoming congressional testimony. Cameron asked what the American troop numbers were likely to be. McCain said the U.S. would “stick at 180,000” and noted, “it’s not the number of troops, but the number of casualties” which is of import. Al-Qaeda, said McCain, had taken to using suicide bombers and now to deploying women bombers. He said one woman was asked why she had tried to become a suicide bomber. She replied, “because my husband told me to.”

Cameron Asks McCain for Appraisal of Basrah
-------------------------------------------

¶4. (C/NF) Cameron asked McCain what he thought was happening in the south of Iraq. McCain said he was very worried. He said it was like “Chicago in the 20’s” and “could go at any time.” The Iranians were there and the Iraqis were likely to find “the going to be extremely difficult.” “Just because its quiet,” said McCain, “doesn’t mean it’s good. It is quiet for all the wrong reasons.”

Pledge on Troops
----------------

¶5. (C/NF) Cameron and Hague told the Senators that the Conservatives would never take a policy position that would undermine British policies where troops are involved. Hague noted the Conservatives largely share the Labour foreign policy agenda. Cameron said Prime Minister Brown did not have the political support to increase the British troop presence in Iraq, saying “that moment has passed.” Hague seconded Cameron’s assessment. Cameron asked McCain whether the British plans for a further draw-down should not go forward, given that HMG could not both maintain a presence in Iraq and build up its role in Afghanistan. In response, McCain thanked Cameron and for Britain’s contribution in Iraq and Afghanistan.
¶6. (C/NF) McCain said he understood the Prime Minister intended to withdraw British troops prior to the next election. Hague confirmed Brown politically could not do otherwise. “I understand that,” said McCain, “the British people have my gratitude for all that you have done.”

Israel
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¶7. (C/NF) McCain told Cameron that Israel’s Prime Minster Ehud Omert was “still paying the price for Lebanon.” Cameron asked whether Quartet Leader Tony Blair was optimistic. McCain said he admired Blair for his steadfastness, but what McCain had noticed in international relations was the tendency of statesmen to be optimistic once they become negotiators.

Iran
----

¶8. (C/NF) McCain told Cameron he saw an increasing, and increasingly damaging role, for Iran in regional affairs. This included an increase in activity in Iraq and in arming Hezbollah. McCain said he advocated gathering Europe to “cut off all credit” to Iran. Not just Europe, but other like-minded nations such as Japan, should be encouraged to take collective action on such matters, he said. Hague responded that he and the Conservatives had been pushing for this for the last two years. Hague and Cameron alleged that the release of the National Intelligence Assessment had set back this effort.

Afghanistan and Pakistan
------------------------

¶9. (C/NF) Cameron told McCain that he and his party focused on Afghanistan as the key foreign police issue. This was due, not least, to the timeline for when the Conservatives might come into office (2010 or 2009 at the earliest) and the fact that British troops were meant to be out of Iraq by then. Cameron also raised Pakistan, noting that 60,000 individuals travel to Pakistan from the UK each year and that this has implications for the UK’s own significant domestic “terror threat.” Cameron said he was interested in exploring the idea of whether ISAF and Enduring Freedom operations could be combined, as well as whether an increase in military presence was required or an enhanced civilian presence was more important. McCain replied that Afghanistan is complicated by the uncertainty in Pakistan. “We all like Karzai,” he said, “but his is a very weak government.” Cameron said NATO troop capacity was “patchy” and there appeared to be perpetual problems with shortages of air transport support. McCain said he was worried about Pakistan. “If they don’t cooperate and help us, I don’t know what we are going to do,” he said. He added, “Waziristan hasn’t been ruled for 2,000 years.” On a positive note, McCain praised the fighting capacity of Afghans, whom he called “great fighters.” Cameron said each year he met with Karzai, and each year he had the sense Karzai’s sphere of influence was shrinking.

¶10. (U) CODEL McCain did not clear this cable.
Visit London’s Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm Tuttle

09ASTANA95     2009-01-20 05:05     2010-12-02 21:09     SECRET     Embassy Astana

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000095

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STATE FOR P, SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, NEA/IR

EO 12958 DECL: 01/19/2029
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF, IR, RS, KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: CENTCOM CDR PETRAEUS MEETS PRESIDENT
NAZARVAYEV, JANUARY 14

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B), (D)

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: President Nazarbayev told CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus:
-- the situation in Afghanistan greatly worries him; the Taliban should never be allowed to become a coalition partner in the Afghan government;
-- Iran cannot be allowed to become a nuclear state, but the United States needs to talk directly with Tehran, and he is willing to be helpful;
-- Kazakhstan will never again be “colonized,” but has excellent relations with Russia and China
-- the West has underestimated the depth of Russia’s wounded pride, but he is willing to be helpful if the Obama administration has “a wise response” to Russia. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (SBU) U.S. Central Command Commander General David Petraeus met with Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev on January 14 for twice the scheduled time, 70 minutes. The U.S. side included Major General Robert Allardice (CENTCOM J5), POLAD Michael Gfoeller, and the Ambassador (note taker). Security Council Secretary Kaibek Suleymenov, Presidential Foreign Policy Adviser Khairat Sarybay, and Magzhan Ilyassov of the presidential administration accompanied President Nazarbayev.

AFGHANISTAN

¶3. (S) General Petraeus thanked President Nazarbayev for the recent formal ratification of the long-existing over-flight and divert agreements, as well as for Kazakhstan’s willingness to participate in the Northern Distribution Network for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. He briefed the president on Iraq and Afghanistan. Nazarbayev responded, “Afghanistan greatly worries us. I am often in touch with (Afghanistan President Hamid) Karzai. He says the situation is good and the economy is growing; but I know he controls only 30% of his territory, and if the Afghan economy is growing, it’s based on drugs. We are already providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, but we need better security in Afghanistan if we are to do more. The United States and Kazakhstan have a common interest in strengthening Afghanistan.” Nazarbayev said he knows Karzai wants to involve the Taliban in his government and commented, “That would be greatly dangerous.” General Petraeus explained that Karzai’s position is more nuanced: the goal would be to break up the Taliban and reconcile some, “but we have no illusion that Mullah Omar could ever join the government.” Nazarbayev replied, “If there’s a chance to break up the Taliban, that’s fine; but the Taliban leadership will never change its position.”

¶4. (S) Nazarbayev told General Petraeus, “You’re aware of Afghan history; no foreign country ever succeeded in invasion. Afghans have to govern themselves.” Calling the situation in Afghanistan “very complicated,” Nazarbayev said he knows some the potential candidates to succeed Karzai, but none of them could unify and lead Afghanistan. “Karzai is weak, but it’s better to keep him on.” Nazarbayev added he’s heard Karzai claim the Taliban are trained in Pakistan and said he accepts that as credible. Nazarbayev added Central Asia needs a common policy on Afghanistan, “but that hasn’t happened.” He alluded to Uzbekistan’s support for the ethnic Uzbek leader Dostum.

IRAN

¶5. (S) Nazarbayev judged that Iran is a problem in the region, and General Petraeus fully agreed. Nazarbayev said, “I have good contacts among the leadership in Iran. I’ve tried to explain to them that Kazakhstan was once nuclear but
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fully gave up that status. I tell them it would be to their benefit to be non-nuclear. That would draw new assistance and investment.” General Petraeus said he again fully agreed with the president, but noted Iran’s policy is determined by the Revolutional Guard al-Quds Force commander, not by President Ahmedinejad or the Foreign Ministry. Nazarbayev noted he had once talked to Ahmedinejad for two and a half hours about such issues, “but in the end I realized I had just wasted my time.” He said Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameni told him that even if Iran compromises on the nuclear issue, the United States would always find another reason to criticize “because they hate us -- all the United States wants is to conquer the entire region and steal the oil.” General Petraeus interjected, “We could have bought all the oil in the region for 100 years for what we’ve spent in Iraq!” Nazarbayev, looking a bit amused, said, “I know. I’m just telling you what he said.” Without specifying his interlocutor, Nazarbayev said he’d asked if Tehran is willing to talk to the United States, “and they said yes. I conveyed this to President-elect Obama during our (post-U.S. election) phone call.” General Petraeus commented the United States had had three rounds of talks with Iran about Iraq but had gotten nowhere. Nazarbayev said, “I have no illusion U.S. negotiations with Iran would be easy or fast, but we cannot let Iran have nuclear weapons. I want to be helpful with Iran.”

¶6. (S) Nazarbayev added he has discussed Iran’s nuclear ambitions with Russian President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin: “I emphasize to them a nuclear Iran is in no one’s interests.” General Petraeus responded that it’s important to get Russia to be helpful with Iran: “They seem conflicted. Sometimes they help; sometimes they send weapons.” Nazarbayev said, “I told Obama that he has a good chance to have good relations with Mevedev. That’s important for us, too, since Russia and Kazakhstan are neighbors.”

RUSSIA

¶7. (S) General Petraeus told President Nazarbayev Kazakhstan’s special relationship with Russia is not a problem for the United States. “It’s not a zero-sum game for us. You can have good relations with Russia and China as well as with us.” Nazarbayev said he fully agreed, adding, “I tell Russia and China we have our own resources. We are Kazakhs. We were colonized for over 500 years, first by the Golden Horde, then by the western Chinese, then by Russia. We’ve been independent for only 17 years, and we do not want to be colonized again. We will never be ‘under’ Russia or China. We have enough resources and a reasonably educated population to make our own choices. We want stability, development, and cooperation. We all have to have Russia ‘inside the tent.’ I’d like the United States and the European Union to help with this.”

¶8. (S) Nazarbayev said the West had made real mistakes after the collapse of the Soviet Union by not treating Yeltsin with respect. He said Yeltsin had once gone to the NATO-Russia Council where he had been “teased.” Nazarbayev explained Russia has great, but now injured, pride. It was once a great empire, and Russian soldiers had played a large role in winning the Great Patriotic War (WW II), but the West seems to refuse to understand this. For Russia, maintained Nazarbayev, “face” is everything. Nazarbayev said he had frequently told President Medvedev that being an energy superpower is not enough; it’s essential to develop international leadership with a spirit of cooperation. Nazarbayev said Medvedev was “almost there,” but then the “Georgia mistake happened.” Nazarbayev concluded, “If the new U.S. administration has a wise response to Russia, I’d be glad to help” with the relationship.

¶9. (S) NOTE: While waiting for Nazarbayev to enter the meeting room, General Petraeus ask Foreign Policy Adviser Sarybay why Kazakhstan had moved its capital from Almaty to
ASTANA 00000095 003 OF 003
Astana. Sarybay answered, “There are probably 20 different reasons people give. In fact, in the first few years of independence, several maps appeared that made our northern border unclear, and so the President ‘planted the flag.’” This is the first time we are aware that a senior official has confirmed Nazarbayev moved his capital to prevent Russian nationalists from annexing the northern third of Kazakhstan, which hotheads, including some in the Duma at that time, claimed was historically part of Russia. END NOTE.

¶10. (S) COMMENT: Nazarbayev looked as fit as ever and was very well-briefed, discussing details of the U.S.-Kazakhstan military relationship without notes. He was not shy that he sees himself as an international statesman. We know he was genuinely pleased with President-elect Obama’s telephone call, and we judge his offers to be helpful for the United States with Iran and Russia are genuine. END COMMENT.

¶11. (U) General Petraeus has cleared this cable. HOAGLAND

09KABUL495     2009-03-03 12:12     2010-12-02 21:09     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Kabul

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C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION
EO 12958 DECL: 03/04/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, AF, IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN INFLUENCE AT PARLIAMENT

Classified By: CDA Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Iranian government officials routinely encourage Parliament to support anti-Coalition policies and to raise anti-American talking points during debates. Pro-Western MPs say colleagues with close Iranian contacts accept money or political support to promote Iran’s political agenda. Some staff members believe Iranian intelligence officials have infiltrated the Parliament’s legal and information technology support offices, compromising the professional staff’s legal advice and the legislature’s electronic communications. Allegations are difficult to verify and may be inspired more by conspiracy theories and inter-ethnic rivalries than actual facts. However, the number of MPs willing to tell us of first-hand encounters with Iranian agents appears to confirm a dedicated effort by Iran to influence Afghan attitudes toward Coalition forces and other issues. End Summary.

Iranian Embassy Relations with Parliament
-----------

¶2. (S/NF) Iranian Embassy officials exploit contacts with a number of Afghan politicians to influence Parliament’s agenda. Many MPs accuse Hazaras, who like Iran’s leaders are mostly Shia Muslims, of having the closest ties with Iran. Moderate Hazaras insist Iranian outreach influences only conservative Hazaras, many of whom received religious educations or lived in Iran while in exile. MPs single out Sayed Hussein Alemi Balkhi (Kabul), Ahmad Ali Jebraili (Herat), and Ustad Mohammad Akbari (Bamyan) as the Hazara MPs who receive the most support from Iran. The Iranian Embassy has also cultivated deep relations with members of opposition groups (including the United Front), Tajik Sayeds, and MPs from Herat and other western provinces.

¶3. (S/NF) Iranian Embassy officers frequently visit Parliament, but rarely sit in the public gallery and usually avoid high-traffic morning hours, according to Parliament watchers. After Iranian-influence allegations exploded a few years ago, the Iranian Embassy began hosting MPs more often at off-site meetings, where other MPs suspect payments are delivered in exchange for commitments to advocate Iranian policies.

¶4. (S/NF) According to several contacts, Iran’s top policy goals in Parliament are: increasing criticism of civilian casualty incidents caused by Coalition forces, encouraging the Afghan Parliament to “legalize” foreign forces, advocating rights for Shia (including a separate judicial system), promoting “Persian culture,” and limiting Western support to Afghan media. These subjects often dominate parliamentary debates, even when not on the official agenda.

Iranian Official Hands Over Talking Points to Deputy Speaker
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¶5. (S/NF) Lower House Deputy Speaker Mirwais Yaseni (Nangarhar, Pashtun) told PolOff an Iranian intelligence officer visited his office in mid-February, coinciding with the visit of Iran’s vice president to Kabul, to pressure him to allow a debate on the status of Coalition forces that would push other scheduled items from the 2/17 agenda (Speaker Yunus Qanooni was out of town, leaving Yaseni to chair the session). The intelligence officer offered to provide “support” to Yaseni if he cooperated. Yaseni declined, only to face the wrath of MPs Balkhi and Akbari, who raised the issue during debate on another item. When Yaseni suggested the MPs wait for a better time to discuss foreign forces, Balkhi accused the deputy speaker of “betraying his country” and being a Western puppet. Yaseni said Balkhi’s and Akbari’s remarks were identical to the talking points provided to him by the Iranian official earlier that day.

¶6. (S/NF) Other MPs have described similar interactions with Iranians they believe to be embassy-based intelligence officers. Some believe Iranian officers work in conjunction with Karzai’s Palace staff to stir up heated reactions from MPs following civilian casualty incidents. Pro-Western MPs worry that Iran exploits such incidents to decrease public support for Coalition troop presence. The Iranian Embassy plays a lower-key role on social issues, paying MPs to support Persian cultural programs and oppose Western countries’ support to local media. Despite Iran’s ambitious lobbying efforts, there are limits to MPs’ willingness to toe the Iranian line. A Lower House debate last November on water rights quickly struck a nationalistic tone, with several MPs accusing Iran of “stealing Afghanistan’s water.” No MP spoke up to disagree.

Suspicions With Staff, Too
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¶7. (S/NF) Parliamentary staffers believe the Iranian Embassy has planted moles in Parliament’s legal and information technology offices. An employee in the Lower House’s legal affairs and research office told PolOff last fall that his new supervisor was editing the staffer’s responses to questions from MPs to reflect Iran-friendly interpretations of Afghan law. Lower House Secretary General Gulam Hassan Gran has repeatedly complained to PolOff that most IT staffers have been trained in Iran and pass electronic communications to the Iranian Embassy. As a result, Gran and other Pashtun staff refuse to use Parliament’s email system. Gran’s deputy keeps a list of MPs who criticize the U.S. and analyzes trends in anti-U.S. rhetoric.

Comment
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¶8. (S/NF) If Iranian efforts to influence MPs are as dedicated as some believe, it means the Iranian government has successfully identified and exploited Parliament’s greatest strength: the bully pulpit. The four-year-old Parliament has often struggled to find its role and usually comes out on the losing end in battles with the judicial and executive branches. Still, MPs have been quick learners when it comes to using the media to draw attention to their causes, even if their views are at times incoherent or serve no other purpose than to bad-mouth the government or political rivals. Iran has deftly taken note, forgoing attempts to influence actual legislation and instead exploiting MPs’ proclivity for media coverage. By strong-arming MPs to incorporate Iranian talking points into their public statements, Iran has opened a potential channel to influence public and elite opinion against U.S. goals and policies for Afghanistan. At a minimum, Iranian interference has helped keep Parliament bogged down in unproductive debates and away from more pressing matters. DELL

10KABUL436     2010-02-03 13:01     2010-12-02 21:09     SECRET     Embassy Kabul

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EO 12958 DECL: 02/02/2020
TAGS PREL, IR, AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN’S OUTLOOK ON IRAN: A KARZAI INSIDER’S
VIEW

KABUL 00000436 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: D/Ambassador Ricciardone; Reasons (b) and (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: President Karzai’s Chief of Staff and former Ambassador to Iran, Omar Daudzai, offered the Palace’s outlook on Iran’s role in Afghanistan. Daudzai suggested that Karzai could provide “an open door” for the United States to engage Iran, at such time as the U.S. may judge this useful. Daudzai had found in Iran that paradoxically, the Iranian people hate foreigners, except for Americans; but that the Iranian revolution survives on its animosity towards the United States. He said that the Iranians no longer deny their support for the Taliban. While there is room for “indirect” U.S.-Afghan cooperation on Afghanistan, Daudzai cautioned that at best the Iranians would only “tolerate” our presence in Afghanistan. End Summary.

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We Can Help Open the Door to Iran
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¶2. (S) At a meeting within the GIRoA with COS Daudzai, D/Amb. Ricciardone asked for Afghanistan’s outlook on the anti-coalition Jundullah organization (Septel), and Karzai’s and Daudzai’s assessments of Afghanistan’s interests with Iran. Daudzai confirmed February 2, that only he and President Karzai had any substantial political engagement with the Iranian government. Karzai does pay close attention to Iran, Daudzai said, and he suggested that Karzai could help “open a door” for the United States to engage Iran “perhaps after Ahmadinejad leaves the scene,” or at any time the USG may judge useful. He explained that Karzai had maintained excellent relations with Iran and Khatami personally, and that Karzai had obtained the former Iranian president’s support for Daudzai’s appointment as Afghan Ambassador to Tehran. Relations had become more complicated with Ahmadinejad’s election. Daudzai went on to serve about a year and a half in Tehran, from 2004-2005.

¶3. (S) D/Amb. Ricciardone posited that, while President Obama and Secretary Clinton had made clear the United States’ willingness to discuss our differences with the Iranians, Iran evidently is not ready to engage with us. Even though we believe that many Iranians desire more normal relations with the United States, the Iranian government appears out of touch with its people, in particular an increasingly angry middle class.

¶4. (S) Daudzai related that after the first and only time he was “summoned to the MFA” for a complaint on alleged GIRoA support for Jundullah (Septel), and his categorical denial later proved true, he developed excellent relations with Iranian officials. Nonetheless, living in Tehran had been “challenging”. At first, Iranian intelligence shadowed Daudzai’s every move; after he told the Iranians that he was annoyed that he was being followed, the Iranians became more subtle in their approach. He was astonished that while there were no Sunni mosques in Tehran, an estimated 30 to 40 percent of its population was Sunni (combining Iranian and Afghan Sunnis residing there). He established an informal mosque in the basement of the Afghan Embassy, an act that drew much appreciation from the Sunni population.

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Iranian People Dislike Foreigners, Except Americans
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¶5. (S) Reflecting on his time in Tehran, Daudzai said he had reached two main conclusions: 1) “Common” Iranians hate foreigners, except for Americans, whom they “miss”. To illustrate, he said that even his wife’s doctor told her, “Please tell the Americans to bring their soldiers to our country next.” 2) paradoxically, the Iranian revolution lives on its animosity towards the United States. If this animosity ends, then the revolution will end. The national leadership knows this and thus do all they can to sustain “the revolution.” While Daudzai did not foresee that the Iranian revolution would end under Ahmadinejad’s tenure, he predicted that Ahmadinejad’s influence over the remainder of his term would wane. Therefore, he said, it was opportune to now start “preparing the ground” for U.S. relations with Iran under a better leader who would replace Ahmadinejad even though the Supreme Leader really “calls the shots.” Daudzai said that Iran’s “real” Foreign Minister is not Motaki, but rather Ali Akbar Velayati, who reports to the Supreme Leader.

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The Two Sides of Iranian Influence in Afghanistan
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¶6. (S) Daudzai said Iran’s influence in Afghanistan, like
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Pakistan’s, has been both helpful and hurtful. (Last year, Daudzai had acknowledged that Iran paid limited amounts of money to the Palace only episodically and unpredictably. He contrasted this with sustained U.S. financial support to Afghanistan with far more than the Iranians’ occasional cash payment.) Iran and Pakistan each had supported their own favored Afghan Mujahedin groups against the Soviets, largely along religious affiliations. Likewise, in the current conflict, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia were each supporting their “preferred” Taliban groups. This time, however, Iran’s support was driven by “a war of objectives” not religious sympathies: Iran would even support Sunni Taliban to counter Western influence in Afghanistan, so long as the Taliban factions they supported were not affiliated with Mullah Omar.

¶7. (S) Daudzai said that two years ago when he raised with the Iranians their support for Afghan Taliban, they had flatly denied any involvement. However, over the past half year, the Iranians, including their Ambassador in Kabul, no longer deny this assertion -- now they remain silent, he said. Daudzai attributed the Iranian change in posture to their awareness that the GIRoA has evidence of Iranian support for some Taliban elements.

¶8. (S) Daudzai said that on occasion, young Afghan males are allowed to cross into Iran, where they are recruited and trained before returning to Afghanistan to fight against the GIRoA and Coalition Forces. The Iranians also recruit Afghan university students and graduates. Daudzai said that approximately 7,000 Afghans hold Iranian university degrees, including three of President Karzai’s cabinet picks, who “fortunately” Parliament did not confirm. He claimed that Iran is also offering three-year visas to Afghans who deposit USD 100,000 in an Iranian bank account.

¶9. (S) According to Daudzai, Iran grooms thousands of Afghan religious scholars. After completing their education in Iran, they return to Afghanistan to work in Madrassas, where they continue to receive “support packages” from Iran. The support package included a monthly salary. Daudzai claimed that a man named Ibrahim directed this program from the Supreme Leader’s office. He also asserted that in addition to financing Afghan religious leaders, Iran had provided salary support for some GIRoA deputy ministers and other officials, including “one or two even in the Palace.” Daudzai claimed that some of these officials had been relieved of their duties because “you can’t be an honest Afghan if you receive a (Iran) package.”

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U.S.-Iranian Convergence of Interests is Complicated
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¶10. (S) Daudzai opined that there could be room for indirect, but not direct, cooperation between Iran and the U.S. regarding Afghanistan. Iran at best would “tolerate” the U.S. participation in an area of common interest here, he said. He would reflect further on the subject and would look forward to continuing the conversation. Eikenberry

09PARIS1228     2009-09-09 10:10     2010-12-02 15:03     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7118
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0387
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7262

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001228

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2019
TAGS: PREL IR FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE-IRAN: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE ROOT OF
BAIL SET FOR KAKAVAND, PER PRESIDENCY ADVISOR

REF: A. A. PARIS 01205
¶B. B. BAGHDAD 02397

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen H. Allegrone
for Reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

¶1. (C) We met with Elysee strategic affairs advisor Richier
September 4 to follow up on reports that a French judge had
released Iranian national Majid Kakavand on bail and subject
to determination of a pending U.S. extradition request. In
previous conversations about the fate of French citizen
Clothilde Reiss and her release to French embassy custody in
Tehran, Richier had assured us that France had no intention
to negotiate with Iranian authorities on a prisoner exchange
and that President Sarkozy himself had been apprised of and
rejected an Iranian effort to seek the release of Kakavand.
(ref. a)

¶2. (C) Responding to Pol M/C,s questions, Richier told us
that the Elysee had been taken completely by surprise by the
judge's decision. The prosecutor in the case had
consistently argued for holding Kakavand, but the judge had
determined that Kakavand "presented little chance for flight"
and had agreed to release him on 200,000 euro bond.
According to Richier, the Elysee reacted quickly and strongly
to news of the decision on August 28 and that there were very
sharp exchanges between the Office of the President (Elysee)
and the Justice Minister, but that the government cannot
reverse the judge,s decision. However, Richier assured us
that French authorities are keeping a close eye on
Kakavand,s whereabouts to prevent or interrupt possible
flight. They have established what Richier called "tight"
surveillance on Kakavand. Proving the point, Richier
telephoned to a colleague in one of the services who
confirmed that Kakavand was currently in buildings owned by
Iran and managed by the Iranian Embassy, located in Paris.
Richier added his own private observation that the way in
which the judgment was rendered in this case implies that the
request for extradition will be approved, although we must
wait until October for that decision.

¶3. (C) Comment: The French have been concerned, from the
beginning of their hostage case, about possible Iranian
pressure to exchange Iranian prisoners for French or U.S.
nationals held in Iran. Embassy Baghdad reporting (ref. b)
suggests that is exactly what Iran plans to do. Obviously
the French judge,s decision to grant Kakavand a temporary
release complicates the situation. However, Sarkozy,s
public tone and Richier,s strong comments, suggest that
France will make every effort to keep Kakavand under close
surveillance, pending a decision on the extradition request.
RIVKIN

09ANKARA226     2009-02-11 13:01     2010-12-01 23:11     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Ankara

VZCZCXRO8464
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHAK #0226/01 0421303
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111303Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8757
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 1961
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 1397
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 1592
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4298
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0391
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3282
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0229
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 5366
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC

Wednesday, 11 February 2009, 13:03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000226
SIPDIS
Note - PII information removed from original message.
SENSITIVE
LONDON FOR GAYLE
BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD
ASHGABAT FOR INGBORN
BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY
BAGHDAD FOR BUZBEE
DUBAI FOR IRPO
EO 12958 DECL: 06/02/2019
TAGS CASC, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PREL, SCUL, SNAR, SOCI, IR,
TU, IQ
SUBJECT: ELDERLY AMERICAN SMUGGLED OUT OF IRAN
Classified By: DCM;DOUG SILLIMAN FOR REASONS 1.4(B,D)
¶1. (C) Summary: American citizen Hossein Ghanbarzadeh Vahedi appeared in the Ankara Consular section around noon on January 9, 2009. Mr. Vahedi, age 75, told Conoff he had paid smugglers $7500 to take him across the Iranian/Turkish border after having been held against his will in Iran for seven months. Although suffering some aches and pains, he appeared to be in good health after a harrowing three-day journey from Tehran to Ankara that included a 14-hour mountain climb on horseback in freezing temperatures. Embassy staff provided immediate consular assistance and worked with Turkish authorities to prevent his deportation back to Iran. Consular officers escorted Vahedi to the Ankara airport where he departed on January 13. End summary.
----------
Background
----------
¶2. (SBU) On January, 7, Embassy Bern alerted posts in the region that American citizen Hossein Ghanbarzadeh Vahedi, DPOB xx/xx/1933 was trying to escape from Iran and could possibly surface in Iraq. Vahedi, a dentist from Los Angeles, instead appeared at the Ankara Consular Section around noon on January 9, 2009. Although visibly shaken,Vahedi said he had no major physical problems, but he did break down a few times when explaining his ordeal. He told Conoff that he had enough medication and declined local medical attention preferring to wait until he was back in the United States.
¶3. (SBU) Vahedi has been a resident, then citizen of the United States since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Aside from this trip, he has only returned to Iran once about ten years ago and did not encounter any problems on that visit. At his wife’s urging to visit his parents’ gravesite in Iran, he traveled to Tehran in early May 2008 where he spent four weeks with family and friends without incident. However, after clearing customs at Tehran airport on June 6, he heard his name called on the public address system with instructions to report to a separate office. At this office, GOI authorities confiscated his passport and told him he would not be leaving Iran. When Vahedi pressed as to the reason, he was dismissed with instructions to follow-up at the Islamic Revolution Court.
------------------------
Seven-Month House Arrest
------------------------
¶4. (SBU) Thus began a seven-month ordeal in which Vahedi appeared almost daily at the court to request that his passport be returned. During this de facto house arrest, Vahedi did contact Elizabeth Bucher, the Deputy Head of the Foreign Interest Section at the Embassy of Switzerland in Tehran. He reported that Ms. Bucher was very kind and helped him get his heart medications, but was unable to help him depart the country. He lived with friends and relatives staying only a few days with each to avoid them being implicated in his problems.
¶5. (SBU) Vahedi believed his passport was confiscated for two reasons, the first being simple extortion. It was made clear to him informally by the authorities at the court that if he paid a $150,000 fine the process would move more quickly. Secondly, he was told by GOI officials that he should use his influence to pressure his American citizen sons to terminate one of their business ventures. Vahedi’s sons are the owners of Concertino Productions, a Los Angeles-based entertainment company that promotes, among other things, the popular Persian pop singers Kamran and Hooman. In addition to American performances, the duet has performed in Dubai and other middle-eastern venues. According to Vahedi, while the singers are simply Persian pop singers, they have gotten crowds riled up with occasional anti-regime rhetoric. Also included in these performances are female dancers whose costumes would not raise an eyebrow in most countries, but are perceived as immoral by the conservative elements inside Iran.
¶6. (SBU) Vahedi did not trust that paying the fine would expedite the return of his passport unless he also convinced his sons to cancel the next Dubai performance of Kamran and Hooman. Vahedi spoke of a third party who was pulling the strings within the Iranian government, particularly in regard to his son’ business. He repeatedly told the officials of the Islamic Revolution Court that his children had lived in America all of their lives and as such he exerted no control over their strong, typically American independent behavior.
---------------
No Empty Spoons
---------------
¶7. (C) Vahedi spoke bitterly about his former country, especially its lack of a fair judicial system and widespread corruption. He told Conoff that all government employees receive free sugar, rice, and cooking oil to ensure their loyalty to the regime. He also said anyone with any authority lives by the “why should I put an empty spoon into my mouth” philosophy. Vahedi reported that regime spies were omnipresent including taxi drivers, hotel clerks, and restaurant workers. He also said it was common knowledge that all new Iranian-made cars had a “Khamenei tax” in the amount of $3100 that was earmarked for a fund for South Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria. At his daily appearances at the court, he came to know the intimate details of the lives of many of the other visitors, some of whom told Vahedi they had no idea where their loved ones were, or if they were even alive. Vahedi also helped one woman whose drug-addicted husband was incarcerated by paying her rent for the months he was there. Vahedi reported seeing Iranian citizens watch helplessly as their family members were hauled off in shackles without any official charges levied against them.
-----------------------
Picking the Best Option
-----------------------
¶8. (C) Vahedi realized that this situation was not going to change and alluded to people who knew of his situation from his daily appearances at the court approaching him with departure options. Vahedi said he studied the four most common illegally used routes out of Iran. The first was crossing as a stowaway on a merchant ship across the Persian Gulf into the UAE. Vahedi dismissed this plan because he thought the heavy shipping traffic was too dangerous and they risked being boarded by the Iranian Navy who were patrolling the area. The second option was overland through Baluchistan but Vahedi could not obtain enough facts about the execution of that plan to seriously consider that route. The third choice was to enter Iraq heading to Karbala and try to make contact with a member of the American military stationed there. Vahedi seriously considered this option, but feared being discovered by the Iraqis before he could make contact with an American soldier. That left only the last option: over the mountains on horseback from Urmia to the Turkish border.
¶9. (SBU) In spite of temperatures hovering around zero degrees Fahrenheit, Vahedi chose the early part of January because it coincided with the Shia commemoration of Ashura and he thought it likely the police would be more preoccupied. In the weeks prior to his departure, this 75-year old man trained for strength and altitude by climbing in the hills north of Tehran. To protect his family and friends from retribution by the GOI after his absence was noted, he spoke to none of them of his escape plans. On January 7 Vahedi boarded a bus from Tehran to Urmia, a city in the northern range of the Zagros Mountains in West Azerbaijan, Iran. He used his California driver’s license as identification at each of the approximately 20 stops the bus made. At Urmia, he and a pre-arranged car and driver drove into the foothills of the mountains where he met two men with a single horse who would escort him through the mountain to the Turkish border.
-----------------
Over the Mountain
-----------------
¶10. (C) The two escorts were paid $5000 at the beginning of the journey and the three set out as soon as it was dark. For all his planning, Vahedi did not have clothing appropriate for the weather and had a very difficult time with the cold. At one point during the 14-hour ride, the escorts had to physically hug him to keep him warm. As an inexperienced rider hours into the climb Vahedi lost his concentration and fell off the horse tumbling into the woods. He told Conoff that at this point, he really believed he was going to die by freezing to death on a mountainside. However, his only partially-paid escorts came to his aid and put him back on the horse. Although he had thought he would be able to walk part way, the altitude proved too much for him and his only choice was to remain on the horse. Vahedi said that he believes they were following known dug smuggling routes, evidenced by the way the horse knew exactly which way to turn. Vahedi said the horse often led the escorts, even going off the normal path in what seemed to be the wrong direction. Knowing that he escorts could also be trying to smuggle drugs on this trip, he covertly went through the one pack they had thrown on the horse and said he found nothing.
¶11. (SBU) Once over the Turkish border they were met on schedule by a man Vahedi described as about 25 years old. During the handover, Vahedi paid out another $2500 but was unsure how the three escorts split that payment. The Turkish escort then brought Vahedi into a home where he was fed and given time to rest and warm up. In the early evening he was driven to Van, a major city in eastern Turkey, and waited there at the bus station for the 0200 bus to Ankara. Vahedi said he maintained a very low profile and did not talk to anyone during the 10-hour bus trip. He arrived at the Consular section around noon on Friday, January 9.
--------------------
Deportation Conflict
--------------------
¶12. (C) As Vahedi had entered Turkey illegally, Conoff worked with GOT officials to ensure his deportation back to America. Initially the Chief of the Foreigner’s police within the Ministry of Interior in Ankara told Conoff that because “we knew Vahedi was coming” he intended to deport him back to Iran. Post is aware that Iranian and Iraqi citizens have been deported back to those countries in a fairly brutal manner. According to UNHCR some have been taken by bus in the middle of the night to the southern Turkish border and released. Police have then allegedly shot into the air forcing the deportees to run across the border into Iraq or Iran with no food or water to sustain them.
(13) (C) Post contacted Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, who subsequently exerted pressure on the Ministry of Interior to allow this 75-year old American citizen to be deported back to the United States. Consular staff assured his security during the four days it took to work through the departure arrangements and accompanied him through the police and court proceedings and finally onward to the airport. Vahedi told Conoff he had never done anything illegal in his life and that he was ashamed to be seen in policy custody. Vahedi departed Turkey at 4:00 p.m. on January 13.
-------
Comment
-------
¶14. (C) The problems Vahedi faced as a result of entering Turkey illegally highlights the tough stand this government takes on illegal entry. This is particularly true with Iranian and Iraqi nationals, even those who may also carry American citizenship. Ensuring Vahedi’s return to the United States, vice deportation to Iran required the intervention of the embassy’s front office.
Visit Ankara’s Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
Jeffrey

09BAGHDAD1103     2009-04-24 16:04     2010-12-01 23:11     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Baghdad

VZCZCXRO8610
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1103/01 1141618
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 241618Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2829
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

Friday, 24 April 2009, 16:18
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001103
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I AND NEA/IR
NSC STAFF FOR OLLIVANT AND MAGSAMEN
EO 12958 DECL: 04/23/2029
TAGS PREL, PTER, PINR, MOPS, ECON, ETRD, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAN IN IRAQ: STRATEGY FOR PRESSURING IRGC-QF
REF: A. 07 BAGHDAD 150 B. 07 BAGHDAD 488 C. BAGHDAD 289
Classified By: Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - Quds Force (IRGC-QF) officers are active in Iraq, conducting traditional espionage and supporting violent extremists as well as supporting both legitimate and malign Iranian economic and cultural outreach. Iraqis and their government have demonstrated increasing willingness to push back against malign Iranian influence in the last year. Working with the Iraqis, we have succeeded in stopping some IRGC-QF activity through military operations and diplomatic engagement, while we prevented some IRGC-QF officers from entering Iraq through explicit warnings that we would target them unilaterally. However, under the Security Agreement effective January 1, all operations in Iraq must be conducted in conjunction with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and our previous unilateral warnings carry less weight. As Coalition Forces continue the period of responsible drawdown, we will rely increasingly on the GOI to keep the pressure on the IRGC-QF. We intend to support the GOI in these efforts through continued diplomatic engagement, intelligence sharing, and our security partnership of Coalition Forces working by, with, and through the ISF. End summary.
-----------
Background:
-----------
¶2. (S/NF) IRGC-QF leadership took advantage of the vacuum which surrounded the fall of Saddam Hussein and the entry of Coalition Forces into Iraq in 2003, using the opportunity to send operatives to Iraq when little attention was focused on Iran. In January 2007, Coalition Forces raided an unofficial Iranian consulate in Erbil, detaining five Iranians who claimed to be diplomats but in reality held no diplomatic status. They were suspected of operations aimed at killing Coalition and Iraqi security forces (refs A and B). The original targets of the raid, IRGC-QF officers Abbas Hoseyni (of the Erbil office) and Hormat Faruqi (of the Sulaimaniyah office), escaped and fled to Iran. The Iranian government immediately pulled back most IRGC-QF officers from Iraq and shuttered its “consulates” in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah until mid-2007; consulates in Basrah and Karbala remained open. Since 2007, Iran has submitted diplomatic visa applications for Hoseini and Faruqi to return to Iraq. In 2008 the Embassy and MNF-I convinced the GOI not to approve these applications, making it clear if they returned to Iraq, they would be targeted by Coalition Forces.
¶3. (S/NF) Since 2008, the MFA has passed names of Iranians applying for diplomatic visas to the US Embassy for vetting. Background checks have revealed that about 20 percent have possible ties to the IRGC or Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) (ref C). The MFA has informed us that it denies visas to all new suspected intelligence officers, but we have not been able to verify such claims. In January 2009, the MFA passed a list of 35 names to the USG of Iranian diplomats already in country before the vetting process began. Of those, eight had ties to IRGC or MOIS.
--------
Strategy
--------
¶4. (S/NF) As U.S. forces continue a period of responsible draw down, we will seek to ensure that the GOI understands that IRGC-QF activity harms Iraq -- which should be self-evident if the IRGC-QF continues to conduct malign activity that targets Iraqi citizens and infrastructure. Qactivity that targets Iraqi citizens and infrastructure. Engagements with political and security leadership at the national and provincial level, intelligence sharing, and security cooperation will be key to explaining the dangers of IRGC-QF activity and providing Iraqis the information they need to defend their own interests. The following are diplomatic, political, military, intelligence, and public information options which either the GOI can pursue unilaterally, or in concert with the USG, to target IRGC-QF activity in Iraq.
---------
Diplomacy
---------
BAGHDAD 00001103 002 OF 003
¶5. (S/NF) We intend to continue working closely with the MFA to deny visas to Iranian intelligence officers. We may also consider suggesting that the MFA use another diplomatic tool, albeit one with more consequences -- the “persona non grata” designation. The MFA may be reluctant to take this step because Iraqi diplomats in Iran would face retaliation and the dispute would inevitably become public. Since the fall of Saddam, the GOI has avoided most public disagreements with Iran.
--------------------
Security Partnership
--------------------
¶6. (S/NF) The role of the ISF in countering IRGC-QF in Iraq is critical, yet complex. We can encourage the Iraqi Army to take the lead on kinetic action against IRGC-QF agents, with Iraqi police monitoring and reacting to suspicious activity at the local level. We intend to continue to strengthen our partnership with the ISF to counter pro-Iranian elements who have infiltrated the security forces such as Kata’ib Hizbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. While the US combat mission will end by August 31, 2009, we will continue to assist the Ministry of Defense (MOD) with training, equipment, mentoring and other bilateral military-to-military programs and engagements. Military sales, such as the recent Iraqi interest in purchasing F-16s and plans to transition from AK-47 to M-4 rifles, will increase US influence through training and support in Iraq for years to come, although the MOD will continue to consider weapons purchases from other sources as well.
---------------
Border Controls
---------------
¶7. (S) The Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) can help limit IRGC-QF activity by combating smuggling and scrutinizing people and cargo crossing legitimate routes from Iran into Iraq. XXXXXXXXXXXX corruption at the ports of entry (POEs), unwillingness of inspectors to do their jobs, and poor leadership and professionalism at the supervisory level keep the DBE from being fully effective. The USG can assist, however. Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES), which checks travelers’ biographic data, is already in use at many land and air POEs around Iraq. Additional training at sea ports, airports, and land borders could help Iraqi officials detect smugglers of cash, weapons, weapons components and other contraband. An Iranian IRGC-QF officer was briefly detained at Baghdad International Airport in November 2008 when his name was flagged in PISCES. In January 2009, KRG’s Minister of the Interior Karim Sinjari praised PISCES and asked for the system at two more land border entry points the KRG shares with Iran, Khalil Ibrahim and Hadjer Meran.
¶8. (S) As of April 2009, there were 200 PISCES units in operation at 15 different POEs in Iraq. Current guidance states that every traveler entering or exiting Iraq is processed through PISCES. On occasion however, travelers will pay a small “fee” to enter or exit without going through PISCES. If a potential match is found to someone on the “stop list,” the screen freezes, and only INIS can unlock the screen and conduct a secondary inspection. INIS notifies the GOI or USG when the identity of a wanted person is confirmed. PISCES is operated by Immigration officers assigned to the Department of Travel and Nationality, and the GOI will continue to use PISCES after the military drawdown. Collection and storage of biometric data is another tool the QCollection and storage of biometric data is another tool the GOI is already using at POEs, although Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) system is run by U.S. forces and will not stay in Iraq after their departure.
¶9. (S/NF) A timely example of cooperation with DBE in countering Iranian lethal aid smuggling occurred April 14. A DBE brigade in Maysan Province, partnered with Multi-National Division-South (MND-S) forces, captured an unmanned boat carrying explosive devices floating in the Huwayza Marsh. The patrol found three explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) and other military equipment. MND-S said it was the first time the DBE had reported success against this type of smuggling.
--------------------
Intelligence Sharing
--------------------
BAGHDAD 00001103 003 OF 003
¶10. (S/NF) Coordinating with GOI intelligence agencies to stop IRGC-QF activity is complicated by the fact that the Iraqi intelligence establishment is extremely fragmented. Intelligence offices affiliated with the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), DBE, and the Ministry of State for National Security Affairs (MSNSA) do not trust each other and often work in opposition. The USG could further assist Iraqi intelligence by negotiating and approving a bilateral US-Iraqi intelligence sharing agreements and further providing the GOI with intelligence that demonstrates the involvement of IRGC-QF officers in lethal assistance to extremists. US Forces in Iraq have established positive relationships with their ISF counterparts and are developing appropriate intelligence-sharing mechanisms. The USG can also assist the GOI to further develop its intelligence infrastructure to monitor malign Iranian influence and counter the IRGC-QF. INIS currently interacts closely with the Office of Regional Affairs (ORA). The establishment of a Defense Attach’s Office at the Embassy will also help facilitate intelligence sharing and is under consideration by Chief of Mission.
-------------------
Public Information
-------------------
¶11. (S/NF) Highlighting nefarious Iranian activity to GOI leadership and the Iraqi public has had a significant impact on increasing GOI willingness to confront Iran, as well as public rejection of Iranian attempts to dominate Iraq’s political and economic sectors. Provincial elections demonstrated that perceived fealty to Iran is a political liability for Iraqi politicians, and they are increasingly sensitive to it. Continued USG assistance in uncovering and publicizing Iranian attempts to influence events in Iraq will make the country a much more inhospitable environment for IRGC-QF operatives.
-------
Comment
-------
¶12. (S/NF) The Iranian government may sense that the drawdown of U.S. military forces in Iraq presents an opportunity to expand IRGC-QF activity, although the broader regional dynamic will undoubtedly also influence Iranian decision making. Without the ability to conduct unilateral military action against IRGC-QF operatives in Iraq, we will leverage our evolving diplomatic, intelligence, security, and military partnerships with Iraq to maintain pressure. Many USG agencies will be involved in assisting the Iraqis in this critical area, and must actively engage in order to counter IRGC-QF officers and their lethal aid. BUTENIS

09MOSCOW2734     2009-11-05 17:05     2010-12-01 23:11     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Moscow

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RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHMO #2734/01 3091741
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051741Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5314
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002734

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 11/04/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ETRD, SENV, IR, AF, UK, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: MOVING BEYOND BILATERAL ISSUES, MILIBAND
REOPENED DIALOGUE

Classified By: Political MC Susan M. Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ).

Summary
-------

¶1. (C) During Foreign Secretary Miliband’s November 1-2 visit, he put an end to the “period of standoff,” but had little concrete to show for his visit. In pushing a new framework for cooperation, he set aside the most contentious issues and focused primarily on the international agenda during his meetings with Russian FM Lavrov -- START Follow-on, Iran, Afghanistan, Middle East peace, and non-proliferation -- resulting in three joint statements. Miliband also met with Gorbachev and Russian business leaders and political notables. Moscow had some lingering hesitancy, with Medvedev and Putin declining meetings, due in part to concerns based on previous interaction between Lavrov and Miliband, and a desire to avoid giving Miliband a success that he could use in a potential run to head EU foreign policy. End Summary.

Ending the “Period of Standoff”
-------------------------------

¶2. (C) On November 1-2, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband ended the five-year hiatus in bilateral visits. In his discussions with Russian FM Sergey Lavrov, Miliband was able to set a new pattern for addressing contentious bilateral issues in the future, while forging ahead on the international agenda. While the Russian press has hailed this as a “reset,” it comes after the slow build up of bilateral contacts at all levels, and is therefore less of a breakthrough than a symbolic final hurdle.

¶3. (C) While the visit succeeded in reestablishing constructive dialogue, President Medvedev and PM Putin had rebuffed British Embassy feelers for meetings with the Foreign Secretary. According to British diplomats, the Russians were unsure that the visit wasn’t going to be another round of “slapping them around the face.” The diplomats also credited Medvedev as the driving force in ending the “period of standoff.”

¶4. (C) During his two-day stay, Miliband dined with Lavrov on Sunday, followed on Monday by working meetings with Lavrov and First Deputy PM Igor Shuvalov. Miliband also met with Mikhail Gorbachev, lunched with select eminent politicians and held separate round-tables with Russian NGOs and the British business community (including TNK-BP). Miliband and Lavrov issued three joint statements regarding the 2010 Review Conference for nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Afghanistan, and the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP).

International Agenda
--------------------

¶5. (C) START Follow-On: Lavrov was reportedly upbeat regarding START follow-on negotiations. According to British diplomats, Lavrov said the key issues involved conventional weapons on ICBMs, verification, and the “numbers gap,” which was being narrowed. Following this treaty, Lavrov suggested multilateral negotiations on further reductions involving the P5, the D3 (Israel, India, Pakistan) as well as “dormant” nuclear powers such as Japan. He also called for close Russian-British cooperation across the arms-control agenda: the NPT, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. CFE was not discussed. The sides issued a joint statement on the NPT, calling for efforts to ensure the 2010 review conference reinvigorated and strengthened it, and noting that an “agreement before the end of the year on a new legally binding treaty to further reduce Russian and U.S. strategic offensive weapons will be a major contribution to this shared endeavor.” The statement also said that both sides were committed to “ensuring the IAEA has the necessary authority and capacity to assure compliance with non-proliferation obligations.”

¶6. (C) Iran: Lavrov claimed Russia had no prior knowledge of the Qom facility and said the S300 deal was in a “holding pattern.” Regarding the IAEA negotiations, Lavrov agreed with Miliband’s call for continued unity among the 5 plus 1 group and was ready to discuss the substance of a “freeze for freeze” deal. According to British diplomats, Lavrov was slippery about sanctions, saying “we’re ready to consider applying sanctions if necessary, but it’s too early.” Lavrov reportedly added that if sanctions are agreed at the UNSC, there shouldn’t be additional unilateral sanctions and sanctions should be limited to “officials” and the nuclear program.
MOSCOW 00002734 002 OF 003

¶7. (C) Afghanistan: Lavrov conveyed that Russia wanted NATO to stay and to succeed. He made the usual pitch for formal CSTO consultations with NATO and for Russia to have a seat at the table of “troop contributing” countries. In the joint statement, the sides condemned the Taliban’s attempts to disrupt the Afghan electoral process and destabilize the country. The statement “noted” the Afghan government’s attempts to reintegrate former fighters, but said that the two governments remained committed to UNSCR 1267. The UK and Russia also made a non-specific commitment to explore opportunities for cooperation in counter-narcotics, which British diplomats said will be pursued at the working level.

¶8. (C) MEPP: The joint statement urged “Israel to immediately end all settlement activities, including in East Jerusalem, and to allow access to the Gaza Strip.” The statement also endorsed the work of the U.S. and the Quartet and restated support for the Russian Moscow conference proposal. British diplomats, however, said that it was clear GOR officials knew the conference would not happen soon.

¶9. (C) NATO/European Security: Miliband reaffirmed that Georgia and Ukraine remained on the NATO membership track and rejected Russia’s concept of a “sphere of privileged interests.” Lavrov was on the defensive and sought to redefine privileged interests to mean closer bilateral relations, which Russia sought to develop with a range of countries, not just those in the CIS. Miliband rebuffed Lavrov’s calls for a new European security treaty, saying he understood Russia feels uncomfortable but that it was too early for a new treaty; he urged Russia to work this through the OSCE’s “Corfu process.”

¶10. (C) WTO/Climate Change: Deputy PM Igor Shuvalov told Miliband that he had offered the U.S. a return to the bilateral negotiating track to facilitate Russis’s WTO accession. Shuvalov proposed this during his September visit to Washington, but claimed that the U.S. refused. Miliband lobbied Shuvalov to increase Russia’s carbon-reduction commitments from its current offer of 15 percent by 2020. Shuvalov said the Russian position was not cast in stone, but the GOR did not want to be tied to targets that would then restrict the expected surge in Russia’s economic growth in the coming decade.

Bilateral Issues
----------------

¶11. (C) In addition to the joint statements, some progress was made on bilateral economic ties. Foremost was the November 5 visit of Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin to London as part of the bilateral financial working group, during which Kudrin is expected to pitch the sale of Eurobonds to fill part of Russia’s projected 2010 budget deficit. The sides had to “agree to disagree” on the more thorny bilateral issues that have poisoned the relationship for the past five years: the British extradition request for Andrey Lugovoi related to the murder of former FSB officer Aleksadr Litvenenko (Nov. 1 was the third anniversary of the murder), and Russian extradition requests for Russian tycoon Boris Berezovskiy and Chechen leader Akhmed Zakayev. Lingering in the background were the tit-for-tat expulsions of British and Russian diplomats over the “rock incident,” the closure of the British Council’s offices in St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg, the handling of the TNK-BP management dispute, and the prior harassment of British diplomats by Nashi youth activists at the presumed behest of Russian officials. That said, British diplomats noted that Lavrov and Miliband agreed to step up cultural relations (especially in 2011) to make up for the decrease in British Council programs. British diplomats believed that there was an understanding that the British Council would take the lead in these activities, but the technicalities were not discussed.

Comment
-------

¶12. (C) While Russia and the UK found some common ground during Miliband’s visit, there was a lingering hesitancy on the Russian side, demonstrated by the lack of solid deliverables and the unavailability of the tandem, Putin and Medvedev. The GOR could have gone further in offering the UK transit (either land or air) to support British operations in Afghanistan, but hedged. Although Miliband’s visit followed many working-level and even senior-level meetings on the sidelines of international conferences, it was clear that the GOR lowered expectations in the event the tone of the visit returned to that following the 2008 Georgian-Russian war. The Russian press added into the mix the possibility that
MOSCOW 00002734 003 OF 003
Miliband was in Moscow to demonstrate that he could talk to “even the most difficult of partners,” thereby burnishing his credentials for a future post with the EU. If that was the case, the GOR has done little to assist him. Beyrle

09STATE28302     2009-03-24 21:09     2010-12-01 21:09     SECRET//NOFORN     Secretary of State

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S E C R E T STATE 028302

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CAPTION ADDED

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2034
TAGS: PARM PREL MASS ETTC TU VE IR
SUBJECT: (S) SHIPMENT OF UAVS FROM IRAN TO VENEZUELA

REF: A. ANKARA 3
¶B. ANKARA 126

Classified By: EUR/PRA Dir. Anita Friedt,
Reason 1.4 (b), (c) and (d)

----------
BACKGROUND
-----------

¶1. (S//NF) Venezuelan officials expected to receive a
shipment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and related
material from Iran, via Turkey, by May 2009. As of early
March, Venezuelan officials believed that the equipment would
be repackaged and labeled as electronic equipment, then
transported overland from Iran to Turkey. Once in Turkey,
the equipment would be loaded onto a maritime vessel for
continued shipment to Venezuela. The U.S. believes this
shipment constitutes arms and related materiel, which Iran is
prohibited from transferring pursuant to UN Security Council
Resolution 1747, paragraph 5.

¶2. (S) This case appears to be similar to one from January
2009 where Iran attempted to ship drums of nitrate and
sulphite chemicals and dismantled laboratory instruments,
which could possibly be used for making bombs to Venezuela
via Turkey. In response to U.S. concerns that the shipment
may have been a violation of UNSCR 1747, Turkish officials
inspected the cargo and made a decision to return it to Iran.
(REFS A and B)

--------------
ACTION REQUEST
--------------

¶3. (S) Drawing from the points in paragraph 5, which may be
left as a nonpaper, post is instructed to approach
appropriate-level Turkish officials and request that they
investigate this activity, and if the cargo is found to be in
violation of UNSCR 1747 that the GOT use all available means
to prevent the transshipment of this cargo and detain it.

----------
OBJECTIVES
----------

¶4. (S) Post should seek to achieve the following:
-- Provide Turkish officials with information regarding
Iran,s attempt to ship unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and
related material to Venezuela via Turkey;

-- Emphasize to the Turkish officials that UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, paragraph 5, prohibits Iran
from transferring any arms or related materiel;

-- Emphasize that these goods are produced by an Iranian
entity listed in the Annex to UNSCR 1747.

-- Urge the Government of Turkey (GOT) to take action against
this shipment pursuant to UNSCR 1747 and possibly 1737, and
in accordance with the GOT's laws and authorities;

-- Thank the GOT for its willingness to interdict and take
positive action with regards to a similar shipment in
January. As a NATO Ally, we try to provide Turkey with as
much info as possible on these issues, which could help lead
them to take action in detaining shipments; and
-- Emphasized that, should we receive additional information
regarding this shipment, we will provide it as expeditiously
as possible.

------------------------
TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER
------------------------

¶5. (S//REL Turkey) Begin talking points/non-paper:

--We would like to share some information with you in an
effort to highlight a transfer of proliferation concern and
to ensure that Iran does not make use of your territory to
transfer items proscribed by UN Security Council resolutions
1737, 1747, and 1803.

-- The U.S. has information indicating that Venezuelan
officials expected to receive a shipment of UAV and
UAV-related equipment from Iran by May 2009.

-- As of early March, Venezuelan officials believed that the
equipment would be repackaged and labeled as electronic
equipment, then transported overland from Iran to Turkey.
Once in Turkey, the equipment would be loaded onto a maritime
vessel for continued shipment to Venezuela.

--Venezuelan officials assessed that a shipment of
electronics coming from Turkey to Venezuela would be less
alerting than a shipment directly from Iran.

--We believe these items are military UAVs and related items,
constituting arms and related materials and are thus captured
by UNSCR 1747 and subject to the asset freeze called for in
UNSCR 1737.

-- UN Security Council Resolution 1747, paragraph 5,
prohibits Iran from supplying, selling or transferring any
arms or related materiel. It also requires all states to
prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their
nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and
whether or not such transfers originated in the territory of
Iran.

--This system is produced by the Qods Aviation Industries.

-- Qods Aeronautics Industries (aka Qods Aviations
Industries) is designated in the Annex to UNSCR 1747 and as
such these items would be subject to the asset freeze
provision of UNSCR 1737 regardless of whether the item is
MTCR- controlled or otherwise prohibited in paragraphs 3 or 4
of the resolution.

-- As such, we request your assistance in preventing the
transfer of goods in violation of UNSCR 1747 and 1737.

-- Additionally, it is possible that some UAV-related
equipment may be MTCR-controlled, per MTCR Item 12.A.1., if
the equipment is designed or modified to support other
Iranian UAVs that meet the Item 1.A.2. or 19.A.2. criteria.
Such items are included in document S/2006/815, the list of
items, materials, equipment, goods and technology related to
ballistic missile programs. Transfer of these items would be
a violation of UNSCR 1737 per paragraph 3.

-- We deeply appreciate the Government of Turkey's continued
cooperation, support and willingness to enact prompt and
thorough efforts in promoting interdictions designed to
prevent the transfer of sensitive materials by Iran.

END POINTS.

---------------------
REPORTING REQUIREMENT
---------------------

¶6. (U) Post is instructed to report results of its efforts
as soon as possible.

-----------------
POINTS OF CONTACT
-----------------

¶7. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are and
Margaret Mitchell, ISN/CATR (mitchellmt2@state.gov) and Matt
Hardiman, EUR/PRA.

¶8. (U) Department thanks post for its assistance. Please
slug all responses for ISN, EUR, NEA, IO, WHA, and T.
CLINTON

09CARACAS1296     2009-10-07 19:07     2010-12-01 20:08     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Caracas

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TAGS: ECON ENRG KNNP VE IR

08OTTAWA918     2008-07-09 18:06     2010-12-01 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Ottawa
Appears in these articles:
nytimes.com

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000918

C O R R E C T E D COPY//SUBJECT LINE//////////////////////////////////

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS IR PK AF CA
SUBJECT: COUNSELOR, CSIS DIRECTOR DISCUSS CT THREATS,
PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN

REF: A. OTTAWA 360
¶B. OTTAWA 808
¶C. OTTAWA 850
¶D. OTTAWA 878

OTTAWA 00000918 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons, 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S/NF) Summary. Canadian Security Intelligence Service
(CSIS) Director Judd discussed domestic and foreign terror
threats with Counselor of the State Department Cohen in
Ottawa on July 2. Judd admitted that CSIS was increasingly
distracted from its mission by legal challenges that could
endanger foreign intelligence-sharing with Canadian agencies.
He predicted that the upcoming release of a DVD of
Guantanamo detainee and Canadian citizen Omar Khadr's
interrogation by Canadian officials would lead to heightened
pressure on the government to press for his return to Canada,
which the government would continue to resist. Judd shared
Dr. Cohen's negative assessment of current political,
economic, and security trends in Pakistan, and was worried
about what it would mean for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.
Canada has begun formulating an inter-agency Pakistan
strategy, and CSIS had agreed to open a channel to Iran's
intelligence service which Judd has not yet "figured out."
(Septel will cover Dr. Cohen's discussions regarding Pakistan
and the OEF and ISAF missions in Afghanistan.) End summary.

¶2. (S/NF) Counselor of the Department of State Eliot Cohen
and CSIS Director Jim Judd in Ottawa on July 2 discussed
threats posed by violent Islamist groups in Canada, and
recent developments in Pakistan and Afghanistan. (CSIS is
Canada's lead agency for national security intelligence.)
Director Judd ascribed an "Alice in Wonderland" worldview to
Canadians and their courts, whose judges have tied CSIS "in
knots," making it ever more difficult to detect and prevent
terror attacks in Canada and abroad. The situation, he
commented, left government security agencies on the defensive
and losing public support for their effort to protect Canada
and its allies.

Legal Wrangling Risks Chill Effect
----------------------------------

¶3. (S/NF) Responding to Dr. Cohen's query, Judd said CSIS
had responded to recent, non-specific intelligence on
possible terror operations by "vigorously harassing" known
Hezbollah members in Canada. According to Judd, CSIS'
current assessment is that no attack is "in the offing" in
Canada. He noted, however, that Hezbollah members, and their
lawyers, were considering new avenues of litigation resulting
from recent court rulings that, Judd complained, had
inappropriately treated intelligence agencies like law
enforcement bodies (refs A and C). The Director observed
that CSIS was "sinking deeper and deeper into judicial
processes," making Legal Affairs the fastest growing division
of his organization. Indeed, he added, legal challenges were
becoming a "distraction" that could have a major "chill
effect" on intelligence officials.

¶4. (S/NF) Judd derided recent judgments in Canada's courts
that threaten to undermine foreign government intelligence-
Qthat threaten to undermine foreign government intelligence-
and information-sharing with Canada. These judgments posit
that Canadian authorities cannot use information that "may
have been" derived from torture, and that any Canadian public
official who conveys such information may be subject to
criminal prosecution. This, he commented, put the government
in a reverse-onus situation whereby it would have to "prove"
the innocence of partner nations in the face of assumed
wrongdoing.

¶5. (S/NF) Judd credited Prime Minister Stephen Harper's
minority Conservative government for "taking it on the chin
and pressing ahead" with common sense measures despite court
challenges and political knocks from the opposition and
interest groups. When asked to look to the future, Judd
predicted that Canada would soon implement UK-like legal
procedures that make intelligence available to "vetted
defense lawyers who see everything the judge sees."

OTTAWA 00000918 002.2 OF 003

Terror Cases and Communities Present Mixed Pictures
--------------------------------------------- ------

¶6. (C/NF) Judd commented that cherry-picked sections of the
court-ordered release of a DVD of Guantanamo detainee and
Canadian citizen Omar Khadr (ref D) would likely show three
(Canadian) adults interrogating a kid who breaks down in
tears. He observed that the images would no doubt trigger
"knee-jerk anti-Americanism" and "paroxysms of moral outrage,
a Canadian specialty," as well as lead to a new round of
heightened pressure on the government to press for Khadr's
return to Canada. He predicted that PM Harper's government
would nonetheless continue to resist this pressure.
¶7. (C) The Director mentioned other major cases that also
presented CSIS with major legal headaches due to the use of
intelligence products in their development: Momin Khawaja has
been on trial for his role in an Al Qaeda UK bomb plot since
June 23 in the first major test of Canada's 2001
Anti-Terrorism Act, and Canada's ability to protect
intelligence supplied by foreign government sources (ref D);
the trial of the first of the home-grown Toronto 11 (down
from 18) terror plotters, which is also now underway; and,
the prosecution of Global Islamic Media Front propagandist
Said Namouh, who was arrested in Quebec in 2007 for
conspiring to conduct bombings in Austria and Germany.

¶8. (C) Judd said he viewed Khawaja and his "ilk" as
outliers, due in part to the fact that Canada's ethnic
Pakistani community is unlike its ghettoized and poorly
educated UK counterpart. It is largely made up of traders,
lawyers, doctors, engineers, and others who see promise for
themselves and their children in North America, he observed,
so its members are unlikely to engage in domestic terror
plots. He said that therefore CSIS main domestic focus is
instead on fundraising and procurement, as well as the
recruitment of a small number of Canadian "wannabes" of
Pakistani origin for mostly overseas operations.

Pakistan and Afghanistan
------------------------

¶9. (C) Turning to Pakistan, Counselor Cohen briefed his
recent trip to Islamabad and Peshawar, noting his alarm at
the degrading economic, political, and security situation
there, and its implications for Pakistan, Afghan, and
regional stability. Judd responded that Dr. Cohen's sober
assessment tracked with CSIS' own view of Pakistan, and that
"it is hard to see a good outcome there" due to that
country's political, economic, and security failures, on top
of fast-rising oil and food prices. Canada does not have an
explicit strategy for Pakistan, Judd said, but Privy Council
Deputy Secretary David Mulroney (who leads the interagency on
Afghanistan) now has the lead on developing one (septel).
Dr. Cohen remarked, and Judd agreed, that it would be
necessary to avoid approaching Pakistan as simply an adjunct
to the ISAF and OEF missions in Afghanistan.

¶10. (S/NF) CSIS is far from being "high-five mode" on
Q10. (S/NF) CSIS is far from being "high-five mode" on
Afghanistan, Judd asserted, due in part to Karzai's weak
leadership, widespread corruption, the lack of will to press
ahead on counter-narcotics, limited Afghan security force
capability (particularly the police) and, most recently, the
Sarpoza prison break. He commented that CSIS had seen
Sarpoza coming, and its link to the Quetta Shura in Pakistan,
but could not get a handle on the timing.

Iranian Outreach
----------------

¶11. (S/NF) Judd added that he and his colleagues are "very,
very worried" about Iran. CSIS recently talked to Iran's
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) after that
agency requested its own channel of communication to Canada,
he said. The Iranians agreed to "help" on Afghan issues,
including sharing information regarding potential attacks.
However, "we have not figured out what they are up to," Judd
confided, since it is clear that the "Iranians want ISAF to
bleed...slowly."

OTTAWA 00000918 003.2 OF 003

¶12. (U) Dr. Cohen has cleared this message.

Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada

WILKINS

07PARIS921     2007-03-09 16:04     2010-12-01 12:12     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR EUN NATO ETRD ECON UNO IR PHUM
KDEM
SUBJECT: FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER NICOLAS SARKOZY OR
SEGOLENE ROYAL

REF: A. PARIS 777
¶B. PARIS POINTS OF 3/6

Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign policy has not and probably will not
play a prominent role in the French presidential election
campaign, and neither Nicolas Sarkozy nor Segolene Royal has
enunciated a fleshed out foreign policy vision. (This
message does not discuss emerging "third man" centrist
Francois Bayrou, whose views fall somewhere between those of
Sarkozy and Royal.) While it is likely that French policy
overall under a Sarkozy or Royal presidency would be largely
marked by continuity, signs are already emerging that the two
candidates would -- initially at least -- adopt somewhat
different approaches to the U.S., the Transatlantic
relationship, and Europe. Sarkozy favors a relationship of
confidence with the U.S. based on trust and with each side
free to disagree (a position which is hurting him with
voters), whereas Royal's natural reflex is to adopt a more
distant and critical approach. If both worry that a NATO
built on global partnerships risks undermining the UN,
Sarkozy at least explicitly endorses a transatlantic alliance
built on shared values and emphasizes the complementarity of
NATO and the EU. If not inherently more pro-European than
his counterpart, Sarkozy's prescription for moving Europe
forward on the basis of a simplified treaty is generally
considered as more realistic (i.e., attuned to European
realities) than Royal's for a new treaty with an enhanced
"social(ist)" dimension.

¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONT'D: Both candidates favor restoring the
place of human rights and democratization as a foreign policy
standard, although it is not clear to what extent this would
mean increased criticism of Russia or China in practice.
Sarkozy is more openly supportive of Israel than Royal (which
could make a difference with respect to current GOF
consideration of contacts with a Palestinian NUG), but both
see resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the key
to increased stability across the Middle East. Both
candidates are committed to France's current policy on
Lebanon, although without the intensive personal engagement
of Chirac. Sarkozy is tough on Iran, and Royal was initially
tougher -- but she has moderated her tone of late, perhaps
under the influence of new advisors. Chirac's departure
might open the way for either Sarkozy or Royal to engage more
positively on Iraq reconstruction. We would expect both to
remain serious about NATO's engagement in Afghanistan. On
Africa, while Sarkozy and Royal alike would put an end to the
Chirac model of personal diplomacy with his counterparts, it
is not clear what this would mean in practice. Chirac's
departure will offer a welcome opportunity to reevaluate
French policy in Africa in particular, including current
troop deployments. END SUMMARY.

INTRODUCTION -- IT'S ABOUT THE DOMESTIC AGENDA
--------------------------------------------- -

¶3. (C) Foreign policy issues so far have not played a
prominent role in the French presidential election campaign,
and there is little chance this will change substantially in
coming weeks. French voters are focused primarily on whether
and to what extent France needs to reform in order better to
adapt to globalization, particularly with respect to the
price to be paid in lost jobs and social protections. From a
U.S. perspective, of course, what counts most will be the
foreign policy orientation of the new president. Both the
leading candidates -- Nicolas Sarkozy of the Union for a
Popular Movement (UMP) and Segolene Royal of the Socialist
Party (PS) -- have in recent weeks outlined views on foreign
policy and defense issues (refs A and B) and offer some clear
indications of what can be expected. (This message does not
discuss centrist Francois Bayrou, the "third man"
neither-Sarkozy nor-Royal candidate whose views fall
somewhere between those of Sarkozy and Royal, although he is
widely regarded as the most pro-European of the three.)

¶4. (C) Sarkozy is above all a pragmatist (witness his recent
reversal on Airbus, where he originally favored a business
approach to the issue that he quickly dropped for more state
intervention in response to popular pressures). In contrast,
Royal leaves an impression of greater rigidity and
ideological orthodoxy. This said, neither Sarkozy (although
he came close in his recent press conference, ref A) nor
Royal (despite her remarks on defense, ref B) has delivered a
formal address on foreign and security policy, and it also
bears repeating that what the candidates say in the heat of
an election campaign may differ substantially from what they
might actually do or not do once elected. It is likely that

PARIS 00000921 002 OF 005


French policy under a Sarkozy or Royal administration would
largely be marked by continuity. We believe nonetheless that
it is possible to draw a few preliminary conclusions about
each candidate's leanings or "reflexes," particularly with
respect to the U.S. and the transatlantic relationship;
market liberalization; Europe, human rights and
democratization; and Africa.

FRENCH-U.S. AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
---------------------------------------

¶5. (C) As their public positioning makes clear, Sarkozy and
Royal differ perhaps most in their approaches to the United
States, primarily in tone if not substance, although the one
invariably bleeds into the other. Beginning with his
September 2006 visit to the U.S., Sarkozy has deliberately
and systematically spoken in favor of putting the U.S.-France
relationship on a new footing based on mutual confidence and
trust. Not only in response to (demagogic) accusations from
the left that this shift risked turning him into an American
"poodle," Sarkozy at the same time has made clear that the
relationship would have to be based on equality, with France
also free to differ with the U.S. -- he cited his opposition
to Turkey's EU accession as one salient example. Significant
is not that Sarkozy has abandoned Gaullism -- he has not --
but that he has attempted to define it in a way that is more
explicitly America-friendly or at least America-compatible.
Above all, he has spelled out the need for active engagement
with the U.S. at all times; the assumption is that France
should be able to work together with the U.S. unless, in a
given situation, our views are fundamentally incompatible.
In cases of disagreement (e.g., Iraq), the clear implication
is that France would stand aside rather than actively seek,
as Chirac did in 2003, to marshal a coalition against the
United States. Sarkozy's pro-Americanism is an electoral
liability for him, and his opponents, Royal foremost among
them, are using it as a campaign issue against him.

¶6. (C) Royal has yet to enunciate with anything approaching
the same degree of clarity the kind of relationship she would
seek with the U.S., owing at least partly to her relative
inexperience. But she leaves the lingering impression of
someone who reflexively wants to keep her distance from the
U.S. In part this is the product of a lack of direct and
personal experience with the United States. It also reflects
the accumulated weight of traditional leftist preconceptions
-- not to say prejudices -- of the U.S. as a hegemonic and
unilateral power (leaving aside hot-button and publicly
popular issues such as environmentalism, climate warming,
globalization, and our more limited social safety net).
Emblematic of this distancing has been the relatively greater
difficulty we have had in setting up meetings with her and
her staff, or her initial inclination -- before she abandoned
the idea altogether -- to travel to the U.S. and meet only
with certain members from the Democratic Party and none from
the Administration. Moreover, in her public utterances,
Royal has explicitly accused the U.S. for contributing to
global instability. The clear implication is that the French
role in international affairs, more than working with the
U.S., should consist of presenting alternatives to our vision.

NATO AND THE EU
---------------

¶7. (C) These differences of approach are well illustrated in
the candidates' attitudes toward the NATO Alliance and
European Security (ESDP). As Chirac before them, Sarkozy and
Royal alike object to NATO's evolving global role, and both
cite the argument that the U.S. vision for NATO, through
global partnerships and assuming out-of-theatre missions that
go beyond its traditional military role, could lead NATO to
become a competitor for the UN. Both candidates also insist
on the importance of increased EU autonomy and cooperation on
defense (ESDP), as well as on the capability of taking
independent action outside NATO. But they appear to differ
significantly in their basic attitudes toward the Alliance.
Sarkozy explicitly referred to the transatlantic relationship
as indispensable for being based on common values; he also
called for retiring old arguments over the pre-eminence of
the one the other, calling them mutually complementary and
noting that not all EU member states are NATO Allies and vice
versa (which may also be convenient in the case of Turkey).
Although committed to the idea of a political Europe as
independent actor, Sarkozy's envisions Europe acting jointly
with or in parallel with the U.S., but not as an alternative
or counterweight to the U.S. Royal's departure point is that
Europe needs to evolve and to reinforce its security
capabilities in order to present an potential alternative to
the U.S., although beyond her distaste for the use of

PARIS 00000921 003 OF 005


military force, she has offered few prescriptions as to how
that would occur.

¶8. (C) The two candidates also differ with respect to the
importance of defense. While Royal and Sarkozy have voiced
support for maintaining defense expenditures at two percent
of GDP, Sarkozy insisted that it should be "at least" two
percent. In public debates and discussions, Royal has
moreover indicated a willingness to reassess France's defense
budget and programs, most notably questioning the need for
the construction of a second aircraft carrier. Sarkozy, for
his part, has made it clear he supports a strong defense and
that the planned construction of a second carrier must go
forward.

FRANCE AND EUROPE
-----------------

¶9. (C) Sarkozy does not have a reputation as an avid
pro-Europeanist, and he has not hesitated on occasion, like
Chirac, to blame the EU for some of France's problems, mainly
in connection with trying to prevent the migration of money
and jobs to the newer member states with fewer social
protections, or promoting a level of political control over
European monetary policy. He has criticized "fiscal dumping"
by newer member states with lower cost and other barriers to
investment. Sarkozy has also advocated EU-wide coordination
on domestically sensitive issues such as immigration. Royal
represents a party that traditionally is viewed as more
pro-European, although many of her positions do not differ
dramatically from Sarkozy's on the surface (although Sarkozy
has been much more strident in calling for a coordinated EU
immigration policy). However, mainly to satisfy that part of
her electorate which voted against the EU constitutional
treaty despite its pro-European tradition, Royal has put more
stress on promoting a more "social" Europe that would adopt
EU-wide standards for social protections and labor rights.

¶10. (C) Indeed, where the candidates diverge most is in the
remedies they would prescribe for overcoming the current
impasse on the EU constitutional treaty. There is already
evidence that Sarkozy's pragmatic proposal for a "simplified
treaty" (formerly referred to as a mini-Treaty) that would
focus on institutional reforms and not require ratification
through popular referendum has made inroads even with the
Germans, notwithstanding the official German position on
retaining the existing draft constitutional treaty. By
contrast, the Germans have privately expressed to us, and
French press reports corroborate this view, considerable
concern over Royal's calls for a new referendum on an
improved treaty, which they see as a recipe for another
French rejection. Royal has argued that a referendum could
be successful if a revised treaty were to include additional
social protections, but it seems likely that this would make
the treaty unacceptable to a number of other European
partners (in particular the UK), and would lengthen the
negotiating process in any case. In sum, although Royal may
be more pro-European in theory, in practice Sarkozy seems
more likely to move the European project forward over the
short term.

FREE MARKET LIBERALISM
----------------------

¶11. (C) Although Sarkozy is viewed by many French voters as
a radical free-market "liberal," in fact his differences with
Royal may be less significant than labels would indicate. As
the Airbus controversy has shown, Sarkozy does not hesitate
to shed his free-market rhetoric when he believes the market
is not looking after France's interests. Both Sarkozy and
Royal support "economic patriotism," even if Sarkozy
rhetorically speaks more of European than strictly French
champions. That said, partly out of necessity in order to
help reduce France's high debt, Sarkozy would remain more
interested than his Socialist counterpart in privatization of
state-owned enterprises. Unlike Royal, he also supports
cutting corporate tax rates, cutting all payroll taxes on
overtime beyond the statutory limit of 35 hours, and ending
France's two-tiered labor market as a means of tackling
France's chronic unemployment. As noted earlier, however,
Sarkozy's "liberalism" has often in the past been trumped by
political expediency -- which would likely be the hallmark of
a Sarkozy presidency. His demand for more European-wide
coordination on fiscal policy as a means of reducing
relocation of French jobs to other EU member countries is
emblematic of bending liberal principle to accommodate French
interests.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION

PARIS 00000921 004 OF 005


--------------------------------

¶12. (C) Both Sarkozy and Royal have called for restoring
more prominence to human rights and democratization as a
means of remaining true to France's heritage and its
universal mission. How far either candidate would be
prepared to make transformational diplomacy a cornerstone of
his or her foreign policy in reality remains an open
question, however. It is likely that Royal would take a more
principled approach to human rights questions than her
counterpart, and it is telling that Sarkozy justified his
criticism of Russia's human rights record in Chechnya
primarily by arguing that, in the modern media age, it is no
longer possible to hide human rights violations as before,
which in turns creates public pressures that cannot be
ignored. At this stage of the campaign, the jury is still
out on whether human rights considerations would become a
main driver of French foreign policy. What seems certain is
that neither Sarkozy nor Royal will be driven by the
sometimes sentimental approach of Chirac, whose admiration
for countries with their own long histories and traditions
(e.g., Russia and China) with a skepticism of the
applicability of Western notions of democracy and human
rights to other countries and civilizations.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFGHANISTAN
-------------------------------

¶13. (C) Similar considerations also apply toward both
candidates' likely approaches to the Middle East and Africa.
Sarkozy differs dramatically from Royal in his insistent
emphasis on the need to take Israeli security interests into
account. This might eventually affect Sarkozy's policy on
dealing with a Palestinian national unity government, where
the GOF of late has argued that it would be a mistake to
isolate Hamas completely if it fails to explicitly accept the
Quartet conditions. Sarkozy has indirectly criticized Chirac
for his overriding attachment to maintaining stability for
its own sake, which encourages authoritarian rule. That
said, both candidates accept the conventional wisdom that the
key to resolving the range of conflicts and tensions in the
Middle East is to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.

¶14. (C) Both candidates are also committed to maintaining
current French policy toward Lebanon, although neither will
be driven by Chirac's loyalty to the memory of former PM
Rafic Hariri -- both in terms of personal involvement, and
Lebanon's centrality to French policy on the Middle East.
Sarkozy and his foreign policy advisors are tough-minded on
Iran. Royal initially was tougher, demanding that Iran be
prevented from developing a civilian nuclear capacity, as
permitted under the NPT. This demand was notably absent from
her most recent foreign policy remarks. (This may reflect
increasing influence of former Foreign Minister Hubert
Vedrine, who is far more dovish with regard to an Iranian
nuclear capability, including military.) We would expect
Sarkozy or Royal to maintain France's commitment to NATO's
engagement in Afghanistan. Finally, Chirac's departure from
the scene should result in greater openness to opportunities
to assist in Iraq's reconstruction.

AFRICA
------

¶15. (C) On Africa, both candidates have indicated that they
would like above all to change the manner in which France
does business in Africa, with Sarkozy going so far as to
stress France's desire to reduce its military footprint
(except in coordination with the AU or under the authority of
the UN). But this does not mean withdrawal, and France will
continue to want to leverage its influence to the greatest
extent possible -- perhaps through an increased EU role --
even as it competes with the growing influence of the U.S.
and China. But both candidates understand they will no
longer be able to rely (nor do they appear to want to) on the
kinds of personal relationships that Chirac developed over
many years with a number of African leaders. The departure
of Chirac will allow the French foreign policy establishment
a welcome opportunity to reevaluate French policy toward Cote
d'Ivoire, Chad, and the Central African Republic.
Inevitably, troop redeployments across Africa will come under
consideration.

NEITHER QUITE WHAT HE/SHE SEEMS
-------------------------------

¶16. (C) Whoever is finally elected, we believe that the
bilateral U.S.-France relationship will eventually settle

PARIS 00000921 005 OF 005


into a kind of normal balance based on our enduring shared
interests and values and the intertwined nature of our
economies on the one hand, and the requirement of a distinct
French voice and authentically independent positions in the
international arena, on the other. In the case of Sarkozy,
we believe it will be important not to set our expectations
too high, since even his pragmatism will always be tempered
by the Gaullist imperative of a French "difference," in
particular vis-a-vis the U.S. As for Royal, although we
would expect her, at least initially, to maintain more of a
distanced approach to the U.S., there is no reason to believe
that she would be anything but pragmatic over the longer
term. In all likelihood, her personal comfort level would
rise with increased contact and experience, and foreign
policy under a Royal presidency would be characterized by the
signature French mix of strategic convergence with the U.S.,
heavily marked by strategic differences and tactical
disagreements.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON

09LONDON2768     2009-12-10 16:04     2010-11-30 23:11     CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN     Embassy London

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NOFORN
SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, MOPS, MARR, AF, UK, PK, IR, IN, CH, RS,
SA, NATO
SUBJECT: SHADOW DEFENSE MINISTER FOX PLEDGES CLOSE U.S.-UK
COOPERATION IF TORIES GAIN POWER

Classified By: Ambassador Louis Susman for reasons 1.4 b and d

¶1. (C/NF) Summary. During a December 9 meeting with the Ambassador, Shadow Secretary of State for Defense Liam Fox affirmed his desire to work closely with the U.S. if the Conservative Party wins power in next year’s general election. He highlighted the importance of the U.S.-UK Defense Trade and Cooperation Treaty insofar as it advances the goal of U.S.-UK interoperability. The Treaty “means a lot to us,” Fox emphasized, adding that “we (Conservatives) intend to follow a much more pro-American profile in procurement.” Fox, who accompanied Conservative Party leader David Cameron on a December 4-6 visit to Afghanistan, (septel) expressed confidence regarding U.S. leadership in Afghanistan and optimism about the way forward. (Note: In a December 8 Chatham House speech, Fox affirmed the importance of the Afghanistan mission and analyzed challenges facing NATO.) Fox predicted that negotiations with Iran would fail; he stated that the U.S. and UK should work together to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. He faulted the Labour government for policies which reinforce the Indian government’s long-held view that HMG’s foreign relations on the subcontinent are “skewed to Pakistan.” End Summary.

U.S.-UK Interoperability
------------------------

¶2. (C/NF) Ambassador Susman met December 9 with Liam Fox, Shadow Secretary of State for Defense. (Mike Threadgold, Head of Fox’s Private Office, and U.S. Embassy Political Officer Chris Palmer attended the meeting as notetakers.) Fox, a committed Atlanticist, underscored his desire to work closely with the U.S. if the Conservative Party wins power in next year’s general election. He affirmed that when Winston Churchill first raised the notion of the “special relationship” it was as a wartime leader. The special relationship will remain strategically central to UK foreign policy regardless of which party is in power in the UK, Fox underlined. However, the relationship will be especially close in the defense sphere under Tory leadership, Fox stated. He affirmed his desire to increase joint defense procurement with the United States. Increasing U.S.-UK “interoperability is the key” since the U.S. and UK will continue to fight together in the future.

¶3. (C/NF) Fox stressed that the U.S.-UK Defense Trade and Cooperation Treaty (Note: SFRL hearings on the Treaty were to be held December 10) is extremely important insofar as it advances the goal of interoperability. Fox expressed appreciation for the Ambassador’s update regarding the likelihood of Senate approval of the Treaty soon. The Treaty “means a lot to us,” Fox emphasized, adding that “we (Conservatives) intend to follow a much more pro-American profile in procurement. The key is interoperability.” Fox asserted that some within the Conservative Party are less enthusiastic, asserting that “we’re supposed to be partners with, not supplicants to, the United States.” Fox said he rebuffed these assertions, and he welcomed the Ambassador’s reassurance that senior U.S. leaders value the UK as an equal partner.

Afghanistan
-----------

¶4. (C/NF) Fox, who accompanied Conservative Party leader David Cameron on a December 4-6 visit to Afghanistan (septel), expressed confidence regarding U.S. leadership in Afghanistan and optimism about the way forward. He noted that he hoped to meet with NSA Jones, Ambassador Eikenberry, and General Petraeus during the December 11-13 Regional Security Summit in Bahrain. Fox also stated that he planned to meet DASD Flournoy in Washington December 18; Fox will visit Washington and New York December 17-20. (Note: In a December 8 Chatham House speech (see paragraph 9), Fox affirmed the importance of the Afghanistan mission to the NATO Alliance and the importance of explaining to the British people with “clarity, conviction, and consistency” “what the national security threats are that compel us to be in Afghanistan.” End Note.)

Iran
----

¶5. (C/NF) Turning to Iran, Fox observed that there are three possible outcomes in Iran: regime change, behavioral change for the regime’s leaders, and “a change of leadership within
the regime.” The first two options “won’t happen” soon, although we could be “in the beginning of the end game.” When regime change comes it will likely be a “bloody end,” Fox stated. The regime’s strong hold on power, its implacable hatred of the U.S. and Israel, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps stranglehold on the economy make it extremely unlikely that the regime will change from within, he said. He predicted that international negotiations with Iran would fail. He said that Iran’s Independence Day in February would provide the next opportunity for the international community to evaluate the strength of Iran’s internal opposition, based on the size of demonstrations. Fox stated that he had recently met with a group of wealthy, Iranian expatriates, most of whom expressed support for Iran’s obtaining a nuclear bomb. “Persian nationalism” more than Islamic fundamentalism is the basis of Iranian popular support for a nuclear weapons program.

¶6. (C/NF) The U.S. and UK need to work together to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, Fox said. He expressed support for the establishment of a U.S. nuclear umbrella in the Middle East. Russia would play a more constructive role in regard to Iran if it began to fear “encirclement” by China and Iran. China could be more helpful under the right circumstances, Fox said. (Note: Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague told the Ambassador in a subsequent meeting (septel) that in his view China would probably not be more helpful in regard to Iran in the foreseeable future, although Russia would likely play a more constructive role. End Note.)

India-Pakistan
--------------

¶7. (C/NF) Turning to India, Fox criticized the Labour government for policies which reinforce the Indian government’s long-held view that HMG’s foreign relations on the subcontinent are “skewed to Pakistan.” Fox predicted this would not be a factor under a Conservative government, since the Conservatives are “less dependent” than the Labour Party on votes from the British-Pakistani community.

NATO
----

¶8. (SBU/NF) During his meeting with the Ambassador, Fox touched on the future of the NATO Alliance, affirming the importance of the ongoing strategic transformation debate and the future of NATO. Fox focused on NATO in a December 8 Chatham House speech on “The Way Forward for NATO.” In those remarks, Fox asserted that “NATO’s mission in Afghanistan has created further debate on NATO’s role and even of NATO’s survival as a defense alliance.” The speech highlights that “neither the financial burden nor the fighting burden is properly shared between NATO allies” and that the pending Strategic Concept should address collective responsibilities. Fox’s speech affirms the importance of strategic nuclear forces to the Alliance, as stated in the 1999 Strategic Concept; the speech commits a future Conservative government to “maintaining Britain’s round-the-clock, independent, submarine-based, and strategic nuclear deterrent.” The speech concludes that, despite its shortcomings, NATO is a “necessity” and “in order to successfully face the threats of the 21st century, NATO is the only way forward.” (Note: The full text of the speech is available at www.chathamhouse.org.uk End Note.)
Visit London’s Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
Susman

07ISLAMABAD1583     2007-04-10 12:12     2010-11-30 21:09     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Islamabad

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SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 04/10/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PK, AF, IZ, IR, ID, MY, SA, LE
SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF TELLS MCCAIN: DON’T PULL OUT OF IRAQ
WITHOUT TRIPARTITE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
REF: ISLAMABAD 1517

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Peter Bodde, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (U) On April 3, President Musharraf met with Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and Representative Richard Renzi (R-AZ), Musharraf’s third U.S. Congressional delegation of the day (reftel). The group,s discussion focused on Iraq, the broader Middle East, and the Pak-Afghan border region.

--------------------------------------------- --
Muslim countries should play lead role in Iraq And help solve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute
--------------------------------------------- --
¶2. (C) Musharraf noted that he and many Middle Eastern leaders were worried that a premature pull-out of U.S. and coalition forces from Iraq would spread sectarian strife throughout the Gulf region. Musharraf underlined the importance of increasing the capacity of the Iraqi armed forces and police. He noted there could be little improvement in the situation in Iraq without broader political participation from the Sunnis. Musharraf agreed with Senator McCain that Muslim countries needed to lead efforts to help Iraq’s Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds reach political consensus before a major withdrawal of coalition troops. Musharraf said he understood U.S. public opinion was against prolonging U.S. presence in Iraq, but hoped U.S. leadership could communicate the importance of the mission in Iraq. Turning to the future of Iraq, Musharraf hoped that Muslim peacekeeping troops (including Pakistanis) could replace U.S. forces under a United Nations umbrella.

¶3. (C) Conflicts outside Iraq also contributed to the unstable situation in the region, Musharraf said. Musharraf noted that in addition to Saudi King Abdullah,s work in forging an Arab consensus on Iraq, he was working on building consensus within the Muslim world on the Palestinian issue ) work that was slowly but surely bringing Syria back into the Arab fold. Alluding to his own outreach to the moderate Muslim world, Musharraf noted there was space for non-Arab nations to play a role on Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and that Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia had agreed to form a united voice to help promote peace in the region. Musharraf said he was the first non-Arab leader invited to address the Arab League Summit.

¶4. (C) Musharraf said he believed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad could play a positive role in both Iraq and Lebanon, and that Assad could be “handled” if the U.S. understood his issues: &If you want him to play ball, he needs comfort on other fronts -- namely, the Golan Heights.8 Turning to another Iraqi neighbor, Musharraf agreed with the delegation that Iran could not be allowed to create further divisions in Iraq.

-------------------------------------
The Pak-Afghan border: Past decisions created present security problem
-------------------------------------
¶5. (C) When asked for his views on Afghanistan, Musharraf
ISLAMABAD 00001583 002 OF 003
said Pakistan was facing the fallout from security decisions made in the 1980s. People who came to fight with the mujahideen against the Soviets settled in Pakistan’s tribal areas and now had families. These people -- mostly Uzbeks and Arabs -- developed links with al Qaeda. Recently, tribal groups in both South and North Waziristan were taking action against Uzbeks and other foreigners because of the foreigners, cruel and high-handed behavior. Pakistan’s military provided covert support in the form of arms and ammunition. Musharraf reported that in South Waziristan, a large group of foreign militants were surrounded on a ridge and would soon surrender.

¶6. (C) Originally, Musharraf said, the Taliban movement was a reaction against growing tribalism and warlordism in Afghanistan. Since Russia and India supported Afghanistan’s (ethnic Tajik) Northern Alliance, Pakistan’s natural ally was the (ethnic Pashtun) Taliban. This all changed after 9/11, Musharraf said, and Pakistan had captured and killed hundreds of al Qaeda fighters near Tora Bora.

--------------------------------------
We’re Going After Militants: Bin Laden May Be Here, But Mullah Omar’s Not
--------------------------------------
¶7. (S/NF) Echoing similar statements he,d made during an earlier meeting with CODEL Tierney (reftel), Musharraf said that although he had no direct evidence, he thought al Qaeda leaders Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri were hiding in Bajaur Agency, since it was in (Afghan militant leader) Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s territory and bordered Afghanistan’s Konar province. The landscape in videos of Bin Laden and Zawahiri looked similar to Bajaur, Musharraf said, and the area provided comfort, high mountains, positive support, and an absence of U.S. troops in neighboring Konar.

¶8. (C) Musharraf voiced concern over Afghan President Karzai,s frequent pronouncements about Pakistan’s &failure8 to capture Taliban leader Mullah Omar in Balochistan’s capital Quetta. &Let me tell you,8 Musharraf emphasized, &Omar would be mad to be in Quetta -- he has too many troops to command in southern Afghanistan to make it feasible. In fact, the only parts of Balochistan where there are Pakistani Taliban are in the province’s Afghan refugee camps, which we are planning to shut down.8 Musharraf said that most Pashtuns in Balochistan were traders and had no reason to join the Taliban. &They want roads to increase their trade, not to fight.8 The same could not be said for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Musharraf said.

¶9. (C) Musharraf said the Taliban were mainly in Afghanistan. Karzai,s policies, Musharraf believed, alienated Afghanistan’s Pashtuns by favoring (ethnic Tajik) Panshiris. After Coalition forces joined the Northern Alliance to oust the Taliban government, there was no change in the ethnic makeup of the victors when it came to planning. Panshiris were disproportionately represented in the government, even though they had never ruled before and were, Musharraf believed, the natural enemy of the country’s majority Pashtuns.
ISLAMABAD 00001583 003 OF 003

--------------------------------------
A New Strategy in the Tribal Areas And the Ethnic Dimension in Afghanistan
--------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Turning to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Musharraf stated that Taliban militants from Afghanistan drew support from Pakistan for re-supply, hospitals, recruitment, and indoctrination of new troops. Musharraf emphasized military force alone could not deny terrorists safe haven in the Tribal Areas over the long term. That was why, Musharraf explained, Pakistan was pursuing a four-pronged strategy that included military, political, development, and administrative elements. The fencing of the Pak-Afghan border in some parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas would reduce some cross-border movement, he said, but it was not enough. Musharraf described development as the most forward-looking ) and in some ways most complex ) part of the strategy. Pakistan was looking for U.S. assistance and expertise.

--------------------------------------------- ---
Pakistan’s Taliban Problem Is An Extremism Issue
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶11. (C) One of Pakistan’s biggest concerns, Musharraf said, was the spread of talibanization, especially into settled and urban areas. Countering talibanization required a well thought out strategy to cleanse society of the Taliban culture and to encourage moderation. Modernization and economic development were the way forward, Musharraf noted. Talibanization was even spreading to Islamabad, as you could see by the recent events at the Red Mosque (reported septel).

--------------------------------------------
Afghanistan’s Poppy Industry Should Go Legal
--------------------------------------------
¶12. (C) In response to McCain’s question about whether Musharraf was worried Afghanistan would become a narco-state, Musharraf answered that he was, especially because if it did it would affect Pakistan. Musharraf thought Afghanistan could follow the example of other countries -- such as India -- where narcotics were purchased legally and channeled into the international pharmaceutical industry. It was a $500-600 million annual industry, Musharraf said, and the profits made from legal poppy sales could go toward poverty alleviation instead of to the Taliban. BODDE

07PARIS1844     2007-05-10 09:09     2010-11-30 21:09     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT ALSO FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017
TAGS: PREL FR EUN IR AF NATO IZ TU UNO LE YI RS
UNMIK
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT ON FOREIGN
POLICY: FIVE IMMEDIATE ISSUES

REF: A. PARIS 1789
¶B. PARIS 921
¶C. PARIS 777
¶D. PARIS 1817
¶E. EMBASSY PARIS DAILY SIPRNET REPORTS

Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign policy played only a negligible
role in the presidential election campaign that concluded May
6, and Sarkozy has relatively little experience in foreign
affairs, despite his tenures as Interior and Finance
Minister. Nonetheless, Sarkozy's personality is such that he
will want to take the stage at the June 6-8 G8 and June 21-22
European summits as a full partner. Instinctively
pro-American and pro-Israeli, Sarkozy is fiercely opposed to
Turkish EU membership. He has promised that his approach to
foreign affairs will be different from Chirac's in its
emphasis on human rights, and has identified Europe, Africa
and the U.S. as his three immediate priorities. That said,
generally speaking, continuity will prevail, reflecting the
non-partisan, consensus support that French foreign policy
has enjoyed during the Fifth Republic. On Europe, his goal
is, by overcoming the current institutional crisis, to
re-impart momentum to European integration and make the EU a
major player on the world stage. On Africa, Sarkozy
advocates increased developmental aid as the offset for
regulating immigration (important for his domestic agenda)
and has repeatedly called for action on Darfur. He has
called for a "Mediterranean Union," to include Turkey and
Israel, as Europe's institutional link to the Middle East and
North Africa. With the U.S., he seeks a relationship based
on renewed confidence and trust that still allows for honest
differences of perspective; most recently, he has pointed to
global climate change (septel) as his major area of policy
difference with the U.S.

¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONT'D: The Deputy Secretary's May 16
meetings in Paris will occur the same day President-elect
Sarkozy assumes office (Sarkozy himself will therefore be
unavailable). Beyond welcoming the prospect of improved
U.S.-French relations, the Deputy Secretary can use his visit
to send a message on five key U.S. foreign policy concerns.
We can welcome Sarkozy's willingness to take a tough line on
Iran, but also will need to impress on him the stakes in
Afghanistan and the importance of France remaining a key
partner there. On Iraq, we can expect Sarkozy to drop the
needling rhetoric on a horizon for U.S. withdrawal, but
having told the President he "wants to help the U.S. get out
of Iraq," we should press him to offer a specific, symbolic
proposal -- such as active French engagement with friendly
Arab governments -- to associate France with our efforts
there. In assuring Sarkozy of strong U.S. support for a
strong Europe, we need to stress the importance we attach to
keeping Turkey's EU accession negotiations going. Finally,
we should stress the importance of a united front against
Russia as Kosovo goes before the UNSC. END SUMMARY.

A NOVICE IN FOREIGN POLICY
--------------------------
¶3. (C) A presidential election campaign dominated by the
domestic change and reform thematic left very little room for
foreign policy. Sarkozy has little foreign policy experience
and speaks only very limited English. Given his strong
character and action-oriented agenda, and his desire to put
France back on center stage, we can nonetheless expect
Sarkozy to move quickly to assert himself as an equal partner
at the upcoming June 6-8 G8 Summit in Germany and the June
21-22 European Council meeting in Brussels. (See ref A for a
discussion of Sarkozy's views on economic and trade issues.)

U.S.-FRIENDLIER, BUT STILL A GAULLIST
-------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Most voters went to the polls May 6 convinced that
President-elect Sarkozy would seek a better relationship with
the U.S., which he explicitly affirmed in his May 6
acceptance speech. Sarkozy's opponents had attempted to use
his September 12, 2006 meeting with President Bush to suggest
that Sarkozy was a U.S. "poodle" who would have supported the
U.S. intervention in Iraq, unlike President Chirac. In a
recent press conference on foreign policy (ref B), Sarkozy
made clear he had supported Chirac's decision. Then and in
his post-election remarks, he nonetheless highlighted the
need for a friendlier tone and more confidence in the
U.S.-French bilateral relationship (and in NATO-EU
relations), in a way that also preserves Gaullist (and EU)
freedom of action. In effect, Sarkozy has already shifted

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the focus of U.S.-French "differences" from Iraq and the
Israeli-Palestinian relationship to climate change and
Turkish membership in the EU (see also refs B, C and D).

EU TOP IMMEDIATE PRIORITY
-------------------------
¶5. (C) Sarkozy's first foreign policy priority will be to
impart new momentum to the EU and show that France is back as
a key EU player. Sarkozy no doubt knows already that his
idea of a simplified treaty is acceptable to London and
Berlin as the best means to avoid new referenda, and he will
move quickly to ensure that a process can begin by the end of
the German EU Presidency that would conclude at the latest by
the end of the French Presidency in December 2008, in advance
of European parliamentary elections in early 2009. Immediate
progress on this front would go a long way to overcome the
sense of malaise and indirection stemming from President
Chirac's failure to push through the referendum on the
Constitutional Treaty in May 2005. Sarkozy wants a European
Union that is a veritable player on the world stage, with
coherent policies to guarantee its energy supplies and create
buffers against globalization while harnessing its creative
energies.

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT AND DARFUR
------------------------------
¶6. (c) Sarkozy lacks the web of personal relationships with
African (and Middle Eastern) leaders that, in particular,
Chirac used to direct French foreign policy. Sarkozy intends
to make a virtue of his less personalized approach, reviewing
France's exposure based on a hard-headed re-evaluation of
French national interests. Sarkozy has identified Africa as
one of his three foreign policy priority areas (along with
the EU and U.S.), in line with his domestic campaign focus on
uncontrolled immigration to France. His interest in
development assistance for Africa appears aimed primarily at
offsetting Africans' concern over Sarkozy's domestic
political goal of reducing immigration from Africa -- and as
part of a more comprehensive international effort to address
conditions in Africa that give rise to mass emigration from
the continent. A review of French national interests may
augur a lessening of French military engagement across Africa
or an increased desire to see the EU take over some of its
missions. Sarkozy has called repeatedly for action on
Darfur, including prosecution of Sudanese leaders by the
International Criminal Court, but it is unclear at this stage
what concrete steps he might otherwise propose.

MEDITERRANEAN UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST
---------------------------------------
¶7. (C) We can expect Sarkozy to push hard his signature
"vision" issue, the idea of a "Mediterranean Union," to
include Turkey and Israel, which would supersede the EU
Barcelona process and create an area modeled after, and
having a privileged partnership with, the European Union.
Sarkozy has bluntly declared that pursuing Middle East peace
is not incompatible with ensuring Israel's security, while
assuring nervous Arab leaders -- most recently Egyptian
President Mubarak -- that his policies toward the Middle East
would be largely in synch with Chirac's. On the whole, it
seems likely that continuity will prevail, although the
traditionally pro-Arab MFA may have to accommodate Sarkozy's
greater emphasis on Israel's security needs. It remains to
be seen to what extent Sarkozy will attempt to leverage his
pro-Israel orientation for more leverage for France and/or
the EU in the Middle East peace process.

MORE HUMAN RIGHTS
-----------------
¶8. (C) Sarkozy has indicated very publicly -- enough so that
it is reasonable to assume that he will follow through --
that he intends to place more emphasis on human rights
issues. He has made clear that he would be less likely than
Chirac to accommodate even Russia or China in the name of
realpolitik, citing the situation in Chechnya and his
opposition to lifting of the EU arms embargo on China. A
consistent emphasis on human rights could have a significant
impact on French policy in Africa and the Middle East.

IMMEDIATE MESSAGES: IRAN, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN,
EU/TURKEY, KOSOVO/RUSSIA
--------------------------------------------
¶9. (C) We believe that, beginning with the May 15-16 visit
to France of the Deputy Secretary, the USG should reach out
quickly to engage the new French government. Beyond
welcoming prospects for an improved U.S.-French relationship,
we need to send messages on the following five key issues:

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Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, EU/Turkey, and Kosovo/Russia. If
time permits, the Deputy Secretary may also wish to review
the state of play on Darfur.

-- IRAN: Sarkozy views Iran as the most serious
international threat, and he will be at least as tough-minded
a partner as Chirac has been. He has expressed a willingness
to tighten financial sanctions against Iran. While he
prefers acting under the authority of the UNSC, we believe he
could support resorting to measures outside the UN framework
if necessary. The late-May consideration of next steps in
the UNSC offers a first opportunity to work with the new
government, and to test and shape its approach.

-- AFGHANISTAN: MFA Political Director Araud has underscored
the need for the USG to engage the new government to dispel
the widespread impression, shared by Chirac, that Afghanistan
may be a losing cause. Under the impact of the Taliban
kidnapping of French citizens, Sarkozy recently stated that
France's role in Afghanistan -- now that the anti-terrorism
campaign has largely ended and French Special Forces
withdrawn from OEF -- was no longer "decisive" and that
French forces would not remain there permanently. The
Taliban threat against the life of the one remaining French
hostage is still directly tied to a demand for France's
military withdrawal form Afghanistan. We will need to
impress on Sarkozy the importance of French perseverance over
the mid-term (including through more purposeful public
statements about the stakes there) and, as the French have
stressed to us on Bosnia or Kosovo, the importance of "in
together and out together," which also applies to national
caveats on the use of forces.

-- IRAQ: Chirac's departure from the scene should enable
France to put U.S.-French differences not only aside, but
behind us. Sarkozy, like most other French politicians, has
said he would have handled our differences in a less
confrontational matter. This does not change the fact that
he (now, in any case) believes Chirac made the right decision
in opposing the war. Moreover, concern about feeding the
"President Bush's poodle" accusation might militate against
any dramatic public change in GOF policy, at least in the
immediate future, with French parliamentary elections
looming. That said, we should take him at his word that he
"wants to help the U.S. get out of Iraq." Our goal in the
near term should be to push the French toward a more positive
declaratory policy, working with the new government to
identify a symbolic turning of the page on France's "let the
U.S. live with it" attitude of the Chirac/Villepin years.
One possibility would be active French engagement on Iraq
with Arab governments of the region.

-- EU/TURKEY: Publicly and privately, we should encourage
France to reassume its rightful place in Europe, as part of
our broader message that a re-invigorated Europe is in the
U.S. interest. If we decide to participate in an ESDP police
mission in Kosovo, we should use this as an example -- one
for them to follow -- of choosing the institutional framework
for joint action to match the needs of the situation. Luc
Ferry, a former Education Minister, political commentator and
close friend of Sarkozy's, has urged that we attempt to
change Sarkozy's opposition to Turkey's EU membership. While
a change of heart appears extremely unlikely given Sarkozy's
political identification with opposition to Turkish
membership and his categorical statements on the issue, we
should seek to persuade him to temper his post-election
rhetoric, allow accession negotiations to proceed, and at
least not close the door dramatically and completely at this
time.

-- KOSOVO/RUSSIA: We should stress the importance of a
united front in the UN Security Council on Kosovo's
independence. We would welcome a more active French role in
persuading Russia not to veto a UNSC Resolution.

ENGAGING THE SARKOZY ADMINISTRATION
-----------------------------------
¶10. (C) We will know more about the likely foreign policy
orientations of the new Sarkozy government once he names a
foreign minister and key advisors are in place. We would
expect him to designate someone of proven competence (such as
former FM Alain Juppe, Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie,
or former FM Michel Barnier). There is no reason to believe
that Sarkozy will come into office with the intent of
seriously challenging the Gaullist consensus underlying
French foreign policy. The MFA will work overtime to ensure
continuity in French policy positions. Over time, and as he

PARIS 00001844 004 OF 004


gains experience, Sarkozy is certain to assert his authority
over foreign policy more directly. It still remains to be
seen whether Sarkozy will create -- as proposed by Pierre
Lellouche -- the French equivalent of a National Security
Council that would supplant the Presidential diplomatic cell
and assume a larger role in coordinating French foreign
policy; we have no indication Sarkozy has personally signed
on to such a move. It is also unclear whether the
Presidency's Africa Cell, which has long enjoyed a privileged
position, will survive in its present form. Sarkozy's desire
to move away from Elysee-centered personal diplomacy with
African leaders may mean the days of this bureaucratic
post-colonial throwback may be numbered.

¶11. (C) Although Sarkozy will initially be focused on
domestic reforms and relaunching the EU, he will also grasp
every opportunity to showcase his leadership of a
re-invigorated France on the international scene, confident
of its place in the world. This entails -- and he will not
be shy about repeating this point publicly -- establishing a
relationship of trust and working together productively with
the United States. The Deputy Secretary's May 15-16 visit
will offer the first occasion to make our views known to the
new Administration, as it comes into office (unfortunately,
this also means that Sarkozy himself will be unavailable for
meetings). The Defense Secretary's June 5-6 visit to France
will offer an excellent opportunity to engage the leaders of
the newly-constituted government.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON

07PARIS4357     2007-10-26 10:10     2010-11-30 21:09     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 11 PARIS 004357

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
NSC FOR NSA HADLEY
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR, NEA, SA, EAP, PM, E, EB, G, WHA, AND AF

EO 12958 DECL: 10/23/2017
TAGS PREL, OVIP, NATO, UNO, YI, RS, IR, IS, LE, FR

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SARKOZY’S FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE
U.S.: POLICY COORDINATION WITH A SELF-CONSCIOUSLY INDEPENDENT FRANCE

Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton for reasons 1.4. (b) & (d) .

¶1. (SBU) Introduction and Summary: The Nicolas Sarkozy who arrives in Washington November 6 is in robust political health. He completely dominates the politics of France. All the levers of institutional power in a highly centralized state are at his disposal. He remains committed to a revitalization of France, through a reform of policies and laws that have acted as a break on French economic growth. The challenge now is to put his ideas and programs into effect. Off to a quick start this summer, with the implementation of a first series of reform measures, Sarkozy is now beginning to feel the full force of French resistance to change. His public support as reflected in the polls is high, but has slipped of late. The political impact of the first direct challenge, last week’s national transportation strike, is not yet clear, but strikes in other sectors are threatening, raising the possibility of the kind of crisis atmosphere Sarkozy had hoped to avoid, given his electoral mandate and professed openness to dialogue. The image of a well-oiled, disciplined machine has suffered, as Sarkozy has repeatedly rebuked members of his team, including his own Prime Minister, raising questions about a thin-skinned and authoritarian personal style. The concentration of power and decision-making in the Presidency has made for uneven decision-making and follow-through. The prospect of slower domestic and international economic growth and a tight GOF budget have narrowed his room for maneuver. His appointment to the cabinet of women and minority representatives and the more populist style of his Presidency have been well-received, but his omnipresence and hyper-activity risk overexposure and Sarkozy-fatigue. Finally, freshly divorced from Cecilia, he is deprived of someone who (by his own account) was crucial to his personal equilibrium and served as a valued political sounding board.

¶2. (SBU) While not central to his Presidential campaign, Sarkozy has quickly asserted French leadership in Europe and staked out new positions and a role for France on the most pressing international issues. He believes that a relationship of trust and close cooperation with the U.S. enhances France’s ability to make an impact -- toward the achievement of what are in most cases common objectives. After five months in office he (and his foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner) have begun to make their mark. They have overseen a dramatic shift in French policy on Iraq, reversed declining French support in Afghanistan, have set in motion a possible “return” to NATO, toughened France’s approach to Iran and also Russia, and promised a new one toward Africa. The top foreign policy issue for Sarkozy is the environment, which he has embraced as a headline issue, linking foreign and domestic policy. Sarkozy and Kouchner also assign priority to Kosovo, Lebanon, and Darfur. Sarkozy’s decision to assist the Dutch in Afghanistan is the latest illustration of a willingness to push a cautious bureaucracy and military and to break the mold of Chirac-era policy. Despite, and perhaps because of, convergence with the U.S. on key issues, and the dramatic improvement in the tone of the relationship, Sarkozy has identified specific areas of disagreement with the U.S.

¶3. (C) We continue to believe that Sarkozy represents an important opportunity. Energetic, in full command at home, he is determined to make a mark on the international scene. As distinct from Chirac, who advocated multi-polar containment of U.S. hegemony, Sarkozy is well-disposed personally to the U.S. He wants close policy cooperation with us, but in a relationship that gives France its full due as an independent player. “Alliance, not alignment” is the way he usually puts it, although he is not beyond striking a more defiant pose, as recently in Moscow, when he stated publicly that he would not be a “vassal” of the U.S. He will also continue to highlight differences on selected issues --

PARIS 00004357 002 OF 011
such as the environment, GMOs and Turkey’s relationship with Europe -- as demonstrations of France’s independent policy course. His emphasis of French independence makes less controversial at home both the warming up of the bilateral relationship and the bold policy decisions in such areas as Iraq, NATO, and Afghanistan. A distinct French approach, supportive on many issues, but not in lock-step, is in our interest. A partner with the international bone fides that France retains, as a leading European power close to but proudly independent of the U.S., is one that can enlarge our ability to effect positive outcomes internationally.

¶4. (U) In addition to setting the scene for Sarkozy’s first official visit to Washington, this message iterates the state of play in a long list of issues where opportunities and challenges abound in U.S.-France relations. End Summary
PART ONE: SARKOZY FIVE MONTHS INTO HIS PRESIDENCY

¶5. (SBU) Nicolas Sarkozy’s visit to Washington follows an exceptionally long “state of grace” (as the French call a political honeymoon), one that only began to peter out in October, the fifth month of Sarkozy’s Presidency. Through the summer and well into the new French political year that begins in September, Sarkozy seemed incapable of a political misstep. His poll ratings set records both vertically (level) and horizontally (durability). For a politician long attacked as an extremist and a divider, this was no small feat.

¶6. (SBU) Sarkozy’s success is attributable to several factors. While Candidate Sarkozy ran a hard right election campaign geared to winning over the 15-20 percent of the votes that Jean-Marie LePen’s National Front had captured in recent years, President Sarkozy quickly made clear he wanted to be a President of all the French, not just the political right. He also made clear that his ambition would not be satisfied with his election to the Presidency. He was determined to use the office to get France moving again -- unleashing its economic potential, allowing it to surmount long-term budgetary, financial and social challenges. He would do this by making good on his program of concrete reform measures, which had received a mandate from the French electorate.

¶7. (SBU) Immediately after his election in May, Sarkozy embarked on a policy of inclusiveness (“ouverture”), bringing in leading figures of the opposition, including the Socialist Party (such as Foreign Minister Kouchner), the non-Gaullist center-right, and civil society. In addition, he shattered the white-male cast of previous French governments with his appointments of women and minorities, including to key ministries. On the strength of his electoral mandate, and with this inclusiveness as cover, Sarkozy moved swiftly, and with virtually no Socialist opposition, to implement his reform program, moving five major pieces of legislation through Parliament by early October. Sarkozy seemed well on his way to proving that France could embrace change, and that he could imprint on it the “culture of results” that would be the basis for less painful, self-renewing change in the future.

¶8. (SBU) Over the past few weeks, shadows have entered this unnaturally bright picture. Current polling suggests that while support for Sarkozy remains at historically high levels (in the low 60’s, depending on the poll), there has been a slow erosion in his standing, which has perhaps accelerated in the past few weeks. In the first serious push-back against a key reform, French public transport unions engaged in a country-wide strike on October 18 over the generous pensions available to public transport workers. Sarkozy

PARIS 00004357 003 OF 011
insists that this time unions will not be able to scuttle this or any other part of the government’s reform program -- while continuing to stress the need for dialogue, not government fiat, as the mode of action. However, international economic uncertainty affords Sarkozy far less room for maneuver as he seeks to reduce both government expenditures and taxes to unleash economic activity, while not fatally exacerbating France’s already alarming debt situation.

¶9. (SBU) Sarkozy’s unexpected willingness to compromise on several of his reform measures may signal recognition of the hard economic realities. However, he risks diminishing this image of determination and command -- key components of his political success thus far. Sarkozy appeared critical of both his Finance Minister and his Prime Minister in turn when the former called for “greater rigor” in state spending and the latter described the state as “bankrupt” in parliamentary hearings. Sarkozy, fearing that alarmist pronouncements could undermine the public’s confidence, risks creating an impression of friction and hesitation at the top. Sarkozy’s close personal association with policy reform has reduced his ability to cast aside the Prime Minister or other officials should his policies lose public support.

¶10. (SBU) The transport unions are but one of the constituencies Sarkozy will offend in shaking the French economy loose from policies that have held back growth and bloated public spending. As he pushes for reforms that make it easier to fire workers, shrink the size of the state (whose spending represents 52 percent of GDP) by cutting the civil service, and open up retail markets to more competition, he can expect further pushback from well-entrenched constituencies. Sarkozy has set in motion a series of negotiations on these issues that ultimately could lead to important systemic change. But the real impact will only become clear once the negotiations conclude -- probably in early 2008 -- and the government is forced to make politically difficult decisions.

¶11. (SBU) France’s broader economic environment will not make the reform process any easier. Having promised the electorate measures that would bring an extra percentage point of growth to the economy, the Sarkozy government finds itself at a delicate point in the business cycle. The government has already scaled back earlier 2007 growth estimates, and most private sector economists believe the government’s 2008 estimates are inflated. Although the fiscal stimulus from tax cuts passed this summer may give the president a short-term boost, he is unlikely to enjoy the political benefit of a strong growth environment in which to pursue his supply-side reforms. He has also promised the French people increased purchasing power, which will be hard to achieve. Some of this he blames on the strength of the dollar.

¶12. (SBU) Sarkozy is keen on unleashing market forces to reinvigorate the French economy, but he is less than laissez-faire when it comes to restructuring French industry. The French state owns a far smaller share of the economy than was once the case, but it still has effective control of energy and other key sectors. Sarkozy’s industrial policy seems to be based on facilitating the emergence of key French firms as leaders in their industries in Europe and globally. While European experience with national champions industrial policies is shaky, the French have done comparatively well of late. Sarkozy does not hesitate to reduce state ownership in these deals. The merger of Gaz de France with Suez creates a European giant in gas and energy but also reduces the French stake in its gas company from 80 percent to 30 percent.

¶13. (SBU) At the macroeconomic level, Sarkozy has been highly critical of the European Central Bank’s tight money, strong Euro policy and he is all but ignoring previously
PARIS 00004357 004 OF 011
agreed Eurozone commitments to brining budgets back into balance. In both cases, Eurozone partners have little recourse and France can ride for free on the budget discipline of its partners, at least for a while. In the meantime, the President’s approach plays well at home, and often appears designed for domestic consumption.

¶14. (SBU) The U.S.-French economic relationship remains robust, with over $1 billion in commercial transactions per day taking place between the two countries’ firms. During President Sarkozy’s visit, CEOs from some of the most important of these will meet, for the first time in several years as the French-American Business Council (FABC) to exchange views on policy priorities. U.S. firms have been almost unanimously positive about the Sarkozy government. Nonetheless there are a number of regulatory unknowns that could potentially impact U.S. commercial interests. Among these are the GOF’s evolving views on genetically-modified organisms, IPR in the digital environment and pricing policy as it relates to pharmaceutical spending.

¶15. (C) On permanent overdrive and intense in the best of times, Sarkozy’s recent divorce raises questions about his ability to maintain his equilibrium and focus. Sarkozy has himself spoken of his dependence on Cecilia -- “my source of strength and my Achilles Heel,” as he put it. During their separation in 2005, a highly irritable, darker Sarkozy came into view -- the same one that reappeared at the Lisbon Summit the day after the announcement of the divorce. How much Cecilia really anchored him, personally and politically, should soon become evident, but we are betting on Sarkozy’s ability to bounce back.

¶16. (C) Notwithstanding the debate swirling around him and his slight decline in the polls, Sarkozy’s political health remains strong. He controls all the main levers of power: the Presidency, the Parliament, the dominant political party, and the omnipresent agents of the French state. The opposition Socialists are in disarray, incapable for the moment of taking unified policy positions. Sarkozy is in a position to reassert French leadership in Europe and in international affairs generally. He (and Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner) have also begun to make their mark, unevenly, on French policy. The foreign policy equivalent of his domestic “rupture” are his Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and possibly NATO. On Iraq, Sarkozy and Kouchner have made a dramatic difference, offering political support and associating France with reconstruction efforts -- and prompting surprisingly little opposition or criticism. On NATO, Sarkozy has challenged his bureaucracy -- and the U.S. -- to find a way to fashion a win-win approach for NATO and ESDP that would entail a full French “return” to NATO, although the specifics of Sarkozy’s conditions have not yet been worked through. Sarkozy will be calculating the political cost of any shift on NATO, knowing that he would be breaking a foreign policy consensus that has long enjoyed the support of the Gaullist right, much of the center, and all of the left. Other issues already showing Sarkozy’s imprint include: Russia, where he is less willing to accommodate and is increasingly concerned about Russian intentions and objectives; the Middle East, where he has introduced a new emphasis on Israel’s security into the inhospitable ground of France’s “politique Arabe”; and, Africa, where Sarkozy appears intent on finally making a break from France’s post-colonial reflexes and relationships. Other high priority issues which Sarkozy will also want to discuss include his top issue, climate change, along with Iran, Kosovo, Burma, Darfur, counterterrorism and climate change. Sarkozy’s approach to these and other international issues of concern to both France and the U.S. are discussed in the second section of this cable.

PART TWO:
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KEY POLICY ISSUES: WHERE THEY ARE AND WHERE WE WANT THEM TO BE

¶17. (C) The White House has already publicly enumerated key topics on the visit agenda: Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East Peace, Lebanon, Darfur, Burma, Kosovo, counterterrorism, and the promotion of democracy. Herein follows a snapshot of where the French are on each of them and on some additional areas, and where we would like to move them. Our list is topped by thee priority policy issues -- Iraq, NATO, and Russia -- sufficiently sensitive not to have been publicly highlighted in the White House announcement, along with Afghanistan, followed by climate change, which will likely be highest on Sarkozy’s list.

¶18. (C) Iraq: The sudden and dramatic French decision, days following the President’s meeting in Kennebunkport, to break with previous policy and reengage with Iraq has uncertain paternity -- with both Sarkozy and Kouchner claiming credit. Following Kouchner’s three-day visit to Iraq in August, the GOF has already hosted both President Talibani and FM Zebari. Last week, Sarkozy told Talibani that France wanted to help Iraq across the board -- politically, diplomatically, educationally, and culturally. French assistance will not include any commitment of French troops in Iraq, but it could include training for Iraqi security/police units as well as counterterrorism forces. The French have promised other, initially symbolic measures such as opening a diplomatic office in the northern city of Irbil and aid for a hospital in the same area. Kouchner has already pressed the EU to become more active in multinational efforts at reconstruction, which France would like the UN to head up. Any U.S. diplomatic conference or initiative could garner French support: Kouchner plans to attend the upcoming ministerial meeting in Istanbul of Iraq’s “neighbors.” In fact, the French are just starting to figure out how they can best help Iraq, especially to relieve what they see as a harsh humanitarian situation. Sarkozy would likely be open to detailed discussion on this topic: Given his and Kouchner’s identification with the new policy, and abiding lack of enthusiasm in at least parts of the bureaucracy, he is in fact the best place to start. Regarding the U.S. role, Sarkozy and Kouchner do not share their predecessors’ fixation on our continued troop presence. They understand and acknowledge the reality that a hasty pullout of U.S. troops would lead to a worsening, not a lessening, of the violence with potentially grave implications for the larger region. We should push Sarkozy to implement humanitarian and reconstruction programs in Iraq, starting with an already promised medical clinic in the Kurdish north, as soon as possible.

¶19. (C) Iran: Sarkozy’s blunt language on the “unacceptability” of a militarily nuclear Iran, and the need to maintain maximum pressure on the Iranian regime over its nuclear program has only been exceeded by that of his foreign minister. The degree to which France has taken a public lead with the EU to press for additional European sanctions should the UNSC be unable to act has been as impressive as has Sarkozy’s willingness to confront Russian President Putin over this issue. French officials make the point that Paris has a “normal” diplomatic relationship with Tehran despite sharp disagreements on the nuclear question. In this context, the French have particularly valued their quiet dialogue over Lebanon, which has convinced them that, by contrast with Syria, Iran has no interest in renewed internal violence that might accompany failure to elect a new president. Sarkozy has proven impervious to Iranian blandishments aimed at softening France’s position or even to break it away from the P-5 1 group, much to Iran’s chagrin. The meetings with Sarkozy offer an opportunity to bolster France’s tough line, and it can be expected that Sarkozy will want to get a sense from the President of his analysis of our

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ability to influence Iranian choices, and how best to maintain international pressure toward that end. Having just met with Israeli PM Olmert to discuss the same issue, Sarkozy will be keen to understand the limits of our patience while we pursue the diplomatic track, which, like us, France prefers to exhaust before considering military options.

¶20. (C) NATO: In one of his first acts as President, Sarkozy launched a defense “white paper” commission to review France’s defense and security priorities; one component of the report (expected in March 2008) is a review of France’s relationship with NATO. The defense white paper could set the stage for a possible full re-integration into the NATO military command. President Sarkozy and Defense Minister Morin launched a public debate over a deeper French role in the Alliance in September in two major foreign policy speeches. Sarkozy clarified that French rapprochement to NATO would be tied to two conditions:
1) strengthening European defense structures by developing Europe’s own capabilities to plan and carry out defense and security operations, and
2) seeking French representation in the highest “decision making posts of NATO.” The MFA and defense establishment uniformly caution us against raised expectations, with some in the Sarkozy Administration (reportedly including Prime Minister Fillon) concerned that abrupt moves toward NATO could be controversial domestically. All, beginning with Sarkozy, argue that, at a minimum, ESDP needs to be strengthened in parallel. The idea seems to be that a French embrace of NATO will ease U.S. concerns about a more robustly structured European defense, while progress on that front will help ease opposition at home to France’s “return” to NATO. Sarkozy will likely use his speech before Congress to further refine his public approach, casting France’s willingness to move ahead in terms of working with the U.S. as an independent ally and partner (not automatically “aligned” to U.S. positions). We believe this visit offers an unprecedented opportunity to identify with Sarkozy the common ground on which a mutually beneficial “bargain” on NATO and European defense might be elaborated. In addition to addressing the substance of Sarkozy’s two “conditions,” we will want to learn how open he is to modifying France’s narrowly military, Europe-focused vision of NATO, and whether he will be on a sufficiently fast track to implement or in some way foreshadow elements of a “bargain” at Bucharest in April.


¶21. (C) Afghanistan: After a moment of hesitation during his Presidential campaign, Sarkozy now publicly highlights the importance of French efforts in Afghanistan. France has recently stepped up military commitments by deploying 3 additional Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) to complement the 2,000 military personnel (ISAF and OEF) now deployed (largely in and around Kabul). Significantly, Sarkozy recently responded positively to the Dutch Prime Minister’s pleas for a French presence in Uruzgan, needed to secure parliamentary approval for renewing the Netherlands’ participation in ISAF. In agreeing to deploy a French OMLT, Sarkozy again demonstrated his willingness to move ahead of more cautious advisors and a bureaucracy that prefers slow adaptation to bold moves. France has taken other decisions to bolster its presence in Afghanistan including moving six French Mirage planes from Dushanbe to Kandahar. On September 10, the French and Germans reaffirmed plans to support the German-led EU police training mission in Afghanistan despite delays. On July 30, SACEUR officially requested six medium-lift helicopters to provide rotary-wing support in ISAF (to replace the U.S. helicopters which are scheduled to depart early 2008). France is considering still this request. We should use the opportunity of the visit to persuade the French to broaden and deepen their efforts in Afghanistan, including by standing up a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). We understand the Presidency favors this proposal, while civilian leadership at the MOD opposes a French PRT. Sarkozy may echo recent MFA and MOD

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calls for a more “comprehensive Afghanistan strategy,” integrating military support and civilian reconstruction, and including a timeline for shifting the burden from the international coalition to the Government of Afghanistan.

¶22. (SBU) Environment/Climate Change: Climate Change: On his election day, Sarkozy called for a greater U.S leadership role on climate issues. He will want to come out of his meeting with the President able to say that he again pushed the President to lead. The Embassy, backed closely by Washington agencies, has impressed on not only Sarkozy and his staff, but also officials across France that the U.S. has been leading and continues to lead in the fight against climate change. We’ve impressed on them -- and Sarkozy should be told again -- that the U.S. has spent $37 billion in the past six years -- more than any other country -- for climate science and energy research. We’ve developed new international partnerships, part of a real strategy of international engagement to reduce carbon emissions. We’ve shown the French that even with considerably greater economic and population growth than in Europe, we’re doing a better job at reducing both energy intensity and carbon emissions. After the President’s Major Economies Meeting (MEM) in late September in Washington, French officials offered to host the next meeting while expressing some disappointment with both the lack of agreement on a post-Kyoto emissions goal and U.S. reluctance regarding market-based cap and trade measures. Areas of potential conflict include concerns that a failure for a broad adoption of similar carbon reduction schemes will put European industry at a competitive disadvantage and the possible French advocacy of a European imposed carbon tax on imported goods. Despite extensive U.S.-French collaboration in developing next generation climate-friendly technologies, the French also criticize what they see as U.S. over-reliance on yet-to-be-developed technologies (carbon capture and storage, second generation bio-fuels, and advanced nuclear) to address emissions. France is skeptical that China and India and other major emerging economies will take steps to reduce emissions unless the U.S. moves first. This is an opportunity to convince Sarkozy that we take this issue seriously and have a concrete plan to make real progress.

¶23. (C) Democracy Promotion/Burma: Under President Sarkozy, the French position on Burma has converged with that of the U.S. France vigorously condemned the regime’s crackdown on peaceful protesters; pushed through as UNSC president a presidential statement supporting the democracy movement; supported toughening EU sanctions; and, bilaterally pressed ASEAN members to take a tougher stand on Burma. FM Kouchner will have visited ASEAN countries and China in the week before Sarkozy’s visit to Washington to push the Burmese leadership to reconcile with Aung San Suu Kyi and the political opposition. While Sarkozy seems forward-leaning (he reportedly considered French disinvestment before being dissuaded by advisors), thus far France remains unprepared to implement unilateral sanctions. Sarkozy, however, has urged French companies to freeze future investments. In our efforts to work with France to promote democracy, we should appeal to Sarkozy to redouble French efforts within the EU to push for tough sanctions against the Junta and for measures in support of the democracy movement.

¶24. (C) Russia: During his first presidential visit to Russia on October 9-10, Sarkozy’s advisors were reportedly struck by Putin’s defiant and distrustful attitude toward the U.S. and his “revisionist” desire to dismantle or undermine the perceived anti-Russian institutional framework -- regional and international -- that has prevailed since the fall of the Soviet Union. Sarkozy made little or no progress with Putin on a broad range of topics including Iran, missile defense, Georgia and Kosovo. Sarkozy’s positions tracked with U.S. views except on Georgia, where he favors future status that is short of NATO membership. Sarkozy’s visit to Moscow highlights a sea-change in Franco-Russian relations

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from the Chirac era. Sarkozy has abandoned Chirac’s notion of Russia as a counterweight to the U.S., and does not shy away from directly addressing difficult issues, including democracy, human rights and rule of law problems in Russia, Chechnya and energy policies. Sarkozy, for example, took the unprecedented (for a French President) step of visiting human rights activists while in Moscow. France is concerned about both Putin’s increasingly authoritarian style and Russia’s increasing willingness to defy international opinion, as on CFE and Georgia. Sarkozy is also less willing than Chirac to allow energy security and trade priorities to dominate France’s appoach. That said, the French never fail to remind us of Russia’s relative proximity and France’s and Europe’s need to come to terms with a newly assertive Russia. Sarkozy will want to address how the U.S. can work with France, in cooperation with its major European partners, to find a new modus vivendi with Russia. We should use the meetings with Sarkozy to solidify a common approach of tough engagement with Russia and highlight the need for the closest cooperation on four related subjects: Georgia, Kosovo, Missile Defense and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.

¶25. (C/NF) Georgia: In Moscow October 9-10, Sarkozy told Putin that France opposes full NATO membership for Georgia (although we have been assured he did not address MAP for Georgia with him). High-level French interlocutors have emphasized in recent meetings that France remains open to “something less than membership.” The GOF has maintained that NATO membership “should not create new lines of division” and that territorial conflicts should be resolved prior to membership -- and that Georgia does not meet these criteria. France is considering whether NATO could offer Georgia a different kind of status and a different approach to regional security, possibly combined with incentives including abolishing visas with the EU. While we are aware of reports that Sarkozy told Georgian President Saakashvili that he supports MAP for Georgia, the GOF continues to oppose MAP which would, in its view, create additional tensions with Russia and exacerbate Georgia’s problems with its separatist regions. It also talks about the need to define the territorial limits of NATO and its Article 5 collective security obligations.

¶26. (C) Kosovo: This is an opportunity for the President to reaffirm Sarkozy’s commitment to an independent Kosovo. Sarkozy has stated numerous times that he supports Kosovo’s independence and has instructed FM Kouchner to actively seek EU consensus on the matter. The French also remind us from time to time that Kosovo is a European issue which Europeans bear primary responsibility for solving. The GOF is pessimistic that Serbia and Kosovo will come to a status agreement and is working closely with the U.S. and the Contact Group on post-December 10 actions. The French remain concerned that while EU member-states may agree to not publicly oppose Kosovo’s independence, the EU may fail to reach consensus on a legal basis for an ESDP mission in Kosovo. The GOF has accepted UNSCR 1244 as a basis for an international force in Kosovo and agrees with the U.S. that it would not be advantageous to seek a new UNSCR. Sarkozy lobbied Putin in Moscow for more Russian flexibility, but received no commitments. The U.S. and EU, Sarkozy will argue, must publicly demonstrate that a good faith effort was made to come to an agreement. The French are not prepared to recognize independence before the end of 2007 and are hopeful that the U.S. will assist in convincing the Kosovars that it is in their interest to be patient with the EU. Sarkozy will likely ask that the U.S. work closely with Kosovar authorities to take a coordinated (U.S, EU, Kosovo) approach to Kosovo’s now almost inevitable unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), and avoid dramatic rhetoric that will further embarrass Serbia, encourage similar UDIs by Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and put internal political pressure on EU states like Greece and Cyprus to publicly oppose Kosovo’s

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independence.

¶27. (C) Missile Defense: The French agree that Russia’s objections to the planned system are politically driven, reflecting a Russian view of its relationship with its former satellites that is at once “revisionist” but is also informed by real fears of NATO encirclement. The GOF is interested in U.S. plans for NATO to adopt a complementary system to protect the exposed southern flank of Europe from short- and medium-range threat, although it has warned that there is “not one Euro” allocated to pay for such a system. Sarkozy will be interested in learning of the status of U.S.-Russian discussions and our analysis of prospects for bringing Moscow around to support a cooperative effort. We should urge Sarkozy to use his leadership position in Europe to promote understanding of the true nature and scope of the MD initiative, one that in no way threatens Russia.

¶28. (C) CFE: The French government remains concerned over the Russian threat to suspend participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in December and strongly supports a unified Allied position in support of the U.S. “parallel actions” plan. FM Kouchner recently wrote to Secretary Rice to propose an informal CFE seminar in Paris on
SIPDIS November 5-6 to promote constructive dialogue leading to a comprehensive political solution. These efforts are seen as key to keeping allied solidarity and building pressure on Russia to recognize the consequences of pulling out of a major arms control treaty. Despite these efforts, the French are increasingly pessimistic; Political Director Gerard Araud was told recently in Moscow that “the decision was already made” by Putin and the MOD to suspend participation, due in part to Russian views that it is “humiliating” to have flank limits imposed on Russian forces within its own borders. We should welcome French initiatives to help resolve the CFE issue and continue our close collaboration.

¶29. (C) Lebanon: Sarkozy has not been as closely associated as FM Kouchner with French efforts to help Lebanon elect a new president and emerge from its present political crisis, but he has played a key supporting role. Initially unimpressed with the March 14 majority leaders he met, Sarkozy?s view of Saad Hariri has improved with subsequent meetings. After their last session, Sarkozy authorized announcement of France?s tranche of more than $6 million for the Special Tribunal, which France had been withholding pending a formal request for contributions by the UN Secretary-General. Our close consultations with the French
SIPDIS over Lebanon continue, although we differ over tactics and the risks attached to any strategy that would allow the majority to elect a president via simple majority. The French emphasize finding a “consensus” candidate acceptable to all Lebanese and external parties and place more trust than we believe wise in Lebanese parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri, despite his association with the pro-Syrian minority. While the French have revived limited contact with Syria to discuss Lebanon, we do not believe they intend to go further at this stage. We will want to discuss with Sarkozy how to keep pressure on the Lebanese to elect a president by the November 24 deadline without compromising the gains we have made over the past two years in terms of reducing Syrian influence and reasserting Lebanese independence. We will want to impress on him that the election of a President -- whether by majority of consensus -- by November 24 is a must; fear of the repercussions of election of a President by a “mere” majority should not be ruled out if it is the only way to prevent a void that the Syrians would only be too happy to fill.

¶30. (C) Middle East Peace Process: Sarkozy will want to hear about our efforts to convene a regional meeting in support of Israeli/Palestinian efforts at achieving a two-state solution. The French have generally supported our efforts and not tried to get out in front. They are,
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however, eager to play some sort of role. Sarkozy has taken to using his bona fides as a “friend of Israel” to call on it for more “creativity” and “gestures” toward the Palestinians in the run-up to the meeting. The GOF recently announced its intention to host a donor’s conference for humanitarian assistance to help the Palestinian people -- as an end in itself and in support of the political process. Sarkozy will mostly be in a listening mode, though as someone who has sought since taking office to underscore his readiness to listen at least as attentively to the Israeli point of view as the Arab one.

¶31. (C) France-EU: President Sarkozy was instrumental in re-activating the moribund political reform process in the European Union with the June negotiation for a shortened “reform treaty” that will simplify some of the EU’s operating procedures, while side-stepping efforts of deepened political integration that doomed the EU constitution in 2005. This “reform treaty” was approved by EU leaders in Lisbon last week and is scheduled to be signed in December with ratification over the course of 2008. Sarkozy has said publicly he wants France to be the first country to ratify the simplified treaty; the process of parliamentary ratification will begin in December. The French will also take over the rotating EU presidency from July-December 2008 and plan to focus on immigration, energy, the environment and European defense during their term. While Sarkozy remains firmly opposed to EU enlargement to include Turkey, he has effectively sidestepped this issue by supporting continued negotiations on the acquis communautaire that do not pre-suppose membership. He also conditioned his position on EU support for a “Committee of Wise Men” to reflect “without taboos” on the broader questions about the European future: i.e., what is the European identity, what should the EU’s borders be, how to handle common issues, and how deep can political integration go.

¶32. (C) Colombia: Sarkozy promised during his presidential campaign to work for the release of Franco-Colombian FARC hostage Ingrid Betancourt. He would sorely like to be able to achieve in a few short months what Chirac couldn’t despite years of effort. In June of this year, the French pushed Colombian President Alvaro Uribe to release 200 FARC prisoners in an effort to move forward negotiations for the release of FARC hostages. While the prisoner release did not achieve the desired results, the French are now backing Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s offer to negotiate a hostage deal between the Colombian government and FARC guerillas. Sarkozy invited Chavez to Paris in late November. The French admit Chavez is a difficult political actor but accept a “bargain with the devil” to advance prospects for the release of an iconic hostage. Sarkozy may ask us to return two FARC leaders in U.S. prison to a third country in order to obtain the release of French hostage. We should ask Sarkozy not to take any steps that would result in separate treatment for Ingrid Betancourt and put U.S. hostages in harm’s way.

¶33. (SBU) GMO Moratorium: When Sarkozy came into office not only did he create a ‘mega’ environment ministry, but he also directed it to undertake a process, the ‘Grenelle’, involving all sectors of the economy to reshape French environmental policies. Among the topics considered in the Grenelle was what to do about Genetically Modified Organisms, a subject of considerable domestic concern in France. The result is that France is currently considering a moratorium on biotech planting that would significantly undermine U.S. agricultural exports to Europe. We believe President Sarkozy may support the politically popular moratorium in order to gain capital to use in his reform efforts.

¶34. (C) Darfur (and Chad, Central African Republic): Sarkozy demonstrated an immediate renewed interest in Africa
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upon entering office, with France calling for and organizing the June 25 ministerial conference on Darfur, which served to refocus international attention on that country. The French followed up with a ministerial meeting on Darfur on the margins of the UNGA in New York in September and then hosted a broader Security Council session on Africa for heads-of-state/government. France has been instrumental in organizing a separate Security Council-blessed EU-UN peacekeeping mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT). Paris hopes to deploy this force as soon as practicable. In addition, the French have firmly supported the deployment of the hybrid UN-AU force in Darfur (UNAMID). We should thank Sarkozy for French leadership on Chad and the C.A.R.. Sarkozy may ask for enhanced U.S. financial contributions to MINURCAT.
Please visit Paris’ Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton

09LONDON2198     2009-09-22 14:02     2010-11-30 21:09     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy London

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RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHSL RUEHTRO
DE RUEHLO #2198/01 2651413
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 221413Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3554
INFO RUCNDSC/DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1486
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0390
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1263

Tuesday, 22 September 2009, 14:13
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 002198
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/21/2019
TAGS PARM, KNNP, PREL, CH, EG, FR, IN, IR, IZ, JA, KN, PK,
RS, SL, UK
SUBJECT: U/S TAUSCHER’S MEETINGS WITH FS MILIBAND AND OTHER
HMG OFFICIALS
Classified By: Political Counselor Robin Quinville for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Under Secretary Tauscher held meetings in London on September 2-4 on the margins of the P5 Conference on Confidence Building Measures Towards nuclear Disarmament with Foreign Secretary David Miliband, Simon McDonald, Head of the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat at the Cabinet Office, Mariot Leslie, Director General, Defence and Intelligence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and Jon Day, MOD Director General for Security Policy. The UK interlocutors expressed broad support for USG goals with regard to nonproliferation and disarmament and highlighted the need for close P3 and P5 coordination in the lead-up to the UNSC Heads of Goverment Summit and the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Confererence (RevCon). They also predicted that UK arms control policy would not be affected either by next year’s elections or the upcoming Strategic Defense Review. McDonald cited the need to get tough with Iran if it did not respond to overtures by the end of September. U/S Tauscher expressed continued commitment to ratification of the Defense Trade Treaty and noted that she is working with the Senate to resolve questions concerning implementation. End Summary
Welcoming U.S. Leadership
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¶2. (S/NF) While in London for the September 3-4 P5 Conference on Confidence Building Measures Towards nuclear Disarmament, U/S Tauscher held separate meetings September 2-4 with Foreign Secretary David Miliband, Simon McDonald, Head of the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat at the Cabinet Office, Mariot Leslie, Director General, Defence and Intelligence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and Jon Day, MOD Director General for Security Policy. The British interlocutors underscored that the UK welcomes U.S. leadership on nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control. FS Miliband expressed appreciation for President Obama’s Prague speech, observing that the process for getting to “a world at or close to zero in terms of nuclear arms is not a straight line” but is long and complex. McDonald said that for the last forty years the nuclear states have downplayed the obligation to spread civil nuclear power and to disarm; President Obama’s leadership presents an opportunity to change that dynamic. DG Leslie observed that UK decision makers are “fired up by how the President has made the (nonproliferation) agenda his own.” Prime Minister Brown wants to “refresh and refurbish” the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), she said. DG Day said he was “delighted” that the U.S. has “resumed leadership” on nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament.
Maintaining P3 and P5 Unity
---------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) Leslie stressed that the UK position is “really very similar to your Administration on nearly everything.” The UK’s goal is for the P5 to work well together but we should “not scare the horses,” which means “not scaring off the French” and “keeping the Chinese and Russians on board.” She acknowledged that it was “hard to get everyone together” for the 9/3-4 P5 Conference, but expressed hope that it would help cement P5 unity in the lead-up to the NPT Review Confererence (RevCon). Day acknowledged that the 9/3-4 P5 Conference was not a vehicle designed to make progress by “leaps and bounds.” He stressed that “the engagement is valuable” and would help cement P5 unity.
¶4. (S/NF) We need a strong, but unanimous, signal from the UN Security Council (UNSC) at the UNSC Heads of Government Summit, Simon McDonald stressed, noting that the first draft resolution was a disappointment. The UK interlocutors agreed on the importance of P5 unity at the summit, as well as on the importance of close P3 and P5 coordination in the lead-up to the summit and to the NPT RevCon. McDonald also observed that Libya was on the UNSC and that the P5 should take positive note of the fact that Libya has made a “strategic shift” on nuclear proliferation.
France and P3 Unity
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¶5. (S/NF) DG Leslie said that the UK had done a “lot of hard
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work and expressed a commitment to disarmament...and the French are uncomfortable with this.” Leslie said that the UK “gets on well” with the French, but the French are “excessively worried about what they view as unilateral UK disarmament.” She said that P3 talks would help maintain P3 unity; “We need to reassure France,” she said. Leslie characterized closer U.S.-France relations as “extremely healthy.”
¶6. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher, Leslie, and Day agreed to regular P3 meetings, starting in October, to help cement P3 unity. French interlocutors also agreed, during separate bilateral meetings with Tauscher, on the importance of regular P3 consultations.
Missile Defense and the nuclear Posture Review
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¶7. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher described the Missile Defense review underway in Washington, with emphasis on countering the Iranian missile threat to Europe with proven technology. She also described the nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which would replace the 2002 NPR and would address questions such as extended deterrence and security assurances. Her UK interlocutors expressed considerable interest in both reviews, and she made clear the U.S. would consult bilaterally and with NATO as soon as the reviews progress to that point.
Political consensus on a Strategic Defense Review
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¶8. (S/NF) Day acknowledged that “the next year will be pretty disruptive” in the UK as the two major parties prepare for the next general election. He stressed that both the Labour and Conservative parties are committed to a Strategic Defense Review after the election. He predicted that neither political conflict between the two major parties nor the defense review would affect arms control policy, although he advised that these factors “may distract the attention” of political leaders. He predicted that “defense will be a bigger issue than it usually is” during the British electoral period. He cited intense debate over Britain’s role in Afghanistan and the “defense budget crisis” as two prominent issues.
¶9. (S/NF) Day opined that “mobilizing” NATO allies after General McChrystal released the results of his review would be “very difficult.” “Our message” to the U.S. is “bear with us... we will continue to work closely with you,” Day said. He pledged to work closely with the U.S. on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and National Posture Review (NPR) as well as on the UK’s Strategic Defense Review. In regard to the UK review, Day observed that he had worked on the last review in 1997-98, and he bemoaned the lack of institutional memory within HMG regarding the review process.
¶10. (S/NF) Day also promised that the UK had “put measures in place to protect your interests” during the UK inquiry into the causes of the Iraq war. He noted that Iraq seems no longer to be a major issue in the U.S., but he said it would become a big issue -- a “feeding frenzy” -- in the UK “when the inquiry takes off.”
Iran
----
¶11. (S/NF) Tauscher made clear that Iran needed to respond to the P5 1 offer prior to the UNGA, at which point there would be a stock-taking; absent progress, attention would turn to substantially stronger sanctions. FS Milband opined that U.S. Administration is “rightly trying to overcome a deficit of prejudice and mistrust in a relatively short time” by diplomatic outreach to Iran. He continued that the Iranian elections were a “bad outcome” -- an outcome that had given extremists the upper hand and resulted in a “culling of reformists.” Miliband said that, in his opinion, Iran’s extremist government would not make concessions in a short time. Nonetheless, the U.S. “Administration’s support for a diplomatic solution is very wise.” He praised the impact of financial sanctions spearheaded by Treasury U/S Levey. Leslie asserted that the Iranian administration is “in a state of flux” and “not focused,” so probably unable to respond to overtures.
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¶12. (S/NF) McDonald stressed that the PM supports the President’s outreach efforts to Iran, but this outreach should not be “open ended.” The UK view is that “if Iran is not responsive, we have to get serious.” UK experts have concluded that stronger sanctions should be in place by the end of the year if Iran is not significantly responsive by the end of September. McDonald observed that it would take some time to negotiate a UNSCR; in the meantime, the UK is considering national steps it could take as well as possible steps the EU could take. HMG shares NSA Jones’ view that proliferation problems posed by Iran and North Korea should be addressed together, not as separate, unrelated issues, McDonald said.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
------------------------------------
¶13. (S/NF) UK interlocutors sought an update from U/S Tauscher on the progress toward U.S. Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) -- and on the President’s leadership on CTBT ratification. Tauscher said the ratification of the CTBT had high priority. START had a certain urgency, given the December 5 expiration; we were working in parallel to prepare for ratification of CTBT, including a new National Academy study, a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), and a funded program to modernize our nuclear infrastructure. UK interlocutors made clear they would welcome U.S. CTBT ratification, which would be a tangible sign to the world of U.S. commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. McDonald noted that since the 1993 Executive Order, the U.S. has acted as if the CTBT had been ratified, which he characterized as an argument that could persuade reluctant senators. UK interlocutors also sought an update from Tauscher on the progress of START negotiations and the status of the NPR.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
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¶14. (S/NF) “We need to put some steel in Director General-elect Amano,” Miliband opined. Amano has a key role and he “must be a leader and a consensus-builder who reports faithfully what experts tell him.” McDonald observed that the IAEA seems more prepared than it has in the past to address Iranian conduct. Tauscher agreed we need to make Amano a success.
Russia-Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
--------------------------------------------- -
¶15. (S/NF) Leslie commended U.S.-Russian progress on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) talks. She said that the UK was looking for the U.S. to deal with Russia since “our relations (with Russia) are very poor.” Leslie said that despite UK-Russia bilateral problems, HMG would be able to work with Russia through the NPT process and she expressed hope that Russia “could do the right thing” to address global proliferation. She noted the Russian proposal for a conference that could help address Egyptian concerns. Day opined that after START negotiations are successfully concluded, Russia might be inclined to seek “another deal” in regard to Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), since such discussions would “keep them at the top table” in terms of negotiations.
China, Pakistan
---------------
¶16. (S/NF) Leslie flagged the “inconvenient truth” that “China is building its nuclear arsenal.” She evoked an arms race in the Pacific in light of India’s nuclear program. Nonetheless, Leslie said she was optimistic regarding China’s commitment to multilateral cooperation and she suggested that the U.S. and the UK should push China for progress “until they say ‘stop it’.” She noted that the Chinese had “pretty much” said a year ago that if the U.S. ratifies the CTBT, China would follow suit. Further, China has “dumped” Pakistan in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which is a “good sign.” Tauscher urged P5 action to get Pakistan to stop blocking progress in the CD on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
¶17. (S/NF) The UK has deep concerns about the safety and
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security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and China could play a big role in stabilizing Pakistan, Leslie said. Pakistan has accepted nuclear safety help, but under the IAEA flag (albeit British technicians). The Pakistanis worry that the U.S. “will drop in and take their nukes,” Leslie said.
¶18. (S/NF) Day expressed support for the development of a “cold war”-like relationship between India and Pakistan that would “introduce a degree of certainty” between the two countries in their dealings. He noted that recent intelligence indicates that Pakistan “is not going in a good direction.” Pakistan sees the debate about Afghanistan in the U.S. and the UK as demonstrating that the allies lack the will to maintain their commitment there. The Pakistanis also believe that their recent successes against extremists in the Swat valley validate their belief that they can deal with their own internal problems without changing their approach toward India. Day asked if the U.S. would be “obliged” to cut relations with Pakistan if the military took over again; he said that the last time the military assumed power the UK had maintained military-to-military ties. Day also asked for the U.S. perspective on Nawaz Sharif, whom he described as “potentially less venal” than other Pakistani leaders.
Nonproliferation and Public Diplomacy
-------------------------------------
¶19. (S/NF) Leslie opined that P5 states are “losing the public diplomacy arguments about nonproliferation” and civil nuclear power, with the P3 and the P5 “being portrayed as the bad guy.” Day expressed a similar sentiment, noting that there is “no real recognition” of what the UK has done in terms of nonproliferation and disarmament, “either in our own media or worldwide.” U/S Tauscher agreed that we all need to do a much better job of getting our narrative out, and noted that the State Department has brought in new people to help to do that.
¶20. (S/NF) Leslie acknowledged that there had been divisions within HMG about the strategy for addressing proliferation. In Leslie’s view, the risk of proliferation is a bigger threat than terrorism but it ranks lower than terrorism on the public’s list of perceived threats. She flagged efforts both by states and by terrorist groups to obtain nuclear weapons. She cited former FS Beckett’s speech at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference in June 2007 as setting out the UK’s commitment to a nuclear free world. In HMG’s view, President Obama’s Prague speech expressed the same commitment. Disarmament alone )- without successfully addressing proliferation )- would not make the world safer, so “we need to manage disarmament,” Leslie stated. She rejected the French assertion that that the U.S. and the UK are “starting a (public) debate that is not there” by publicly addressing issues of nuclear disarmament.
Civil nuclear Cooperation
-------------------------
¶21. (S/NF) UK interlocutors noted HMG’s commitment to civil nuclear power and that the nuclear weapons states have done a poor job in terms of Article IV of the NPT. FS Miliband commented that the nuclear weapons states have a credibility problem with the non-nuclear weapons states. Leslie said that the UK had demonstrated its commitment to “moving forward” civil nuclear issues, citing the UK-hosted and organized nuclear fuel cycle conference in March 2009 as an example. Tauscher agreed that we should support nuclear power and nuclear cooperation in a manner that does not lead to the spread of dangerous technologies, citing our agreement with the UAE as an example.
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
-----------------------
¶22. (S/NF) FS Miliband asked about the status of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), insisting “we are not trying to keep people from bearing arms in the USA.” He asked if it was “conceivable” for the U.S. to ratify the treaty. Tauscher stated she was not optimistic given the Second Amendment issues being raised by opponents, but said the Administration was planning to review the ATT and we are prepared to listen to the UK make its case on this issue. FS Miliband said that the UK launched its campaign in favor of the ATT in September 2008 with the support of some U.S. companies.
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¶23. (S/NF) Day observed that there is “sometimes a sense” that the FCO “pushes” the ATT while the MOD opposes it. He stressed that the MOD and the UK defense industry “support strongly” the ATT. He said that he had personally seen the impact of MANPADS in Sierra Leone, and stated that ground to air missile proliferation is a major problem that the ATT could address. “Given our operational deployments in Afghanistan, we’re focused on” the ATT,” he said.
NATO - Strategic Concept
------------------------
¶24. (S/NF) Day raised the NATO Strategic Concept review, predicting a major debate in the Alliance about deterrence and its strategic dimensions. A “major objective” should be “to minimize fallout” on nuclear issues. He noted that the Secretary General (SYG) would prepare the first draft. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) will need to review the final product since the first stage of work is done among a small group of nations and many others will be “suspicious.” The direction of NATO’s debate will depend on the outcome of the German elections: the Social Democratic Party (SPD) could force a debate, while the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) would not, Day said. Day volunteered that he had been “soured” by the last two Strategic Concepts. Tauscher said that the USG would be addressing some of the issues in developing the Strategic Concept as part of our nuclear Posture Review.
¶25. (S/NF) Day said SYG Rasmussen “must not take his foot off the accelerator of reform.” The SYG must be a strong leader, needs “some early wins,” and must have the kind of access in Washington that former NATO SYG Robertson had, Day said.
Defense Trade Treaty
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¶26. (S/NF) UK interlocutors sought an update from U/S Tauscher on the status in the Senate of the U.S.-UK Defense Trade Treaty. Tauscher explained that we are working with the Senate to resolve questions concerning implementation. Day emphasized that the Treaty “matters operationally... this is the sort of stuff that saves lives.” McDonald stressed that the Treaty was not just an agreement between two leaders, former President Bush and former Prime Minister Blair, “but an agreement between our two systems.” McDonald expressed appreciation for Tauscher’s affirmation that implementing legislation is not necessary for the Treaty to go into force. Tauscher replied that the purpose of the Treaty was to cut red tape, and we don,t want to put it back in the implementation. Leslie stressed that the UK did not want to “complicate” the Administration’s efforts to get the Treaty fully ratified. The UK interlocutors expressed appreciation for Tauscher’s commitment to the Treaty’s ratification and her explanation of the Administration’s steps to achieve that goal.
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
--------------------------------------------- --------------
¶27. (S/NF) FS Miliband asked for U.S. support for UK candidate John Freeman as Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Director General.
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09LONDON2214     2009-09-23 16:04     2010-11-30 21:09     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy London

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 LONDON 002214

NOFORN
SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 09/22/2019
TAGS PREL, PARM, KNNP, CH, EG, FR, IN, IR, KN, PK, RS, UK
SUBJECT: U/S TAUSCHER’S BILATERAL MEETINGS IN LONDON WITH
RUSSIAN, CHINESE, AND FRENCH OFFICIALS
REF: A. (A) LONDON 2198 B. (B) LONDON 2199
Classified By: Political Counselor Robin Quinville for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: U/S for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher and Special Representative for nuclear Nonproliferation Ambassador Susan Burk held bilateral consultations in London September 3-4, on the margins of the P5 Conference on Confidence Building Measures Towards nuclear Disarmament, with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs He Yafei, and French Director for Strategic Affairs Patrick Maisonnave. (Refs) All interlocutors agreed on the need for close P5 coordination in the lead-up to the UNSC Heads of Government Summit and the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon). French interlocutors expressed a particular need for closer, more efficient P3 coordination. All interlocutors were supportive of the President’s proposed nuclear Security Summit. End Summary.
Russian Perspective -- NPT
--------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) U/S for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher and Special Representative for nuclear Nonproliferation Ambassador Susan Burk held bilateral meetings in London September 3-4, on the margins of the P5 Conference on Confidence Building Measures Towards nuclear Disarmament, with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs He Yafei, and French Director for Strategic Affairs Patrick Maisonnave. Ambassador Burk opened the first meeting, with Russian DFM Ryabkov, by presenting an outline of U.S. objectives for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon). DFM Ryabkov stated that Russia and the U.S. are “very much in line with each other” regarding the NPT RevCon. He confirmed that Russia seeks a P5 consensus with a results-oriented NPT conclusion. “We cannot allow the NPT to fail,” he said. Ryabkov cited the “good experience of being almost there” in terms of the chair’s recommendations from the third Preparatory Committee (PrepCom). “We must focus while moving toward the NPT RevCon on realistic deliverables in all areas,” he said, which means avoiding pretexts for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to balk. Russia seeks to avoid “prescriptive outcomes.” He expressed the view that the UK draft text was a good basis for a P5 statement. Ryabkov said Russia would stress universal adherence to the NPT, universal adherence to the Additional Protocol, the Comprehensive nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and negative security assurances. He noted the importance of “progress” on CTBT ratification, preferably before the end of the conference. He stated the importance of developing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification and control mechanisms, and that negative security guarantees are key. Russia would think positively about the development of a legal instrument.
Egypt
-----
¶3. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said the Egyptian position gives Russia “serious concern.” Russia regularly engages with the Egyptians, but the Egyptians do not seem to understand the gravity of the situation. Ryabkov expressed hope that the U.S. would support ideas such as a special coordinator and comprehensive IAEA coverage of facilities in the Middle East. He noted that Middle Eastern countries need to ratify the CTBT. Russia has been in touch with Israel to see if it would consider becoming part of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which would “play well” with the Egyptians. U/S for Arms Control and International Security Tauscher said she had been working with Egypt, including with Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit, and would continue to do so in the coming weeks. She said that some Egyptians consider their approach last year to be a mistake, and that we were working to get Egypt and Israel to come together on an approach that would command consensus. Ryabkov said Russia had not detected reconsideration by Egypt, and promised to “explore”
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Tauscher’s suggestion that the U.S. and Russia meet jointly with the Egyptians to show U.S.-Russia coordination and to explain concerns to the Egyptians.
Multilateral Approaches to the Fuel Cycle
-----------------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said Russia was surprised by opposition to initiatives, “both yours and ours,” at the most recent Board of Governors (BOG) meeting. Russia will continue to push forward on its Angarsk idea. Russia will soon circulate a draft agreement and will consult with the U.S and as many other potential co-sponsors as possible to increase the chances of a positive outcome. U/S Tauscher made clear the U.S. supports the Angarsk initiative and wants to push it forward at the November Board as the first step; other steps could follow using the Angarsk precedents. Ryabkov expressed appreciation for U.S. expressions of support for Angarsk and asked the U.S. to make positive remarks at the next BOG meeting.
“Creative Ways” to Present Arguments Needed
-------------------------------------------
¶5. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said it is important in the lead up to the RevCon to find “creative ways” to present our arguments, citing Egyptian skepticism. U/S Tauscher agreed that we need to find better ways to get our narrative out, and proposed that the two of them write an op-ed that could run in New York at the time of the UNGA. Ryabkov responded that such a piece could make clear that the U.S. and Russia stand together on fuel assurances. He said it was a “good idea,” and they should look for the right occasion. Ryabklov also raised the 13 steps, suggesting that some elements were “OBE” and the context was now different.
nuclear Security Summit
-----------------------
¶6. (S/NF) Senior Director for WMD Terrorism and Threat Reduction at the National Security Council Laura Holgate briefed on plans for the nuclear Security Summit in April. Ryabkov expressed appreciation and said the summit should seek a result that is both “political and technical,” which he characterized as “a huge task requiring thorough preparation.” He stressed the importance of early exchanges on summit preparations. He promised that Russia would work to develop ideas by the Sherpa meeting or shortly thereafter. However, the time frame is “extraordinarily short,” even if the summit is postponed until April. The summit should seek a “defendable niche” that will not take away from NPT, he said.
CTBT, FMCT
----------
¶7. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher said the U.S. was carefully preparing for ratification of the CTBT by the Senate, including a new study by the National Academy. Another key priority for the U.S. is the FMCT. We were encouraged by the steps in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in May, but Pakistan has blocked implementation. She said the P5 must work together to preserve the work plan in January and commence actual negotiations. Ryabkov responded that Russia would welcome early U.S. CTBT ratification. Russia had talked to the Pakistanis about the FMCT, but DFM Ryabkov indicated that they were “quite evasive.” He urged the U.S. to engage the Pakistanis. Tauscher said we would continue to do so and encourage the rest of the P5 to do so as well.
Iranian Threat, Missile Defense
-------------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher proposed that Russia and the U.S. implement together the understandings reached by the two Presidents in Moscow regarding missile defense, joint threat assessment and the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC). Responding to her proposal to send a team to Moscow to get Russia’s intelligence assessment on the Iranian missile threat, Ryabkov said that missile defense remains a difficult
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issue for Russia; the Presidential text was good guidance, but Russia needed more time to consider the U.S. view regarding the missile threat from Iran and issues of their missile technology. Russia has “objective data” and the differences between the Russian and U.S. views are “considerable.”
¶9. (S/NF) Tauscher described the missile defense review underway in Washington. Ryabkov expressed appreciation, and suggested that they revisit the joint threat assessment and the JDEC after the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) review has been completed.
nuclear Cooperation
-------------------
¶10. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher welcomed Head of Federal Atomic Energy Agency Sergei Kiriyenko,s planned visit to Washington and the establishment of the working group on nuclear energy and nuclear cooperation. She pressed for approval and signature of the plutonium disposition agreement. DFM Ryabkov replied that the situation with respect to plutonium disposition was the same as it was during the President,s visit to Moscow. The issue of financing had precluded real progress before the POTUS visit. Russia needs to figure out what is realistic. There are no political constraints. Russia is disposing of highly toxic materials. Ryabkov expressed interest in information about what the U.S. was doing in that regard.
S-300 Air Defense Missiles
--------------------------
¶11. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov asked about the status of the Russia 123 agreement. U/S Tauscher responded that some in Congress are interested in moving forward on the 123 agreement, and that further discussions could be held in October. It is crucial that Russia not transfer the S-300 system to Iran if Congress is to allow the agreement to come into force, she added. Ryabkov said Russia had a valid contract for the sale of the S-300s, and acknowledged that Russia needed to make a decision regarding the S-300 sale to Iran, an issue that has been the subject of “utmost attention in many places.” Russia is in a position of growing difficulty for not honoring its contractual obligations and, finances aside, Russia is getting “no points in Iran.” Ryabkov said Russia understands the U.S. and Israeli arguments and wants to be transparent on the topic, and noted that the U.S. and Russian presidents have discussed it. The current situation is not sustainable; Russia cannot hold up the sale indefinitely. At some point Russia will have to make up its mind, Ryabkov said. Russia did not agree to sell surface-to-surface missiles but has a contract to sell Iran air defense systems.
Votkinsk
--------
¶12. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said that Russia and the U.S. have different views on whether continuous monitoring at Votkinsk should be continued in the Stategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) follow-on agreement. Russia considers the importance of switching off the system to be quite high. The run-up to the end date of START could create difficulties. U/S Tauscher stated that we have the right to monitor until December 5, to which Ryabkov replied, “That goes without saying.” Tauscher went on that we see merit in continuing with the Votkinsk system in the new agreement. If the final decision is not to continue the system, we are prepared to work out an arrangement that maintains our rights through December 4. Contractors can box and ship the equipment; there are ways to manage this, she said.
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
-----------------------------------
¶13. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said that Russia circulated its ideas on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty in Vienna on May 5. “We don’t want to abandon the CFE regime altogether,” he said. Russia has the sense that NATO is “becoming comfortable” with the current situation. Russia,
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however, does not want to return to the old treaty. CFE adaptation plus more is required. Flank limitations are the core problem. Ryabkov said Turkey is not that concerned about flank limitations but wants to keep the system for its own reasons. There could be a chance to “move innovatively” regarding CFE, but the current situation is unsustainable.
¶14. (S/NF) Ryabkov concluded by saying Russia wants someone on the U.S. side who will deal with this issue on a regular basis with MFA Security and Arms Control Director Anatoly Antonov. Russia wants to move forward and wants to reinvigorate the Vienna process without undermining the bilateral process.
Australia Group
---------------
¶15. (S/NF) Ryabkov asked for a “fresh look” regarding the Australia group, since the U.S. and Russia are now cooperating in many ways. U/S Tauscher said she has seen no interest on the part of the other members of the Australia Group in Russian membership given the concerns with respect to Russian implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Ryabkov responded that he thought they had dealt with those questions.
MANPADS -- Venezuela
--------------------
¶16. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher asked that Russia look further into the end-use controls on Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) transferred to Venezuela to ensure they do not wind up with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC). Ryabkov affirmed Russia’s commitment to ensure legitimate end-user certificates and the ability to conduct inspections; this is true for MANPADS. The information provided was fragmentary, he said. Russia concluded that the factory marks on the munitions made it difficult to determine if they were part of the equipment sold to the Venezuelan government. Ryabkov said Russia understood the tense situation between Venezuela and Colombia.
Chinese Perspective -- CTBT
---------------------------
¶17. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher opened the discussion with Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affiars He Yafei with a description of U.S. preparations to seek ratification of the CTBT in the Senate. VFM He asked “Are you there yet?” Tauscher asked if China would follow with its own ratification, and He replied that it is “likely” that China would follow if the U.S. ratified the CTBT.
U.S.-China Cooperation
----------------------
¶18. (S/NF) VFM He said China and the U.S. have many common interests and “we’re flooded with issues.” President Obama’s Prague speech “caught the attention of many.” The NPT is “important but we must improve on it” and must “start and restart” issues of disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful use. The Chinese President’s vision is to study issues in the context of Chinese and U.S. cooperation. “I have a mandate to work with you,” He said. Nonproliferation issues have been dormant for a dozen years, but the context has changed. China’s goal is a “serious reduction of the nuclear threat.” The time to act is now since “we have a mandate and a consensus at the top level.”
P5 Consultation in Advance of the NPT RevCon
--------------------------------------------
¶19. (S/NF) VFM He said the P5 may not always see eye-to-eye but should closely consult in the lead-up to the NPT RevCon. The P5 should “stand together” and unite since the P5 countries are a “target.” He added that is important to improve communications with non-nuclear states.
¶20. (S/NF) VFM He raised the issue of the Egyptian Middle East nuclear-free zone. U/S Tauscher responded that the U.S.
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was working hard with both Egypt and Israel to find a common approach and avoid confrontation at the IAEA General Conference and the NPT RevCon. He said China was prepared to support that effort. He added the P5 should carefully review Iran and the DPRK but deal with them separately from the upcoming UNSC Summit and the RevCon.
FMCT, Pakistan
--------------
¶21. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher outlined the problem caused by Pakistan in blocking implementation of the CD program of work. She said the U.S. was talking to Pakistan and arguing that Pakistan could make its points in the negotiations but should not block the beginning of talks. VFM He agreed that the Pakistanis “have concerns” regarding the FMCT negotiations. He said he understood Pakistani “hesitancy,” as well as their “logic” and “illogic.” The solution is to address the underlying problem, which is that India and Pakistan view each other as enemies. nuclear weapons are crucial to Pakistan. Indeed, a Pakistani military leader said his army was no match for the Indian army. “India is the lynchpin” to assuaging Pakistan’s fears and the U.S. could influence India. China has resolved all border issues except those with India, He observed. In response to Tauscher,s expression of appreciation for China’s efforts in the CD with Pakistan, He said China would engage the Pakistanis.
UNSC Summit
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¶22. (S/NF) VFM He said that the U.S. draft for the UNSC Summit was fairly good, but that China had amendments. China’s Ambassador to the UN has authority to negotiate on the draft resolution which, unfortunately, does not mention China’s disarmament efforts, though the efforts of other P5 countries are noted. China should get credit for, for example, its no first use policy. VFM He also said that China has a different view on the proposed moratorium on the production of fissile material. China supports a ban, but not a moratorium, which raises questions concerning definition, how long, verification, and the like.
nuclear Security Summit
-----------------------
¶23. (S/NF) Senior Director Holgate briefed on planning for the nuclear Security Summit in the spring. VFM He said China supports this initiative, which he described as a “huge, daunting job.” He advised the U.S. to consider establishing a “small, informal group to resolve issues” before the summit--U.S., UK, China, Russia, and a few others--to make sure the major parties are comfortable.
DPRK
----
¶24. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher mentioned Ambassador Philip Goldberg,s useful talks, which would continue. She asked where the DPRK stood. VFM He responded that the United States is the DPRK’s main preoccupation. The country views normalization of its relations with the U.S. as the only way out of its current “mess.” China believes the DPRK leadership is anxious about economic development but they believe their security concerns override their economic concerns. Nonetheless, there are signs the DPRK is reaching out. DPRK wants bilateral talks with the U.S., not Six-Party Talks. China wants the Six-Party Talks to continue. The DPRK wants “something in return” to restart the talks. VFM He asserted that China is encouraging the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks. China is also trying to convince the DPRK not to go back on its promise to denuclearize. The DPRK leader appears to be in good health and control.
Civil nuclear Cooperation with Pakistan
---------------------------------------
¶25. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher asked about the status of civil nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. VFM He responded that all
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cooperation is for civil purposes, under safeguards, and that China is not going out of that mode. It is not in China’s interest to proliferate nuclear technology. Tauscher asked about Pakistan,s financial situation. VFM He replied that Pakistan was hit hard by the financial crisis, but it is a largely agrarian society that needs little cash to survive and is in no danger of going broke. China is the only country that has given cash support to Pakistan, he said.
French Perspective -- P3 Coordination
-------------------------------------
¶26. (S/NF) In a final meeting, French Director for Strategic Affairs Patrick Maisonnave expressed a need to reinforce P3 coordination. Maisonnave noted his disappointment at the current negotiating process in New York, stating that “P3 coordination could be more efficient.” U/S Tauscher agreed the P3 needed to stick together and suggested frequent telephone calls. Maisonnave said he looked forward to frequent phone contact among the three countries.
UNSC Summit
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¶27. (S/NF) Regarding the September UNSC Heads of State Summit, Maisonnave observed that it could be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve consensus on specific language regarding the DPRK and Iran, but “a strong generic message would help.” This was important to French political authorities. U/S Tauscher agreed, and asked if there were other political messages France wanted to send. DAS-equivalent for Disarmament and nuclear Non-Proliferation Martin Briens said France wanted the text of the Summit’s resolution to put the issue of nuclear nonproliferation in a broader context. He suggested a short sentence asserting that “we need to make progress on other forms of disarmament.” Briens said that France wants a paragraph in the resolution setting out concrete measures against proliferation. He also noted “some technical problems” that needed to be resolved, such as issues surrounding the return of property and equipment.
Defining Language and Minimum Objectives
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¶28. (S/NF) DAS-equivalent Briens noted the “political requirement” of sending a message to Iran and the DPRK, of “not letting them off the hook.” Maisonnave said that one red line for France was that there must be nothing in the final text of the resolution that would weaken deterrence. He expressed support for a “balanced result” and called for managing expectations. Maisonnave stressed the importance of supporting access to civil nuclear energy. P3 consultations would provide an opportunity to clarify goals and to “define minimum objectives.” Briens said that when the P3 meets in early October, there would be an opportunity to set “minimum goals” and “work on our statetgy.” The October 8-9 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Conference in Washington would potentially be a good time for experts to meet, Briens said.
¶29. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher noted the importance of coordinating public diplomacy messages. Brien concurred on the importance of better public outreach.
nuclear Security Summit
-----------------------
¶30. (S/NF) Senior Director Holgate briefed on plans for the nuclear Security Summit. Maisonnave expressed support for the summit next spring and sought details about timing and goals. He described it as an “excellent initiative” and said that French officials would have their first planning meeting September 8. Briens said that the summit would give political momentum and help provide political will to reenforce nonproliferation mechanisms. Briens expressed “one small caveat” about such mechanisms, citing French displeasure with the Global Partnership and remarking that it provides a “huge benefit for Russia” by paying for its
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disarmament while Russia builds submarines. “Let’s leverage what we have rather than spend money” at the summit, Briens said. Maisonnave expressed appreciation for reassurance that the President’s summit would not be a pledging conference.
FMCT: P3 Coordination and Red Lines
-----------------------------------
¶31. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher provided an update on START negotiations, Administration strategy regarding CTBT ratification, the nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) review, and Pakistan’s actions to prevent the beginning of negotiations on the FMCT at the CD. Briens agreed that Pakistan had been a problem regarding the FMCT. He added that France shares some common interests with the U.S. regarding the FMCT but said that “we need to discuss some technical details.” He stated that France would be reluctant to agree to terms regarding transparency of fissile material stockpiles. He underscored the importance of not raising expectations and stressed that there are “sensitive issues that we must coordinate carefully with the P3” and discuss in detail. He said that national experts should talk directly on sensitive technical issues, and that France has some red lines that need to be discussed.
IAEA
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¶32. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher encouraged support for the new IAEA Director General Amano, saying we need to make him a success and make sure he has the budget to do his job. Briens agreed that the U.S. and France should talk to DG Amano regarding shared priorities, “and make sure he does the right thing.” He also agreed that the U.S. and France should consult with each other regarding the IAEA budget. The U.S. and France should also think about what can be done to improve IAEA verification safeguards.
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10ABUDHABI33     2010-01-25 09:09     2010-11-30 21:09     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Abu Dhabi

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R 250933Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0187
INFO GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0010
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0014
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0012

Monday, 25 January 2010, 09:33
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000033
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/SRAP, SCA AND NEA/ARP
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/01/25
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, EFIN, AF, IR, YM, AE
SUBJECT: UAE FM DISCUSSES TALIBAN FINANCIAL FLOWS AND REINTEGRATION
WITH AMB. HOLBROOKE AND TREASURY A/S COHEN
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard G. Olson, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: During a January 11 meeting in Abu Dhabi, visiting Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) Amb. Richard Holbrooke discussed Afghan reintegration with UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (AbZ). AbZ noted the importance of establishing an effective and transparent reintegration trust fund that includes Saudi support. Amb. Holbrooke urged the UAE to do more to disrupt Taliban financial flows. AbZ discussed his recent visit to Iran, noting Iran is acting more confident even as the country moves backwards. He added that Pakistani President Zardari had asked the UAE to take in his family in the event of his death. End Summary.
AFGHANISTAN MEETINGS
--------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Amb. Holbrooke began by thanking AbZ for hosting the well-timed SRAP meeting in Abu Dhabi on January 12. AbZ said he was looking forward to the Gulf participation, including that of the Jordanian Foreign Minister, particularly following the recent attack in Khost. AbZ said Judeh had told him Jordan plans to send more troops to Afghanistan; Amb. Holbrooke said Judeh had made the same point during his recent visit to Washington.
¶3. (S/NF) Amb. Holbrooke said the decisions on the Afghan reintegration program and the upcoming elections would be the key deliverables for the Abu Dhabi meeting and would pave the way to success in London. AbZ asked what the role of reintegration fund contributors would be, noting that the UAE did not want to be associated with a fund that Afghans would find ineffective, non-transparent or slow. AbZ said funding must go to programs with clear benchmarks that have strong financial and policy oversight. He added that it is “very crucial” Saudi Arabia donate to the fund, for symbolic reasons. Turning to the elections, AbZ suggested a compromise solution, whereby the Afghan government would ask ISAF when it would be ready to support the elections, rather than having any party dictate to President Karzai.
DISRUPTING TALIBAN FINANCE
--------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Amb. Holbrooke stressed to AbZ the importance of UAE efforts to combat Taliban financial flows through the UAE. Amb. Holbrooke noted the productive meeting he and Treasury A/S Cohen had with UAE National Security Advisor Sheikh Hazaa bin Zayed earlier on January 12 and the UAE’s efforts to crack down on bulk cash smuggling. A/S Cohen added that the USG is most concerned about Dubai’s central role in regional financial flows.
¶5. (S/NF) AbZ asked several questions about USG concerns and the UAE’s response, including if Taliban financial flows are regional and/or transiting Dubai, what is the suspected value of these flows, why the USG does not intercepting the funds in Afghanistan, if incoming or outgoing cash declarations would help, and if the USG believed the UAE was not effectively enforcing existing regulations. Amb. Holbrooke and A/S Cohen explained that the USG is concerned that Dubai is being used for the facilitation of the flow of Taliban funds, goods and personnel to and from Afghanistan. The USG is working with Afghanistan and Pakistan, but that the UAE should also take steps to enforce and investigate inbound cash declarations and amend laws to require outbound declarations. A/S Cohen noted that the planned DHS/ICE cash courier training in February would focus on identifing and intercepting likely couriers.
PAKISTAN - ZARDARI CONCERNS
---------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) AbZ said he had met with Pakistani President Asif Zardari in Dubai in late December and the latter was “in better shape” than AbZ expected. Stressing the sensitivity of the information, AbZ told Amb. Holbrooke that Zardari had asked AbZ to convey a request to UAE President Sheikh Khalifa (AbZ’s half-brother) that Zardari’s family be allowed to live in the UAE in the event of his death. (Note: The Bhutto family has lived in Dubai for years and in effect this would be a continuation of a commitment late UAE President Sheikh Zayed made to Ali Zulfikar Bhutto. End Note.)
IRAN - AND YEMEN
----------------
¶7. (S/NF) Turning to his late December trip to Iran, AbZ said it was his first meeting with Ahmedinejad that did not include a cleric (murshid). He interpreted this to mean that Ahmedinejad is now trusted and does not need constant supervision. Noting that Ahmedinejad had cited Western media criticism of Dubai’s financial situation as a plot against Dubai, AbZ told Amb. Holbrooke he believes Ahmedinejad is “crazy but well-educated.” AbZ said he felt Tehran is going backwards although he was surprised by the number of women “not covered up properly.” The Iranians believe that the United States is now preoccupied in Afghanistan and Iraq, which will prevent any US attack on Iran. AbZ said the U.S. message on Iran in the region is “not loud and clear.” Many are acting like Iran is already a nuclear power, and Iran sees the United States is not doing anything about it. If Middle East peace was achieved, AbZ said the Iranians would be unable to suggest they are the defenders of the Palestinian cause.
¶8. (SBU) AbZ said that FM Mottaki was polite and courteous, “for a change” during the December visit. He added that Mottaki called him on January 3 to convey that the U.S. had promised democracy and development in Afghanistan, but the result was more smuggling, narcotics and terrorist acts. Mottaki went on to discuss Yemen, telling AbZ that Saudi and US forces are attacking civilians in Yemen.
¶9. (SBU) Amb. Holbrooke’s office has cleared this cable. OLSON

09RIYADH447     2009-03-22 10:10     2010-11-30 17:05     SECRET     Embassy Riyadh

O 221014Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0402
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL DUBAI IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T RIYADH 000447

NSC FOR JBRENNAN AND JDUNCAN; STATE FOR S/WCI

EO 12958 DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS PREL, PTER, KWBG, SA, AF, IN, PK, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISER BRENNAN’S MEETING WITH
SAUDI KING ABDULLAH
REF: RIYADH 427

Classified By: Pol Counselor Lisa Carle, 1.4(b),(d)

¶1. KEY POINTS
-- (S) Saudi King Abdullah welcomed White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan, S/WCI Ambassador Williamson, and Ambassador Fraker to his private palace March 15 for a 90-minute discussion focused on U.S. Saudi-relations, counterterrorism cooperation, the Yemeni Guantanamo Bay detainees, Iran, and Iraq.
-- (S) Brennan presented the King with a letter from President Obama expressing a personal message of friendship, appreciation for our close and collaborative relationship and concern over the disposition of Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo.
-- (S) The King said he had told Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki only minutes before that Iran should stop interfering in Arab affairs, and had given Iran a one-year deadline to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia.
-- (S) The King expressed a complete lack of trust in Iraqi PM al-Maliki and held out little hope for improved Saudi/Iraqi relations as long as al-Maliki remains in office.
-- (S) When asked what advice he had for President Obama, the King said he had “one request”: that it was “critically important to restore America’s credibility” in the world.
U.S. SAUDI RELATIONS

¶2. (S) PLEDGES OF FRIENDSHIP: Brennan asserted that the U.S./Saudi alliance must remain strong, and assured the King of President Obama’s wishes for a long and healthy U.S./Saudi relationship, and the President’s personal commitment that Saudi Arabia had a friend in the White House. The King replied that he appreciated the sentiments and that he had great respect for President Obama. “We (the U.S. and Saudi Arabia) spilled blood together” in Kuwait and Iraq, the King continued, and Saudi Arabia valued this tremendously. Friendship can be a difficult issue that requires work, Abdullah said, but the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have done it for 70 years over three generations. “Our disagreements don,t cut to the bone,” he stated.

¶3. (S) U.S. CREDIBILITY IS CRITICAL: The Bush Administration is now in the past, the King said. Both President Bushes were his friends, but the recent President Bush didn,t take his advice on dealing with issues in the region, and they found their problems “compounded.” The King said, “we are ready to consult, provide guidance and to do whatever is necessary. We are people of the region and we know it well.” Brennan responded that President Obama wants to listen, and asked what advice the King would offer to President Obama. Abdullah said his one piece of advice was that restoring U.S. credibility in the world was critically important. Brennan responded that this was an important issue for President Obama as well. Brennan said that under President Obama we will restore our credibility. He said the U.S. is a great country and we know what we have to do.

¶4. (S) THE WORLD NEEDS OBAMA: Brennan said President Obama looked forward to seeing the King at the G-20 summit in London. “Thank God for bringing Obama to the presidency,” the King answered, which has created “great hope” in the Muslim world. “May God grant him strength and patience, Abdullah continued, “May God protect him. I’m concerned about his personal safety. America and the world need such a president.”

¶5. (C) THAT WITHOUT WHICH NO SAUDI MEETING IS COMPLETE: Abdullah said “as a friend” that “it was a mistake” to limit access of Saudi citizens to the U.S., since “this damages bilateral relations and the image of the U.S. in Saudi Arabia.” The King noted there were 60,000 Saudi students abroad, about one third of whom were in the U.S., and “others would have gone” but for the difficulties in gaining access to the U.S. The King noted that for many years very senior Saudi officials, including Prince Saud al-Faisal, had studied in the U.S. He then noted that Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., Adel al Jubeir (who was interpreting for the King) had studied in the U.S. and was “half American” as a result. He also said he was aware of, and appreciated, Ambassador Fraker’s efforts to improve the visa situation “even though there were people in Washington who fought him.” Finally, he observed that anyone from Saudi Arabia who studies in the U.S. inevitably becomes a friend and advocate of the United States and that we only hurt ourselves by cutting off this flow of students.
DETAINEES

¶6. (S) GUANTANAMO WILL BE CLOSED: Brennan explained that President Obama had made a commitment to close Guantanamo to eliminate the potential propaganda benefits its existence provided to Al-Qaeda, but also because it was the right thing to do. Brennan reassured the King, however, that President Obama would remain strong on counterterrorism. Brennan presented the King with a letter from President Obama addressing the issue of Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo. Brennan noted that he had met with Prince Mohammed bin Nayef (MbN) the day before to discuss at length The issue of the Yemeni detainees. Brennan further stated that he would be traveling to Sanaa the next day to meet with President Saleh, as the issue of the remaining 99 Yemeni detainees still needed to be resolved. Brennan praised MbN as an outstanding counterterrorism partner, and that the MOI was doing a wonderful, courageous job in countering the terrorist threat to the Kingdom. Returning to the subject later in the conversation, Brennan warned that the U.S. feared Yemen could become another Waziristan, and urged that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia needed to work together to keep Al-Qaeda in Yemen from growing even more dangerous. The King replied that having Somalia next door to Yemen only adds to the danger. Brennan said that the capabilities of the Ministry of the Interior security forces had grown impressively over the past 10 years. Brennan added that counterterrorism and intelligence sharing cooperation between our countries had never been better and that MbN deserved the credit. In an unusual concession, made at the conclusion of their conversation, the King said, “be assured I am fully briefed on the work you are doing with Prince Mohammed bin Nayef.”

¶7. (S) HOW TO TRACK DETAINEES: “I’ve just thought of something,” the King added, and proposed implanting detainees with an electronic chip containing information about them and allowing their movements to be tracked with Bluetooth. This was done with horses and falcons, the King said. Brennan replied, “horses don,t have good lawyers,” and that such a proposal would face legal hurdles in the U.S., but agreed that keeping track of detainees was an extremely important issue that he would review with appropriate officials when he returned to the United States.
IRAN

¶8. (S) A “HEATED EXCHANGE”: The King noted that Iranian FM Mottaki had been “sitting in that same seat (as Brennan) a few moments ago.” The King described his conversation with FM Mottaki as “a heated exchange, frankly discussing Iran’s interference in Arab affairs.” When challenged by the King on Iranian meddling in Hamas affairs, Mottaki apparently protested that “these are Muslims.” “No, Arabs” countered the King, “You as Persians have no business meddling in Arab matters.” The King said the Iranians wanted to improve relations and that he responded by giving Mottaki an ultimatum. “I will give you one year” (to improve ties), “after that, it will be the end.”

¶9. (S) “SPARE US YOUR EVIL”: The King expressed hope the U.S. would review its Iran policy and “come to the right conclusion.” Brennan responded that President Obama was personally reviewing U.S. Iran policy and wanted to hear the King’s thoughts. Abdullah asserted that Iran is trying to set up Hizballah-like organizations in African countries, observing that the Iranians don’t think they are doing anything wrong and don’t recognize their mistakes. “I said (to Mottaki) that’s your problem,” recounted the King. Abdullah said he would favor Rafsanjani in an Iranian election, were he to run. He described Iran not as “a neighbor one wants to see,” but as “a neighbor one wants to avoid.” He said the Iranians “launch missiles with the hope of putting fear in people and the world.” A solution to the Arab/Israeli conflict would be a great achievement, the King said, but Iran would find other ways to cause trouble. “Iran’s goal is to cause problems,” he continued, “There is no doubt something unstable about them.” He described Iran as “adventurous in the negative sense,” and declared “May God prevent us from falling victim to their evil.” Mottaki had tendered an invitation to visit Iran, but Abdullah said he replied “All I want is for you to spare us your evil.” Summarizing his history with Iran, Abdullah concluded: “We have had correct relations over the years, but the bottom line is that they cannot be trusted.”

¶10. (S) AN EMPTY CHANNEL: The King said “three years ago” Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei had sent his adviser Ali Akbar Velayati with a letter asking for Abdullah’s agreement to establish a formal back channel for communication between the two leaders. Abdullah said he had agreed, and the channel was established with Velayati and Saudi FM Saud al-Faisal as the points of contact. In the years since, the King noted, the channel had never been used.

¶11. (S) A DANGEROUS NEIGHBORHOOD: Brennan responded that the Saudis lived in a dangerous neighborhood with Iran across the Gulf, with Saudi Arabia sharing a long border with Yemen, and with a number of other troublesome countries nearby. Brennan noted that we have a lot of work to do in the Middle East together. The King responded that the world,s attention was focused on the region. He further stated that he believed that the U.S. could help in this sensitive region, but that we should not take matters lightly. Brennan noted that President Obama is fully aware of the dangers in the region, that the U.S. knew that it had to remain involved in constructing a solution, and that we would seek the King,s counsel in dealing with the many issues in the Middle East. The King asked if that included Iran. Brennan responded that it did. Brennan said that we had our eyes wide open to Iranian ambitions, that we were not nave to the dangers Iran posed to Saudi Arabia, and that Iran could not be allowed to succeed in its destabilizing activites. Brennan observed that the President had ordered a complete review of U.S. Iran policy and made reference to a passage in the President,s letter that we needed to test Iran,s intentions to cease its destabilizing behavior and live up to its international obligations. Brennan further observed that the U.S.-Saudi partnership had to remain strong and that together, and with others, we needed to thwart Iran,s nuclear ambitions. “That is important,” responded the King. Finally, Brennan said the President wanted the King to know he had a good friend in the White House who would be willing to assist in any way that he could. The King thanked Mr. Brennan, said he appreciated the sentiments, said that he had great respect for President Obama, and reflected that we had been great friends for many years and would remain friends as our disagreements were minor.

¶12. (U) SEE REFTEL: Ref A provided a separate readout on the Iran discussion and the King’s meeting with Mottaki.
IRAQ

¶13. (S) IN THE HANDS OF GOD AND IRAN: Brennan expressed the importance the U.S. attaches to achieving peace and stability in Iraq. The King replied that this was “in the hands of God,” though he agreed that Iraq was vitally important to both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The King also pointed out that “some say the U.S. invasion handed Iraq to Iran on a silver platter; this after we fought Saddam Hussein.”

¶14. (S) NO HOPE FOR MALIKI: The King said he had “no confidence whatsoever in (Iraqi PM) Maliki, and the Ambassador (Fraker) is well aware of my views.” The King affirmed that he had refused former President Bush’s entreaties that he meet with Maliki. The King said he had met Maliki early in Maliki’s term of office, and the Iraqi had given him a written list of commitments for reconciliation in Iraq, but had failed to follow through on any of them. For this reason, the King said, Maliki had no credibility. “I don,t trust this man,” the King stated, “He’s an Iranian agent.” The King said he had told both Bush and former Vice president Cheney “how can I meet with someone I don,t trust?” Maliki has “opened the door for Iranian influence in Iraq” since taking power, the King said, and he was “not hopeful at all” for Maliki, “or I would have met with him.”
AN ALERT AND ENGAGING HOST

¶15. (S) I MISS MY HORSES: The King appeared alert and at times animated, entertaining his guests with anecdotes about his encounters with Iranian leaders (septel), and throwing up his hands in complaint when asked if he spent time with his horses: “I see them on television when they race,” he said. “I love horses,” he exclaimed, “every couple of weeks I get to see them, and then I have a very calm and restful sleep.”

¶16. (S) DIALOGUE AND REFORM AS DUTY: In response to Brennan,s praise for the King,s interfaith dialogue initiative, his commitment to advancing rights as reflected by his recent appointment of the first female (deputy education) minister, the King said “Thanks for the sentiment but I did nothing special, only what I thought was my duty. I believe we do our duty as determined by God.”

¶17. (S) PARTICIPANTS:
Saudi Arabia -- Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud -- HRH Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, Assistant Minister of the Interior -- Ambassador to the U.S. Adel al-Jubeir (interpreter)
U.S. -- John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism -- Ambassador Ford Fraker -- Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes Issues Clint Williamson -- John Duncan, NSC Director for Counterterrorism -- Shaun Coughlin, Special Assistant, S/WCI -- Embassy control officer/notetaker

¶18. (U) Assistant to the President Brennan cleared this cable.
FRAKER

72TEHRAN5055     1972-08-22 09:09     2010-11-30 16:04     UNCLASSIFIED     Embassy Tehran

R 220927Z AUG 72
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9461

UNCLASSIFIED TEHRAN 5055

E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006
TAGS: IR PTER
SUBJECT: CONTINUING TERRORIST VIOLENCE

REF: TEHRAN 4887

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL SAID TAHERI, BOMBING AND OTHER TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAVE CONTINUED TO INCREASE. SAVAK MAINTAINING ITS POLICY OF WIDESPREAD PREVENTIVE ARRESTS AND, WHILE THIS RUNS RISK OF HEIGHTENING RESENTMENT AMONG POPULACE, OFFICIALS SEEM CONFIDENT THAT GUERRILLAS ARE ON THE RUN. WE ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE OFFICIAL OPTIMISM AND FEEL THAT SANGUINE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND THE GUERRILLA REACTION THEY USUALLY PROVOKE MAY FURTHER ERODE CREDIBILITY OF SECURITY ORGANS IN MIND OF PUBLIC.
END SUMMARY

¶1. IN WAKE OF SMOOTHLY HANDLED ASSASSINATION AUGUST 13 OF HEAD OF PRISONS BRIGADIER GENERAL SAID TAHERI (REFTEL) WHO WAS ALSO CHIEF OF AN ANTI-GUERRILLA SUBCOMMITTEE WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, FREQUENCY OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAS INCREASED. RECENT CONFIRMED INCIDENTS HAVE INCLUDED A BOMB IN A TEHRAN DEPARTMENT STORE WHICH INJURED THE TERRORIST PLANTING IT, BOMB IN TEHRAN NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY BUILDING WHICH KILLED WATCHMAN, APPREHENSION OF A TERRORIST IN SOUTH TEHRAN WHICH RESULTED IN ONE KILLED AND FIVE WOUNDED, AND SHOOTING TO DEATH OF THREE POLICEMEN IN A SMALL BAZAAR IN SOUTH TEHRAN. NUMEROUS OTHER BOMBINGS AND SHOOTINGS RUMORED BUT NOT VERIFIED BY EMBASSY OR CONFIRMED BY GOI.

¶2. SAVAK AND OTHER SECURITY ORGANS ARE PROCEEDING WITH A WIDESPREAD AND, WE HEAR, NOT VERY WELL TARGETED ROUND-UP OF SUSPECTS, AIDED BY LISTS OF NAMES AND OTHER DOCUMENTS FOUND IN DWELLING OF A RECENTLY SLAIN TERRORIST LEADER. POLICE NETS, WHICH ARE REPORTEDLY HAULING IN THE INNOCENT WITH THE GUILTY, HAVE EXTENDED AS FAR AFIELD AS ISFAHAN WHERE A NUMBER OF SUSPECTS WERE ARRESTED TWO WEEKS AGO.

¶3. DESPITE INCREASING LEVEL OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY, POLICE OFFICIALS REMAIN OPTIMISTIC. CHIEF OF NATIONAL POLICE LTG JAFFARQOLI SADRI ASSURED EMBOFF AUG. 17 THAT CURRENT FLURRY OF INCIDENTS CONSTITUTES DYING GASP OF GUERRILLAS WHO, HE CLAIMS, HAVE BEEN REDUCED BY TWO THIRDS IN PAST YEAR AND ARE FORCED TO ACT NOW TO SHOW THEY STILL EXIST. IN A MEDIA INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN LOCAL PRESS AUG. 19, SADRI UPPED FIGURE FOR REDUCTION OF GUERRILLA FORCES TO THREE FOURTHS, PREDICTED THAT REMAINING TERRORISTS WOULD SOON BE WIPED OUT AND REITERATED STANDARD GOVERNMENT LINE THAT GUERRILLAS ARE CONFUSED MISGUIDED INDIVIDUALS OF MARXIST-LENINIST BENT BUT WITHOUT GOALS OR PROGRAM. IN DISCUSSION WITH EMBOFF SADRI ATTACHED NO PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO MURDER OF GENERAL TAHERI, ASSERTING THAT TERRORISTS WOULD HAVE BEEN SATISIFED WITH ANY HIGH-RANKING OFFICER AND CHOSE TAWERI ONLY BECUASE OF IOSLATED LOCATION OF HIS HOUSE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR LONG WALKS ALONE. SADRI ALSO DISCOUNTED POSSIBILITY THAT ASSASSINS WERE OF HIGHER CALIBER THAN RUN-OF-THE-MILL GUERRILLAS, POINTING OUT THAT SHOTS WHICH KILLED TAHERI HAD BEEN FIRED FROM 50 CENTIMETERS AND THAT "A CHILD COULD HIT A MAN FROM THAT DISTANCE."

COMMENT: WE CONSIDER IT MORE LIKELY THAT TAHERI WAS PERSONALLY TARGETED DUE TO HIS DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. MOREOVER, SKILLFUL MANNER IN WHICH ASSASSINATION CARRIED OUT, REQUIRING CAREFUL PLANNING AND RECONNAISSANCE AS WELL AS DEFT EXECUTION, APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT THOSE INVOLVED WERE MUCH BETTER TRAINED THAN AVERAGE TERRORISTS, SOME OF WHOM HAVE BEEN BLOWN UP BY THEIR OWN BOMBS.

IT IS POSSIBLE THAT NUMBER OF GUERRILLA INCIDENTS WILL BEGIN TO TAPER OFF, BUT WE DO NOT SHARE SADRI'S CONFIDENCE THAT HIS TACTICS AND THOSE OF SAVAK CAN COMPLETELY HALT TERRORIST ACTIVITY. IN FACT OVER REACTION AND TOO ZEALOUS A REPRESSION BY SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS SEEM AT LEAST AS LIKELY TO RECRUIT NEW GUERRILLAS AS TO STAMP OUT OLD ONES. IN ADDITION WISDOM SEEMS QUESTIONABLE OF SECURITY OFFICIALS MAKING PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT BREAKUP OF GUERRILLA GROUPS AND PREDICTIONS OF THEIR DEMISE. WE RECALL THAT THE LAST SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT LAST JANUARY WAS FOLLOWED BY SERIES OF EXPLOSIONS ON US-PROPERTIES AND OTHER SITES IN TEHRAN. IN OUR VIEW SUCH PUBLIC DECLARATIONS RUN RISK OF INCREASING CREDIBILITY GAP AND RESENTMENT ON PART OF PUBLIC WHO LIKELY BE INCREASINGLY APPREHENSIVE OF INDISCRIMINATE ARRESTS THAT DO NOT SEEM TO BE STAMPING OUT TERRORISTS.

THE PROGNOSTICATION THEREFORE IS FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE TERRORISM BUT, DESPITE SUCCESSFUL MURDER OF TAHERI, WE DO NOT CONCLUDE THAT GUERRILLAS WILL NOW PLACE GREATER RELIANCE ON ASSASSINATION AS A TOOL. REASON IS THAT TERRORISTS STILL LACK ENOUGH TRAINED PERSONNEL TO PULL OFF ASSASSINATIONS ON REGULAR BASIS.

FARLAND

75TEHRAN2069     1975-03-04 11:11     2010-11-30 16:04     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Tehran

R 041125Z MAR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 475

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TEHRAN 2069

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO
Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY CREATED BY SHAH

SUMMARY: CREATION OF IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY ANNOUNCED BY SHAH
MARCH 2 IS MOVE TO SEEK BROADER SUPPORT FOR MONARCHY AND THE SHAHPEOPLE
REVOLUTION. ALL IRANIANS OF VOTING AGE ARE EXPECTED TO
EXPRESS ALLEGIANCE TO NEW PARTY OR RISK BEING VIEWED AS OPPONENTS
OF SHAH AND EVEN TRAITORS WHO SHOULD LEAVE IRAN OR GO TO PRISON.
SHAH EXPLAINED IRAN'S RETURN TO SINGLE PARTY SYSTEM AS NECESSARY
BECAUSE QTE SHAMEFUL UTTERANCES UNQTE BY SOME IRANIANS SHOWED NEED
FOR IRANIANS TO CLOSE RANKS IN EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE QTE GREAT
CIVILIZATION, UNQTE AND BECAUSE OPPOSITION PARTIES HAD FAILED.
ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR SUMMER WILL APPARENTLY BE HELD, BUT IT IS
NOT CLEAR HOW THEY WILL BE ORGANIZED. NET RESULT IS TO MAKE
IRANIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM LESS FLEXIBLE. INTERNATIONAL REACTION
WILL PROBABLY RANGE FROM INDIFFERENCE TO CHARGES OF INCREASED
TOTALITARIANISM. SHAH APPARENTLY PLANS TO CONTINUE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT
IN DAILY POLITICAL AFFAIRS. THIS IS CONTRARY TO EARLIER SUGGESTIONS
THAT HE MIGHT BE MOVING GRADUALLY TO CONFINE HIMSELF TO
BROAD POLICY GUIDANCE AND LEAVE IMPLEMENTATION TO GOVERNMENT. END
SUMMARY.

¶1. SHAH'S LENGTHY STATEMENT AT HIS MARCH 2 PRESS CONFERENCE, FROM
WITH CORRESPONDENTS FOR FOREIGN MEDIA WERE EXCLUDED, (TEXT SENT BY
AIRGRAM) ESTABLISHED IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY. NEW PARTY WILL
ABSORB RULING IRAN NOVIN PARTY, LOYAL OPPOSITION MARDOM PARTY,
AND THE ULTRA-NATIONALIST PAN IRANIST PARTY AND ITS SPLINTER
GROUP THE IRANIANS PARTY. PRIME MINISTER HOVEYDA IS TO BE SECRETARY
GENERAL FOR A PERIOD OF AT LEAST TWO YEARS. SHAH WILL LATER
PROPOSE CHAIRMAN OF NEW PARTY'S EXECUTIVE BOARD AND PRESIDENT FOR
ITS POLITICAL BUREAU. A PARTY CONGRESS WILL BE HELD, PERHAPS
WITHIN TWO MONTHS. GENERAL ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD THIS SUMMER
UNDER AUSPICES OF NEW PARTY.

¶2. SHAH'S STATEMENT BEGAN WITH FAMILIAR RECITATION OF IRAN'S
GROWING SELF-RELIANCE AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE CONTRASTING SHARPLY
WITH ITS RELATIVE WEAKNESS IN FIRST HALF OF CENTURY. HE NOTED THAT
OPPOSITION PARTIES WERE CREATED IN RESPONSE TO HIS OWN WISHES
AND COMMENTED THAT THEY HAD BEEN FACED WITH A DIFFICULT TASK.
SHAH OBSERVED THAT THEY HAD FAILED TO FULFILL THEIR PROPER ROLE. HE
COMMENTED THAT SOME IRANIANS HAD MADE QTE SHAMEFUL UTTERANCES
UNQTE WHICH REFLECTED A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF IRAN' GOALS. IN
ORDER TO WELD ALL IRANIANS TOGETHER IN PURSUIT OF GOALS OF THE
SHAH-PEOPLE REVOLUTION, HE HAD, THEREFORE, DECIDED TO CREATE NEW
ORGANIZATION WHICH WOULD SUPPRESS PARTY DIFFERENCES. ONLY REQUIREMENTS
FOR MEMBERSHIP IN NEW ORGANIZATION WOULD BE LOYALTY TO (1)
MONARCHY, (2) IRAN'S CONSTITUTION, AND (3) SIXTH OF BAHMAN (SHAHPEOPLE)
REVOLUTION. HE SPECIFICALLY SAID NEW PARTY WOULD FOSTER
CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM, AND HE PREDICTED THAT POLITICAL WINGS
WOULD EVOLVE WITHIN NEW PARTY. HE URGED ALL IRANIANS ELIGIBLE TO
VOTE TO ENTER INTO NEW POLITICAL STRUCTURE OR CLARIFY THEIR POSITION.
BY THIS HE MEANT THAT THOSE WHO COULD NOT AGREE WITH THE
THREE PRINCIPLES SHOULD LEAVE IRAN OR GO TO PRISON AS TRAITORS
UNLESS THEY OPENLY EXPRESSED THEIR DISAPPROVAL AND WERE NOT ANTINATIONAL.
IF DISAPPROVAL IS IDEOLOGICAL, PERSON WOULD REMAIN FREE
IN IRAN BUT QTE SHOULD NOT HAVE ANY EXPECTATIONS UNQTE. FULL
PARTICIPATION IN IRAN'S PROGRESS WOULD OBVIOUSLY REQUIRE MEMBERSHIP
IN THE IRAN RESURGENCE PARTY. HE SAID IT WAS HIS EXPECTATION
THAT WORKERS, FARMERS, AND TEACHERS WOULD BE THE FIRST GROUPS TO
ANNOUNCE THEIR LOYALTY TO THE NEW PARTY.

¶3. COMMENT: ABOVE ALL, SHAH'S ACTION IN RETURNING TO SINGLE PARTY
SYSTEM OF 1964-67 PERIOD SHOWS HIS EXTREME SENSITIVITY TO CRITICISM
AND STRONG DESIRE TO RECEIVE OVERT EVIDENCE OF POPULAR SUPPORT.
AFTER HE EXPERIMENTED WITH TAME OPPOSITION PARTIES IN
1956-64 PERIOD WITH POOR RESULTS, SHAH THEN TURNED TO HASSAN ALI
MANSUR'S PROGRESSIVE SOCIETY TO CREATE IRAN NOVIN PARTY AS INSTRUMENT
TO IMPLEMENT HIS SIXTH OF BAHMAN REVOLUTION. MARDOM PARTY
WAS SUBSEQUENTLY REJUVENATED TO STIMULATE IRAN NOVIN TO PERFORM
MORE EFFECTIVELY. DESPITE CONSTANT STATEMENTS OF LOYALTY TO SHAH
AND HIS PLANS FOR IRAN, PARTIES HAVE APPARENTLY NOT PLEASED HIM.
AS INDICATED BY FAILURES OF FORMER MARDOM PARTY SECRETARIES
GENERAL ALI NAQI AND NASSER AMERI, EVEN ACTIVITIES OF GELDED
OPPOSITION HAD PROVED TOO CRITICAL FOR SHAH'S TASTE. NEVERTHELESS
HIS PAST STATEMENTS INDICATED CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR COCCEPT OF
MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM IN IRAN, AND IMPERIAL DECISION TO INSTITUTE ONEPARTY
STATE REPRESENTS 180-DEGREE SHIFT IN POLICY WHICH ALSO
APPEARS TO NEGATE EARLIER PROMISES OF FREER ELECTIONS LATER THIS
YEAR. KEY SECTION OF SPEECH IS COMMENT THAT HE HAD HEARD QTE SOME
REALLY SHAMEFUL UTTERANCES, WHICH IN NOW WAY SHOULD BE EXPECTED
FROM AN IRANIAN. THIS SCENE, OF COURSE, HAS ALWAYS RECURRED WHEN
IRAN HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN THE DEFENCE OF ITS RIGHTS AT A HISTORIC
JUNCTURE. THIS SITUATION IS INTOLERABLE, UNQTE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES
WE DOUBT THAT MUCH CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM WILL EMERGE
FROM THE IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY.

¶4. IN OPERATIONAL TERMS LITTLE HAS CHANGED, FOR DESPITE FACADE OF
QTE ME-TOO UNQTE OPPOSITION PARTIES SHAH HAS ALWAYS CALLED THE
TUNE AND ONLY RULING IRAN NOVIN PARTY HAD ANY IMPORTANCE. PRIME
MINISTER HAS BEEN LEAD DANCER, AND HIS SELECTION AS SECGEN AT
JANUARY PARTY CONGRESS HAD TIED IRAN NOVIN PARTY EVEN CLOSER TO
SHAH. IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE OF NEW MOVE HAS BEEN FLOOD OF STATEMENTS
OF LOYALTY TO SHAH, CONSTITUTION AND REVOLUTION, BOTH BY
GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS. THERE IS CLEARLY NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE FOR
IRANIANS WHO WANT TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN IRAN'S DEVELOPMENT
AND SHARE ITS PROSPERITY. ALL DIFFERENCES OF VIEW ON HOW TO IMPLEMENT
SHAH'S PLAN FOR IRAN WILL BE SUPPRESSED UNTIL NEW PARTY
DEVELOPS AN IDEOLOGY AND ITS LEADERSHIP IS CONSTITUTED.

¶5. SHAH'S SPEECH IS VAGUE ON GOALS OF IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY AND
MANY OTHER POINTS. IT IS NOT CLEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, HOW CANDIDATES
WILL BE SELECTED FOR SUMMER ELECTIONS AND ON WHAT PLATFORMS THEY
WILL RUN. SPEECH SHOWS SIGNS OF HURRIED PREPARATION FOR ISSUANCE
PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR ALGIERS. WHILE MOST IRANIANS WILL
ACCEPT NEW CHANGE WITH TYPICAL CYNICISM, IMPLIED CRITICISM OF ALL
PARTIES FOR FAILING TO GET BEHIND SHAH'S PUSH FOR REVOLUTION FROM
THE TOP MAY ALIENATE SOME PEOPLE, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO HAVE
WORKED HARD FOR IRAN NOVIN PARTY ON ASSUMPTION THEY WERE CARRYING
OUT SHAH'S WISHES.

¶6. INTERNATIONAL REACTION WILL PROBABLY VARY FROM INDIFFERENCE TO
INCREASINGLY SHRILL CHARGES OF TOTALITARIANISM. IRAN'S IMAGE AS
COUNTRY IN WHICH ALL ELEMENTS WERE BEING TAPPED IN DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS MAY SUFFER UNLESS NEW PARTY'S MEMBERSHIP COMES FROM BROAD
SPECTRUM. IT APPEARS THAT EARLIER SUCCESSFUL IRANIAN POLICY OF
COMPROMISE AND COOPERATION HAS BEEN REPLACED BY QTE TAKE IT OR
LEAVE IT UNQTE STANCE IN DEALING WITH OPPOSITION.

¶7. IN A-19 EMBASSY NOTED THAT SHAH HOPES TO MOVE TOWARD SITUATION
IN WHICH HE GIVES POLICY GUIDANCE BUT KEEPS HIS DISTANCE FROM
DAILY ACTIVITIES OF GOVERNMENT. INITAL IMPRESSION OF HIS ACTION IN
CREATING NEW POLITICAL PARTY AND FORECASTING HIS PERSONAL SELECTION
OF SOME OF ITS LEADERS IS THAT HE HAS RETURNED TO MORE DIRECT
INVOLVEMENT IN THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT. BETTER JUDGMENT ON THIS
POINT CAN BE MADE WHEN FUNCTION OF NEW PARTY BECOME CLEAR.

¶8. IN SUM, GIVEN EXISTING STRICT DEGREE OF POLITICAL CONTROLS,
SHAH'S DECISION TO MELD ALL POLITICAL PARTIES INTO ONE APPEARS TO
OFFER LITTLE IN WAY OF IMPROVEMENTS TO IRANIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
WHILE ADDING SEVERAL DISADVANTAGES BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY.


HELMS

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO
Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

09KUWAIT110     2009-02-05 16:04     2010-11-30 16:04     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Kuwait

VZCZCXRO3981
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #0110/01 0361636
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 051636Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2777
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000110

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2029
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR KU IR
SUBJECT: THE INTERIOR MINISTER'S REMEDY FOR TERRORISTS:
"LET THEM DIE."

REF: KUWAIT 0095

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: During a February 3 meeting in their
ongoing dialog on US-Kuwait CT cooperation, Kuwaiti Minister
of Interior Shaykh Jaber al-Khalid Al Sabah discussed with
Ambassador US and Kuwaiti efforts to locate and apprehend
terror financiers (including Mohammed Sultan Ibrahim Sultan
Al-Ali, aka Jawad/Abu Umar), applauded improved liaison
information exchange, expressed skepticism Kuwait would ever
develop a rehabilitation center for former GTMO detainees and
other extremists supporting jihad, and suggested the US
should release current GTMO detainees back into Afghanistan,
where they could be killed in combat. He sardonically
questioned why US NAVCENT forces had gone to the trouble of
rescuing foundering Iranian hashish smugglers two weeks
earlier, saying "God meant to punish them with death and you
saved them. Why?" Characterizing the previous Saturday's
provincial elections as a "huge success," Shaykh Jaber
expressed his belief that President Obama and the US had the
tools necessary to successfully confront all challenges. END
SUMMARY.

¶2. (S/NF) Ambassador called on Shaykh Jaber February 3 to
review progress on our CT liaison relationship and to seek
the Interior Minister's support for operational concepts
aimed at intercepting individuals involved in the
exploitation of traditional smuggling routes in the northern
Gulf to move would-be jihadists and their
financier/facilitators between Kuwait and Iran, Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Shaykh Jaber began the meeting by applauding
the "huge success" of the provincial elections in Iraq and
expressing his confidence in the ability of President Obama
and the "super power" US to address current challenges.

¶3. (S/NF) Ambassador noted she'd met recently with VADM
McCraven, now JSOC commander for this region, and that they'd
discussed alternative approaches to staunching the flows of
terror financing, given the constraints of Kuwait's current
legal and political systems. Offering his support for these
approaches ) and underscoring that he was as concerned about
terrorist influences from Saudi Arabia as from Iran, given
the loose border controls -- the Minister expressed his
understanding of what he characterized (fairly) as improved
information exchange between our services, while
acknowledging the ongoing deficiencies in Kuwait's legal
system that stymie effective prosecution and restraint of
these individuals once captured.

¶4. (S/NF) Ambassador noted recent press reports that
self-confessed jihadi recruiter and financier Mohammed
al-Bathali had been released on a 500 dinar bond after being
sentenced to three of a possible five years imprisonment for
"inciting jihad against a friendly state." (Reftel) At the
same time, Kuwait's Ambassador to the US, Shaykh Salem Al
Sabah, had approached S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson to
inquire after the status of Kuwait's four remaining GTMO
detainees. Ambassador clarified that President Obama's
announcement of our determination to close the detention
center at Guantanamo did not mean we no longer had security
concerns which would be factored into any release scenarios;
the Kuwaiti detainees were nasty, unrepentant individuals and
Kuwait's record had been tarnished by the example of former
GTMO detainee al-Ajmi, who'd allegedly blown himself up in
Mosul following his release to the Kuwaiti authorities.
Ambassador asked the Interior Minister the status of the
rehabilitation center Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser Mohammed
Al Sabah had mentioned in his September 18th conversation
with then-Secretary Rice in Washington. Ambassador noted
that we were aware of the stories of Saudis who'd gone
through SAG rehabilitation centers only to re-emerge with Al
Qaeda in Yemen; nonetheless, the GOK had to take steps to
show its seriousness in changing and controlling the
behaviors of extremists within its society.

¶5. (S/NF) Shaykh Jaber replied with an anecdote: Following
the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and Desert Storm, General
Schwarzkopf had raised the issue of "rehabilitating" Kuwaitis
who'd been exposed to the brutality of war so that they could
re-integrate into society. Shaykh (Ret,d General) Jaber had
replied: "But you are thinking of the Vietnam model, where
young war veterans came home to empty apartments or anonymous
urban environments. That is not who we are. We are a small,
close-knit society and everyone knows each other. No one
will feel alienated: those who can heal will heal naturally
with family; those who cannot heal in that environment will
never heal." Relating this to the current topic, Shaykh

KUWAIT 00000110 002 OF 002

Jaber told the Ambassador: "You know better than I that we
cannot deal with these people (i.e. the GTMO detainees). I
can't detain them. If I take their passports, they will sue
to get them back (Note: as happened with Al-Ajmi. End
note.) I can talk to you into next week about building a
rehabilitation center, but it won't happen. We are not Saudi
Arabia; we cannot isolate these people in desert camps or
somewhere on an island. We cannot compel them to stay. If
they are rotten, they are rotten and the best thing to do is
get rid of them. You picked them up in Afghanistan; you
should drop them off in Afghanistan, in the middle of the war
zone."

¶6. (S/NF) Ambassador then raised with the Minister developing
an SOP for dealing with incidents such as the recent rescue
by US NAVCENT forces in the northern Gulf of seven Iranian
smugglers whose boat was foundering while engaged in
smuggling hashish. In the event, the Omanis had agreed to
repatriate the Iranians but we nonetheless needed to think
about dealing with similar episodes in future in expeditious
fashion. The initial response of the Kuwaiti Coast Guard had
been to refer the matter to the Minister of Interior, via the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador noted our
supposition that the Kuwaiti Coast Guard must have had
similar experiences with Iranian smugglers who needed
repatriation to Iran. Smiling broadly, the Interior Minister
deflected the question, saying "God wished to punish them for
smuggling drugs by drowning them, and then you saved them.
So they're your problem! You should have let them drown."
In any case, he added, the Kuwaitis generally sent the
Iranians back to Iran in their own boats so there had not
been a question of physically handing them over.

¶7. (S/NF) In closing, Ambassador noted that the Minister had
created the position of Special Advisor to Shaykh Jaber for
Kuwait Security Services (our GRPO liaison counterpart) and
assigned Shaykh Salman Sabah al-Salem al-Humoud Al Sabah to
that role. Ambassador asked whether the Minister believed
there was any appropriate liaison relationship between the
Embassy and Shaykh Salman, to which the Minister replied in
the negative. Finally, the Ambassador invited the Minister
to join her in attending the US Ambassador's reception
February 24 at the IDEX event in Abu Dhabi, as part of our
efforts to boost the relationship.

¶8. (C) COMMENT: The Minister was as frank and pessimistic as
ever when it came to the subject of apprehending and
detaining terror financiers and facilitators under Kuwait's
current legal and political framework. Ongoing tensions
between parliament and the PM and his cabinet make any
changes highly unlikely any time soon. The remaining GTMO
detainees remain a particularly thorny issue for the
leadership here, who privately recognize the downsides of
taking custody and readily acknowledge their inability to
manage them but who remain under strong domestic political
pressure to "bring their boys home." Telling was the fact
that press accounts of the Ambassador's February 3 meeting
with the Minister (which was one-on-one with a notetaker) and
her meeting two days earlier with the MFA U/S focused solely
on the GTMO issue, although it was discussed only marginally.
END COMMENT.

********************************************* *********
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at:

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it
********************************************* *********
JONES

09STATE11937     2009-02-10 03:03     2010-11-30 16:04     SECRET//NOFORN     Secretary of State

O 100328Z FEB 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
INFO USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KYIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 011937


NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2019
TAGS: OVIP CLINTON HILLARY PREL KPAL FR IR RS
NATO, UK, CN
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's February 5, 2009
expanded meeting with French Foreign Minister Bernard
Kouchner

CLASSIFIED BY EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARCIE RIES,
ACTING FOR REASONS 1.4 (D)

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Secretary Clinton and French Foreign
Minister Bernard Kouchner met on February 5 for 30
minutes in their first bilateral meeting. The warm and
open exchange followed a one-on-one working lunch and
preceded a 20-minute press conference. The two agreed
to coordinate closely on a wide range of issues
including the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iran, Russia,
the Balkans, GTMO detainees and Africa, especially
Darfur. On Afghanistan, Kouchner emphasized the need
for greater "Afghanization" and international "access"
to everyday Afghan people, and asked for U.S. support to
hold a second "Neighbors" conference to follow up on the
initial December 14, 2008 event. On GTMO, the FM
indicated Europe would help on a case-by-case basis, and
asked the U.S. for assistance with a 15-year old
Canadian national, Omar Khadr. The FM asked for a
reaction to its Transatlantic paper, passed to the U.S.
during France's 2008 EU presidency. As the meeting
closed, the Secretary joked that the FM was "not even in
her league" concerning criticism when the FM mentioned a
new book critical of him that might spark press
questions. END SUMMARY.

-----------
Middle East
-----------

¶2. (C) The Secretary opened the meeting by welcoming FM
Kouchner and expressing appreciation for French
leadership on a broad agenda of cooperation, which she
said President Obama hoped to deepen. Kouchner
congratulated the Secretary and said he looked forward
to the pleasure of working together on a first name
basis. The two then summarized topics discussed in
their one-on-one meeting, beginning with the Middle
East.

¶3. (S) The Secretary said she understood that the issue
of the Middle East was of grave concern to France. She
expressed appreciation for French leadership on
interdicting weapons into Gaza and with the Copenhagen
process. She thanked President Sarkozy for his ideas
and for French work in providing assistance to the
people of Gaza. FM Kouchner said that he had met with
Palestinian Authority (PA) PM Abu Mazen three days prior
and found him completely isolated. There was a game
being played among Arabs, most of whom, Egyptians
excepted, did not care. He said "Abbas is lost. You
tried, we tried but nothing has happened. The key, he
said, was to figure out how to build up Abu Mazen in a
government of national unity. Salam Fayyad was a
fantastic PM who had ideas about how to open the Gaza
crossing, specifically a tax paid by a group of people
who would be acceptable to both sides just to get the
crossing operating." It was especially important, he
continued, to offer the Palestinian people a sign that
the crossing was open because of Abu Mazen's
involvement. He had to be seen as a leader. He said it
would take weeks and noted that Hamas does not want to
talk to Mazen. Still, it was important to help convince
the Israelis to open the crossing. Kouchner cautioned
that it would be difficult to get anything done ahead of
the Israeli election on February 10.

¶4. (S) The Secretary concurred that the situation was
difficult. She added that confidence building measures
were needed so that the Israelis would feel committed.
It was important to persuade the new Israeli government
to participate in the peace effort and be convinced that
they could work with the PA. If Abu Mazen's government
of national unity is to work, Israel needs to understand
that it should work with him and that this development
could help. She was encouraged by the actions that the
Egyptians had taken against the tunnels. She said there
was much to coordinate and supported the role of the
Quartet, but agreed that little could happen in advance
of the Israeli elections. She noted that the U.S. was
conducting a review based on Mitchell's work.

-----------
Afghanistan
-----------

¶5. (S) The Secretary said that the U.S. was working on
a comprehensive strategy and thanked the FM for France's
contributions and cooperation. Kouchner noted that
France had increased its troops to 3000 from 3300. He
said there was progress in several areas, including
civil society, but presented a mixed picture overall.
He returned several times to problems with access to the
population and suggested that this was the key. He also
promoted Afghanization, saying it was important "for the
people to take their own problems into their own hands."
He expressed pride in the French hospital in Kabul as an
example of what was possible noting that Afghan patients
were being treated by Afghan doctors, and even the
Taliban presented themselves for treatment. He said
that Kabul is not Afghanistan, but that Kabul works
because it has been "Afghanized." The rest of the
country needs the same, but it will take years. He was
also concerned about growing Iranian influence, noting
that a huge Shi'a mosque had recently been built with
Iranian funds.

¶6. (C) FM Kouchner asked for the Secretary's support
for a follow-up event to the December 14, 2008
"Afghanistan Neighbors conference" that Kouchner hosted
in Paris. The FM said the meeting had been very
interesting, despite the Iranians not showing at the
last minute, and should be repeated if the U.S. agreed.
Kouchner put the conference in the context of a broader
approach, stressing "there is no military solution in
Afghanistan."

¶7. (C) The Secretary took note of the proposal, but
made no commitment on a follow-up conference. She said
the U.S. believed that there had been some success with
building the Army, but more problems with the police.
Both commented on the strength of the new Minister of
Interior. The Secretary said that the Minister of the
Interior was an interesting person but that it might be
necessary to deal with some of the more radical people
whether we wanted to or not. On reconciliation,
Kouchner said that there were some very bad people
involved, but they were nationals of Afghanistan and it
was important to start negotiations, including the
negotiations in Saudi Arabia. Finally on the
presidency, Kouchner said "Karzai is somebody. We have
to talk to him, but there may be other candidates." He
said Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi was such a person but, while
interesting, he probably couldn't win against Karzai.
The Secretary noted that Richard Holbrooke would travel
to the region.

-----------
GUANTANAMO
-----------

¶8. (C) The Secretary expressed appreciation for French
leadership within the EU on this issue. She said she
was proud of President Obama's commitment to close the
facility, calling it "a cancer" the U.S. wanted to take
care of, but would take time. She said this was
complicated, so we were asking friends and allies to
consider taking some detainees. FM Kouchner said the EU
27 had not yet reached consensus, but that they
"accepted the idea," but would consider detainees on a
case-by-case basis; Europeans do not want to create
legal problems for themselves. They were working with
three categories of individuals. First were "the best
cases." Second, were those who had made individual
requests for resettlement in specific countries and
third without legal problems. There were many
outstanding questions, such as whether they had refugee
status, but because of the Schengen visa requirements,
it was necessary for the EU to address this together.
At the end of this discussion, the FM handed the
Secretary a paper concerning Omar Khadr, a 15-year old
Muslim of Canadian origin. The Secretary agreed to
review the case.

----
Iran
----

¶9. (S/NF) The Secretary opened the discussion by
alluding to the private conversation with FM Kouchner
and their agreement that it was important to prevent
further development of Iran's nuclear capabilities and
its missile program. Iran's recent space launch
complicated this effort noting that the Iranians had
respected none of the internationally recognized
requirements for a space launches specified in UN
Security Council resolutions. The FM said he welcomed
the U.S. willingness to consider direct talks between
the U.S. and Iran. He said that the Iranians were
waiting for the U.S. The launch had surprised the
Russians, of whom he said "they are more affected than
we being 2000 kilometers closer." He added that the
sanctions seemed to be having some effect on the
domestic population, but he ended by repeating the need
for a Quartet meeting. He said that it was important
for any approach to be done together with the Germans
and the Russians, particularly since the Russians are
closer to Iran and could be more easily targeted.
Kouchner suggested not including the Chinese because the
Chinese are "absolutely not useful" in this process.
The Secretary said it was important to follow up,
possibly with U.K. Foreign Secretary David Miliband on
the margins of the G-20 Summit in London.

---------------------
Russia/Georgia/Energy
---------------------

¶10. (C) FM Kouchner told the Secretary that France had
been surprised by the Georgian invasion. "We did stop
it, but we didn't solve it." He continued that the
South Ossetians and Abkhaz are a "sort of independent
people" but he worried that there is no humanitarian
access to the population. He said that Georgian PM
Saakashvili had been "badly inspired; he fell into the
trap." But the FM said the Geneva process should
continue, though it might take months or years. On
energy, he said the EU had been united, but then Poland,
Romania and others had been completely cut off and that
both Russia and Ukraine had been "absolutely awful." He
said "a group of Europeans were trying to secure a
pipeline from one country to the other." But he
cautioned that the U.S. position on Missile Defense was
also a factor. He complimented Medvedev as "a normal
guy, at least better than Putin," and credited him with
what he believed to be the sound decision not to put
Iskander missiles in Kalinigrad. He said things were
now more complicated with the Iranian space launch. On
the whole, things were frozen, which was "not bad" as a
place to be for the moment.

¶11. (C) Continuing on Russia, Kouchner said that the
main thing for the U.S. and Russia to begin to work
together. "Let's talk to them," he said. He said that
the Russians are "rough, rude, and brutal," but we
should still engage them. Kouchner said Russian FM
Lavrov was one of the most brutal, but was among the
cleverest FMs. In any case, they were an important
player and had to be included.

-------
Balkans
-------

¶12. (C) FM Kouchner said that Bosnia remained a
problem, but, it was important to simply "follow the
road." It was important to push the Serbian government
closer to the EU, though he conceded this was difficult
due to Dutch and Belgian objections to the failure of
the Serbs to hand over Ratko Mladic to ICTY. Presumably
referring to EULEX, he said there was success on the
ground in Kosovo as the two sides were not killing each
other and concluded that things were not in a bad place
for the moment.

------
Darfur
------

¶13. (C) FM Kouchner told the Secretary he thought the
International Criminal Court (ICC) would soon issue an
arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar al-
Bashir. He complimented the Qataris for playing a
useful role with their work in Doha. He said they were
working with both sides, including the Islamists. He
said it had taken two years to build toward success.
EUFOR, a contingent of 17 nations deployed in Eastern
Chad and northern Central African Republic, was a
success and he expected a resolution before March 15
when EUFOR will hand over its responsibilities to the UN
(MINURCAT II). On the humanitarian front, he estimated
that half of the displaced persons in Eastern Chad,
mainly women, would begin coming home in Darfur by March
¶15.

----------------------------
Book and Transatlantic Paper
----------------------------

¶14. (SBU) As the meeting ended, the Secretary said
there was a lot to digest and do. It would require
cooperation. On a lighter note, FM Kouchner said that
waiting journalists might raise the issue of "The World
According to K," the expose published yesterday accusing
him of enriching himself as a consultant in Africa,
tarnishing his humanitarian image. The Secretary
dismissed the book, saying "One book? I have 25.
You're not even in my league!" He said that "the first
one hurts a little more than the others." The FM asked
the Secretary for US reaction to the Transatlantic paper
passed to the U.S. during the French presidency. The
Secretary said she would review the issue and respond.
Note: EUR passed the paper to S staff on 2/5/09 and is
preparing a response to the FM). End note.

¶15. (U) Participants in the Bilateral:

United States
The Secretary
SCA - A/S Richard Boucher
EUR - PDAS Marcie Ries
NEA - DAS David Hale
PA - Robert Wood
EUR/WE - Pamela Spratlen (notetaker)
NSC - Toby Bradley
Interpreter

France
Foreign Minister Kouchner
Ambassador Vimont
Eric Chevallier, MFA Spokesperson
Philippe Errera, MFA Counselor
Emmanuelle Lenain, Embassy Spokesperson
Aurelien Lechevallier, Notetaker
Interpreter



CLINTON

10ANKARA302     2010-02-25 11:11     2010-11-30 16:04     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Ankara

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2242
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 1577
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 7044
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/MNF IRAQ C2 OPS
RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU
RUETIAA/NSACSS FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000302

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2020
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC MASS IR TU
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' FEBRUARY 18 MEETINGS WITH U/S
SINIRLIOGLU

REF: ANKARA 263

Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) Summary: During February 18 "Shared Vision and
Structured Dialogue" meetings in Ankara, Turkish MFA
Undersecretary Sinirlioglu:

-- Appealed for "simultaneity" between Armenian Protocols
ratification and the Minsk Process;
-- Registered increasing GoT dissatisfaction with Iraqi PM
Malaki;
-- Expressed hope USF-I CG Odierno's engagement would elicit
substantive cooperation from the KRG against the terrorist
PKK;
-- Urged higher profile USG involvment in the Cyprus
reunification talks, and;
-- Confirmed GoT interest in further dialogue on missile
defense.

End Summary.

IRAN
----

¶2. (C) Burns strongly urged Sinirlioglu to support action to
convince the Iranian government it is on the wrong course.
Sinirliolgu reaffirmed the GoT's opposition to a nuclear
Iran; however, he registered fear about the collateral impact
military action might have on Turkey and contended sanctions
would unite Iranians behind the regime and harm the
opposition. Burns acknowledged Turkey's exposure to the
economic effects of sanctions as a neighbor to Iran, but
reminded Sinirlioglu Turkish interests would suffer if Israel
were to act militarily to forestall Iran's acquisition of
nuclear weapons or if Egypt and Saudi Arabia were to seek
nuclear arsenals of their own. He said the international
community's patience with Iran had been met with the Iranian
refusal, since October, to work with the P5-plus-1, the
clandestine enrichment facility near Qom and Tehran's recent
decison to enrich its low-enriched uranium to 20%. The
IAEA's creative proposal to fabricate new fuel assemblies for
the Tehran Research Reactor had stumbled on a technically
unfeasible Iranian counter-offer for a simultaneous exchange
in Iran of Iranian fuel for fuel assemblies. Carefully
constructed sanctions, Burns argued, targeting the
increasingly pervasive economic power of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps, would convey the international
community's unity and determination. "We'll keep the door
open to engagement," he stressed. A visibly disheartened
Sinirlioglu conceded a unified message is important. He
acknowledged the countries of the region perceive Iran as a
growing threat: "Alarm bells are ringing even in Damascus."

ARMENIA
-------

¶3. (C) Sinirlioglu appealed for "simultaneity" between
Armenian Protocols ratification and the Minsk Process. He
emphasized "a strong reaction" against the protocols among
ruling party MPs had to be overcome before the government
would hazard a ratification effort. He warned Congressional
passage of an Armenian genocide resolution would "complicate"
his government's domestic political calculations regarding
ratification. He said if something acceptable to Azerbaijani
President Aliyev can found, then "we can move" the protocols
forward. Sinirlioglu suggested Azerbaijan and Armenia's
announcement of an agreed framework for Minsk Group progress
would provide the GoT with the necessary political cover.
Burns inquired about the prospect for progress on a natural
gas deal between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Sinirlioglu implied

ANKARA 00000302 002 OF 005


Aliyev is holding an agreement hostage to Turkey's handling
of the protocols: "He doesn't trust us."

IRAQ
----

¶4. (C) Sinirlioglu registered the GoT's increasing
dissatisfaction with PM Malaki and fear that he is tending
"to get out of control." "He is preoccupied with his
political survival;" nevertheless, Sinirlioglu continued,
the GoT is in frequent contact with him. The MFA hosted
Maliki advisors Sadiq al Rikabi and Tariq al Najmi to
meetings 10 days prior. Sinirlioglu lamented Iran's efforts
to influence the election. He noted Saudi Arabia is also
"throwing around money" among the political parties in Iraq
because it is unwilling to accept the inevitability of Shia
dominance there. "We want a free, transparent and fair
election," he said, "we need to forestall a deepening of the
sectarian divide."

¶5. (C) After the March 7 elections, Sinirlioglu said, Turkey
would initiate an effort to connect Iraqi gas fields to the
Turkish grid via a 300 kilometer pipeline, costing USD 500
million. He asserted the pipeline could begin pumping within
two years. He alleged Iranian opposition to the pipeline
because most of Iraq's gas fields are in Kurdish and Sunni
areas. Sinirlioglu advocated a second pipeline that would
give Iraqi oil an alternative to the Gulf as a route to
Europe once the country is able to meet its OPEC quota. He
asserted the piplines' construction would pull the several
Iraqi communities together into a common project. The
creation of new "common assets," he said, could be more
important for its politically unifying effect than its
economic impact.

¶6. (C) Sinirlioglu registered his appreciation for USF-I
Commanding General Odierno's recent visit. He hoped for the
early drafting of an action plan that would elicit more
cooperation from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)
against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
leadership harboring in northern Iraq: "We want the KRG to
understand that working with us is important."

ISRAEL
------

¶7. (C) Burns focused on Turkey's strained relationship with
Israel. Sinirlioglu argued "the problem is not bilateral,
but general." He attributed increasing regional country
frustration with Israel to the stalled Peace Process,
especially on the Palestinian track. He blamed the lack of
progress on Israeli intransigence, which caused regional
stake-holders to question Netanyahu's goals. He contended
the "humanitarian situation in Gaza," which is not a
punishment of Hamas, but of the Gazan people, fed Turkish
popular anger against Israel. Even so, bilateral cooperation
with Israel is continuing. Turkey is acquiring Israeli
military equipment, notably Heron UAVs. Direct flights
between the two countries are routine. Two-way trade is
healthy, he said, tourism has dropped recently, but "will
recover." Sinirlioglu described Israeli Defense Minister
Ehud Barak's mid-January visit as "very good." He noted the
MFA is exploring the possibility of arranging a meeting
between the two prime ministers on the margins of an
international gathering. Returning to a GoT obsession, he
recalled the Turkey-brokered Syria-Israel proximity talks,
"which were shattered by Cast Lead," Israel's December 2008
military operation in Gaza. Burns noted Syria places high
value on Turkey's role as a mediator and repeated Senator
Mitchell's statement that Turkey-brokered proximity talks can
make an important contribution to the Peace Process.

ANKARA 00000302 003 OF 005



SYRIA
-----

¶8. (C) Sinirlioglu contended Turkey's diplomatic efforts are
beginning to pull Syria out of Iran's orbit. He said a
shared hatred for Saddam had been the original impetus for
their unlikely alliance. "Now, their interests are
diverging." Once again pitching Israel-Syria proximity
talks, Sinirlioglu contended Israel's acceptance of Turkey as
a mediator could break Syria free of Tehran's influence and
further isolate Iran.

EU, CYPRUS and GREECE
---------------------

¶9. (C) Sinirlioglu said Turkey's EU accession is being
obstructed by the politically motivated objections of several
member states, notably France, Austria and Cyprus. He
reserved special criticism for President Sarkozy. He accused
France of changing the rules mid-game. He contended French
opposition to Turkey's membership is "deepening the cultural
divide" between Christian Europe and the Muslim world: "A
wider audience is watching this."

¶10. (C) He regretted perceived Greek Cypriot complacency
regarding the island's reunification talks: EU "membership
makes them invulnerable." Greek Cypriots, he said, want the
world to forget the progress achieved by the Annan Plan in
¶2004. They pretend relations between the island's two
communities are an internal affair, even though, by treaty,
it's been an international issue for 50 years. Talat's
cross-voting proposal, Sinirlioglu continued, should have
been a breakthrough, but the Greek Cypriots failed to react.
Downer is frustrated, Sinirlioglu alleged, and so are the
Turkish Cypriots. He implied the island's Turkish community
would register its frustration by voting out Talat as TRNC
"president" in April. He renewed Turkey's appeal for higher
profile direct USG involvement in the negotiations.

¶11. (C) Sinirlioglu welcomed Greek PM Papandeou's belated
response to Erdogan's October 30 letter seeking a frank new
discussion of the two neighbors' several long-running
disputes. He conceded Papandreou's delay is understandable
in light of his likely preoccupation with Greece's acute
financial crisis. Based on Papandreou's response,
Sinirlioglu said, Turkey expects to begin new talks with
Greece soon.

AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN and INDIA
-------------------------------

¶12. (C) Burns opened the discussion on Afghanistan with
praise for Turkey's military, training and development
contributions there. Sinirlioglu said Turkey had chosen to
focus on three Afghan challenges: "the marriage of Wahhabism
and Pashtun nationalism"; the chronic antagonism between
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and; the country's security forces
deficit. He said Turkey plans to address the first by
ramping up its education programs in Afghanistan; the second
by pursuing its trilateral Ankara Process, which sponsors
meetings of senior Afghan and Pakistani ministerial and
intelligence counterparts, and; the third by establishing a
police training center in Kabul that aims for a throughput of
5160 trainees per year. Keying off the last point, AMB Tacan
Ildem, who recently concluded an assignment as Turkey's NATO
PERMREP, declared the EUPOL police training effort in
Afghanistan a failure. He said the EU's criticism of
Turkey's unwillingness to work directly with EUPOL is
unjustified. He argued, since Turkey does not have a
security agreement with the EU and is excluded from the

ANKARA 00000302 004 OF 005


European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the GoT lacks a
legal basis on which to cooperate with EUPOL. "We would like
the EU to involve us not as a third country, but, in view of
our accumulated rights," as a candidate for membership. He
urged the USG not to coordinate bilateral agreements to
support EU operations but, instead, to route all cooperation
with the EU on security issues through NATO.

¶13. (C) Deputy Undersecretary for South Asian Affairs Engin
Soysal led the discussion on Pakistan. He described the
Ankara Process and the recent Turkey-sponsored Afghanistan
Neighbors Summit as Turkish efforts to assert regional
responsibility for South Asia's inter-linked problems. He
said Turkey had not invited India to the neighbors summit in
deference to Pakistani sensitivities; however, he claimed,
Pakistan understands attempting to exclude India from the
nascent South Asian regional structures would be a mistake.
He reported Indian Prime Minister Singh had requested
President Gul's assistance with Pakistan during the latter's
visit to New Delhi the previous week. Acting on that
request, Gul had phoned Pakistani President Zardari, who was
skeptical of Indian intentions. Gul is planning to visit
Pakistan later this year. Soysal said Iran is proposing a
quadrilateal summit, which would include Turkey, Afghanistan
and Pakistan, but that proposal had yet to generate
enthusiasm.

¶14. (C) Soysal, Turkey's former ambassador to Pakistan, said
the Pakistani military, though displeased with Zardari,
remains unwilling to intervene; nevertheless, senior
officers' patience may not be infinite. Zardari needs to
increase the democratic legitimacy of parliament. Soysal
offered. Nawaz Sharif has become a much more constructive
player.

¶15. (C) Soysal urged a NATO training role in Pakistan.
Picking up from Soysal, Tacan Ildem suggested NATO invite
Pakistani military officers to courses at Oberammergau.

BOSNIA
------

¶16. (C) Sinirlioglu registered the GoT's determination to
resist perceived EU efforts to exclude Turkey from the
Balkans, particularly Bosnia. He identified effecting
rapprochement between Bosnia and Serbia as Turkey's immediate
diplomatic goal for the region. Towards that end,
Sinirlioglu said, we convinced Haris Siladjdzic, who had been
in Ankara the day before, to cease references to Serbian
"genocide." The United States and Turkey have "agreed to
disagree" on the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Bosnia;
nevertheless, "we value your involvement in the Balkans."

BILATERAL EUROPEAN RELATIONS, NATO
----------------------------------

¶17. (C) Burns inquired about Turkey's bilateral relations
with Europe. Sinirlioglu briefly recapped Turkey's
unhappiness with Sarkozy. He described his country's
relationship with Austria as infected by the latter's ethnic
prejudice. He complained Belgium and Denmark are reluctant
to suppress terrorist PKK-affiliated organizations active in
their countries. Tacan Ildem added that, as part of the 2009
POTUS-brokered deal that had overcome Turkish objections to
the appointment of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO Secretary
General, Denmark had promised to clarify its legal
requirements prerequiste to acceding to Turkey's request for
the closure of Roj TV, a PKK mouthpiece. This still needed
to be done, Ildem said.

¶18. (C) Picking up from Ildem, Sinirlioglu recalled the

ANKARA 00000302 005 OF 005


POTUS-brokered deal had included an understanding that a
qualified Turk would be considered for Assistant Secretary
General. Instead, he said, a German of uncompelling merit
was selected. "We suspect a deal between Rasmussen and
Merkel." Ildem complained high-level positions should be
part of NATO reform: "We missed an opportunity with the
selection of the Assistant Secretary General." Sinirlioglu
added: "We let Rasmussen have Secretary General, because we
trusted you."

MISSILE DEFENSE
---------------

¶19. (C) Sinirlioglu inquired about Russia's reaction on
missile defense. Burns said the Russians are much more
relaxed towards the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) and we
hope to have more conversations on missile defense
bilaterally and, eventually, within the NATO-Russia Council.
Sinirlioglu recalled PM Erdogan's request in his recent
meeting with SECDEF Gates that the Iranian threat not be
highlighted to justify PAA.

¶20. (U) Participants:

Turkey

Undersecretary Feridun Sinirliolgu
Deputy Undersecretary Engin Soysal
Ambassador Reha Keskintepe, Director General for the Americas
Ambassador Tacan Ildem, Director General for International
Security Affairs
Ambassador Aydin Sezgin, Director General for Intelligence
and Security Affairs
Ebru Barat Gokdenizler, Deputy Director General for the
Americas
Serhat Aksen, Department Head, Americas

United States

Undersecretary William Burns
Ambassador James Jeffrey
Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina Kaidanow
Bridget Brink, NSC
Daniel O'Grady, Political Counselor
Tamir Waser, P Staff
Jeremiah Howard, Deputy Political Counselor - Notetaker

¶21. (U) Undersecretary Burns has cleared this cable.



Jeffrey

"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"

09LONDON2303     2009-10-06 16:04     2010-11-30 11:11     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy London

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DE RUEHLO #2303/01 2791646
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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T LONDON 002303

NOFORN
SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 10/06/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ECON, UK, KNNP, MOPS, IR, PK, AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY’S OCTOBER 10-11
VISIT TO LONDON

Classified By: Ambassador Louis B. Susman for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

¶1. (C//NF) Summary. The Secretary’s visit to London comes on the heels of the Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Democrat political party conferences -- their last before the UK elections which must be held by June 2010. The domestic political situation remains in flux, but with the Conservatives enjoying a consistent lead in the polls. A Conservative victory is not assured, however; the Conservatives have done a better job of criticizing Labour policies than of selling Conservative solutions. The cumulative contraction of the UK economy by 5.7 percent over the last five quarters has focused electoral discussions on economic issues. The major foreign policy issues for the election are the UK’s involvement in Afghanistan, which all parties continue to back for now in spite of eroding public support and a lively debate in the media, and the UK’s role in the EU, which Labour has been using as an example of the Conservatives’ “isolationist” tendencies on economic and foreign policy. Politically, PM Brown and Foreign Secretary David Miliband will want the Secretary’s visit to demonstrate the strength of their relationship with the U.S. administration in order to counter domestic press speculation about a perceived decline in the “special relationship” following Megrahi’s release and President Obama’s reported “snubbing” of PM Brown’s requests for one-on-one meetings at the G-20 and UNGA. Some of the key issues of import to the UK Government are Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Northern Ireland, and non-proliferation. End summary.

The UK on Key Issues
--------------------

¶2. (S//NF) The Secretary’s meetings with PM Gordon Brown and Foreign Secretary David Miliband likely will focus on the following key issues:

-- Afghanistan - As the second largest force contributor in Afghanistan, the UK has lost 219 soldiers since operations began in 2001. The up-tick in British casualties in July and August 2009 has contributed to renewed public debate on the UK’s engagement there. Public support for the war effort is tepid. Rather than questioning the reasons for the UK’s presence in Afghanistan, many critics instead have asserted that Brown has provided insufficient troops and equipment (including helicopters) to get the job done. In his September 25 discussion with the President, Brown said Afghan forces must shoulder a greater portion of the burden and take more responsibility for their own affairs and asserted the UK would not be “cutting out” of Afghanistan, though it lacks the capacity to commit additional troops. Brown and Miliband made similar statements to General McChrystal on October 1 and Admiral Mullen and Admiral Stavridis October 2, and the PM’s Foreign Policy Advisor Simon McDonald has asked the USG to show “understanding of the political pressures that the PM is under.” However, UK military officials claim that 1,000 - 2,000 additional troops are available for deployment. Brown, Miliband, and British military leaders would like other NATO allies to assume a greater share of combat operations, stressing that the U.S., UK and a few other allies have borne the brunt of the fighting. The PM very much wants to see strong U.S. leadership and is anxious to see the Administration’s policy review completed soon.

-- Iran - The UK has privately shared with us that it is ready to proceed with designations of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and Bank Mellat under their Counter Terrorism Act powers, an action that requires parliamentary approval. In the wake of the October 1 P5 1 meeting in Geneva, however, UK officials are likely to want to consult with the U.S. on the best timing for announcing the designation. UK officials may also raise the issue of Nosratollah Tajik, former Iranian ambassador to Jordan, currently under arrest in the UK and awaiting extradition to the U.S. on charges of procuring restricted military items (night-vision goggles) for the Iranian government. Tajik has exhausted all judicial appeals in the UK and all that stands in the way of the extradition is approval by the Home Secretary. Before approving the extradition, the UK wants to be sure the timing is right and will not interfere with our joint efforts through the P5 1 to engage with Iran.

-- Pakistan - Because of immigration and economic ties, Pakistan has an important domestic dimension for the UK and will feature in public debates in the run-up to the UK’s 2010 elections. Following the Friends of Pakistan meeting on September 25, the UK announced it will provide an extra GBP 50 million (USD 80 million) to improve infrastructure and security in Pakistan’s border areas. However, UK officials later confirmed that these are not new funds and will instead
come from the current GBP 655 million (USD 1 billion) already designated for Pakistan aid. British leaders view a secure Pakistan as key to regional stability. They recognize Pakistan’s now more effective response to the Taliban and other extremists, but say more is needed.

-- Northern Ireland - Prime Minister Brown and Northern Ireland Secretary Shaun Woodward will probably ask the Secretary to urge Northern Ireland First Minister Peter Robinson and Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness to accept the “Westminster Package,” regarding the devolution of justice and policing powers, which was recently presented by Prime Minister Brown. HMG would like to reach an agreement with the parties this week, before the Secretary’s arrival. HMG argues that the proposal is a good deal for Northern Ireland. If the agreement is not completed by the weekend, there is potential that some of the parties could seek to draw in the Secretary. The best approach is to urge all parties to work together patiently to reach agreement. An agreement would be a strong, positive signal to potential investors.

-- nuclear Non-proliferation - Both PM Brown and FS Miliband welcome U.S. leadership on the global nuclear non-proliferation agenda, including the April 2010 nuclear Security Summit in Washington. The UK firmly agrees with us on the importance of close P5 and P3 cooperation in the lead up to next year’s nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference. At UNGA, Brown emphasized that the onus is on non-nuclear states to prove they are not developing nuclear weapons. He also pledged the UK’s support for sponsoring a uranium bank and offering civil nuclear power to non-nuclear states that fulfill their responsibilities. He also announced that, subject to the sustained ability to maintain continuous deterrence, the UK will consider reducing its fleet of Trident nuclear-armed submarines from four to three. The move also is regarded as a cost-cutting measure for a government facing significant fiscal challenges in the coming years.

-- Defense Trade Treaty - The PM and FS Miliband may ask about the status of the Defense Trade Treaty and when the Senate will ratify it. U/S Tauscher told UK officials on September 30 that her goal is to have the Senate act on the treaty by year’s end. U/S Tauscher and A/S Shapiro are working to counter the SFRC staff’s belief that implementing legislation is necessary to enforce the treaty and to address their concerns about Congressional consultations and notifications.

-- Arms Trade Treaty - Miliband frequently raises with senior U.S. interlocutors the possibility of negotiating an ATT. We continue to have doubts about the possibility of negotiating an effective treaty, but are willing to move forward on the condition that it will proceed on the consensus basis traditional for multilateral arms control and nonproliferation negotiations.

-- Gary McKinnon Extradition Case - The PM will likely raise with the Secretary (as he has with the Ambassador) the extradition case of Gary McKinnon. McKinnon is a 43-year old computer hacker with Asperger’s Syndrome who is wanted for prosecution in the U.S.; he is accused of hacking into U.S. government systems in 2001 and 2002. McKinnon has gained enormous popular sympathy in his appeal against extradition; the UK’s final decision is pending. The case has also caused public criticism of the U.S.-UK extradition treaty. In August, PM Brown, in a one-on-one meeting with the Ambassador, proposed a deal: that McKinnon plead guilty, make a statement of contrition, but serve any sentence of incarceration in the UK. Brown cited deep public concern that McKinnon, with his medical condition, would commit suicide or suffer injury in imprisoned in a U.S. facility. The Ambassador has raised this proposal with AG Holder and would be happy to brief the Secretary in more detail.

Domestic Politics in Flux in Run-up to Elections
--------------------------------------------- ---

¶3. (C//NF) The annual political party conferences currently underway have thrust the UK into electoral campaigning mode, with the Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Democrat parties all positioning themselves for the general elections, which must occur before June 2010. The recent conferences have given each party in turn an up-tick in the polls, though with the Tories consistently enjoying a significant overall lead. PM Brown is unchallenged as leader of the Labour Party, but remains embattled by the UK media. Many in his party question if Labour can win the next elections with him at the helm despite his strong showing at the Labour conference. Honing its campaign message, the Labour Party plans to make
the elections about class divisions, highlighting Labour’s strong public services record and its economic vision for Britain. At present, the major foreign policy issues shaping the electoral debate are the UK’s involvement in Afghanistan, which all parties continue to back for now in spite of eroding public support and a lively debate in the media, and the UK’s role in the European Union, which Labour has been using as an example of Conservative economic and foreign policy “isolationist” tendencies.

¶4. (C//NF) Conservative leader David Cameron’s headline message to the media as the Tory conference began October 5 was about the UK’s “twin crises” of debt and unemployment and the Tory’s to-be-unveiled “big, bold, and radical” scheme to “get Britain working.” The Tories’ platform during the June European and local elections was based on keeping in focus bedrock issues such as the economy, job creation, and health and education reform; casting Labour as profligate and irresponsible; and portraying the Conservatives as the party of thrift, responsible spending and transparency. Ireland’s “yes” vote on the Lisbon Treaty has highlighted internal Conservative party divisions on the EU as the conference gets underway. PM Brown and FS Miliband may ask the Secretary to emphasize U.S. support for a “strong Europe” as a way to highlight Conservative schisms.

¶5. (C//NF) In response to the summer 2009 parliamentary expenses scandal, which has alienated some voters from the political class and the mainstream parties, Cameron has been credited with reacting more decisively than Brown - a performance that some political commentators have said demonstrated impressive leadership, especially compared to Brown (who throughout his prime ministership has had to fight accusations of indecisiveness). Keeping the public focused on the economy, Cameron has said the Conservatives would be judged by their response to the UK’s debt crisis and has called for an “age of austerity.” While spending cuts are expected to be a large part of the future Conservative program, neither Cameron nor Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer Osborne has offered details on where government spending should be cut, beyond just saying there will be a ten percent cross-the-board cut with only education and the National Health Services remaining untouched. Many in the UK public remain skeptical of the Tories’ unspecified plans for major cuts.

¶6. (C//NF) The UK’s relationship with the U.S. has also become a campaign issue. During the fever pitch of UK media reporting on the release of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, the Conservatives blamed Labour for damaging the “special relationship.” The UK media has refused to let the issue die, continuing its mischievous reporting of recent alleged USG snubs of senior UK officials, particularly during UNGA.

Overview of UK Economy
----------------------

¶7. (U) The UK officially entered recession in the third quarter of 2008 and has suffered a cumulative contraction of 5.7 percent over the last five quarters. In July, the IMF forecast a further contraction of 4.2 percent in 2009 and growth of 0.2 percent in 2010. HM Treasury expects a contraction of 3.5 percent in 2009 and growth of 1.25 percent in 2010. Unemployment stands at 7.8 percent, its highest since 1995, and is expected to climb to more than 10 percent in early 2010. Unemployment is particularly acute among 18-to-24 year olds at 17 percent. The economic downturn is taking a heavy toll on trade. According to U.S Commerce Department and U.S. International Trade Commission monthly trade statistics, U.S. goods exports to the UK declined by 21.7 percent from January to June 2009, compared to the same period in 2008, and UK exports to the U.S. declined by 25.6 percent. Concerns about employment figures remain high, with unemployment rates near eight percent and expected to peak just in advance of the parliamentary elections.

¶8. (U) Public debt stands at GBP 800 billion (56.8 percent of GDP), its highest level since records began in 1974, and up from 56.6 percent last month. However, UK debt as a percentage of GDP is still lower than in the other G7 countries. How to manage and finance the UK’s debt burden is a key issue dividing the two parties, and is expected to emerge as one of the top economic issues during the political campaign.
Visit London’s Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN

08BEIJING1141     2008-03-26 09:09     2010-11-29 21:09     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Beijing

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Wednesday, 26 March 2008, 09:48
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 001141
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/26/2033
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PARM, KNNP, MNUC, KN, CH, IR
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL JANUZZI DISCUSSES NONPROLIFERATION, IRAN,
AND DPRK WITH MFA ARMS CONTROL DIRECTOR GENERAL
Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Current bilateral cooperation on arms control, nonproliferation and export control is “remarkable,” MFA Department of Arms Control Director General Cheng Jingye told Staffdel Januzzi March 24. Nevertheless, there is a “perception” that the United States counts on China’s support on nonproliferation issues but does not fully trust China as an equal partner. On Iran, China supports a dual approach which includes applying pressure via Security Council resolutions and focusing on the diplomatic front. China’s cooperation with Iran on energy is unrelated to the Iran nuclear issue and Cheng “can’t imagine” the consequences if Sinopec is sanctioned. On North Korea, Cheng urged the United States to find a creative resolution to the declaration issue. End Summary.
¶2. (C) Frank Januzzi and Puneet Talwar, staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, met MFA Department of Arms Control Director General Cheng Jingye March 24 to discuss Chinese views on arms control, non-proliferation, Iran and North Korea.
“Remarkable” Cooperation
------------------------
¶3. (C) Arms control, export controls and nonproliferation all contribute to China’s security, said Cheng. A decade ago, cooperation between China and the United States focused on certain cases, but today’s level of cooperation on nonproliferation and arms control issues is “remarkable,” Cheng said. For example, China is actively involved in diplomatic negotiation efforts on North Korea and Iran. And in many areas of nonproliferation, said Cheng, the two countries see “eye-to-eye.” He referred to multilateral agreements such as the nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement and said that even if China is not a member of these various organizations, China has in place its own export control regime. For example, there is interagency coordination on sensitive exports as well as alleged proliferation cases raised by the United States. Cheng noted that while the pace of implementing arms control agreements has slowed in the past decade, China is prepared to move the disarmament conference forward within the United Nations framework.
Equal Partners
--------------
¶4. (C) Cheng contended that there is a “perception” that the United States counts on China’s support and cooperation on nonproliferation issues but does not fully trust or treat China as an equal partner. For example, in the 1990s, China was invited to join the MTCR and the Australia Group but declined to join. Currently, however, China is “not welcome,” despite expressing a willingness to join, Cheng said. China and the United States need to cooperate on a “mutual, equal basis.” Cheng also raised the issue of sanctions against China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC). CGWIC has been subject to sanctions for ten years without “solid evidence,” said Cheng. Over the past 3-4 years, CGWIC has restructured the company, changed its business model and prohibited contacts with countries of concern to the United States. Cheng expressed hope that the company would make progress during its March 20 meetings in Washington.
Iran
----
¶5. (C) Cheng said China and the United States share the same goal for Iran: no further proliferation of nuclear weapons. China makes this point very clearly to the international community and to Iran in the context of its private bilateral contacts. PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told Iranian leaders during his November visit to Iran that China is opposed to proliferation in the Middle East. China supports the UNSCRs on Iran and the P5-plus-1 process, emphasized Cheng. After the release of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and IAEA reports on Iran last year, there is a need for more diplomatic efforts, Cheng said. China supports a dual approach which includes applying pressure via UNSCRs and focusing on the diplomatic front.
¶6. (C) One of the dilemmas of the Iran nuclear issue is that despite three UNSCRs, Iran’s capability to enrich uranium
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continues to expand, Cheng underscored. China and other countries need to be “creative” in devising a proposal “attractive” to Iran. The international community must find a way to ensure its concerns about Iran’s nuclear development are addressed and promote the peaceful development of nuclear energy, maintained Cheng. Cheng reasoned that if incentives do not work, then it will make applying pressure easier in the future because it shows that diplomacy was not effective. The P5-plus-1 meeting in Shanghai in April will allow the ministers to discuss strategy on next steps. Cheng noted that a recent proposal from the United Nations Association of the USA (UNA-USA) includes some interesting ideas and that his office is in the process of studying its proposal. Cheng said that Germany has put forward a proposal to “refresh” previous offers. China believes that the P5-plus-1 will need to offer new incentives to Iran.
¶7. (C) Iran might be more willing to offer a reciprocal positive gesture on the nuclear issue if it does not feel threatened by regime change, Cheng said. Regarding Iran’s claim that it did not have a nuclear program prior to 2003, China is not in a position to comment without presentation of evidence and materials, Cheng said. China continues to urge Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and encourages the IAEA to play a greater role. Cheng also discussed possible incentives for Iran after international confidence is restored, including reinstatement as a non-nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) member, education cooperation, normalization of economic relations, etc.
China-Iran Energy Cooperation
-----------------------------
¶8. (C) Regarding China-Iran energy cooperation, Cheng believes that there is a “misunderstanding” on the part of the United States. China has made clear its need for energy resources and has previously stated that its cooperation with Iran on energy has nothing to do with the Iran nuclear issue. China hopes that the U.S. Congress understands this point, said Cheng. Specifically, the threat of sanctions against Sinopec is a very serious issue, Cheng emphasized. Sinopec is very important to China and Cheng “can’t imagine” the consequences if the company is sanctioned. Januzzi noted Cheng’s concerns and said that he would pass this message to Washington.
North Korea
-----------
¶9. (C) Januzzi recounted his meetings with DPRK counterparts during his five-day trip to North Korea and said that he encouraged them to provide a declaration. Cheng said that China does not have specific information on North Korea’s alleged purchase of centrifuge technology and that China had received this information from the United States. He urged the United States to focus on the future and not to dwell on the past. The United States is not interested in delving into North Korea’s past, Januzzi countered. The United States needs to have clarity on certain issues, however, in order to move forward. According to Cheng, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei urged the DPRK to take advantage of this unique opportunity. The resolution of the declaration issue will require some imagination and creativity, Cheng said. North Korea does not fully trust the United States and remains concerned about admitting to an activity it claims never existed, Cheng claimed.
¶10. (U) Staffdel Januzzi did not have an opportunity to clear this cable. PICCUTA

09ASTANA982     2009-06-08 10:10     2010-11-29 21:09     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Astana

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STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/A, EUR/CARC, EAP/CM, EAP/K, EEB/ESC
EO 12958 DECL: 06/08/2029
TAGS PREL, ECON, EPET, AF, GG, RS, IR, KN, ZK, KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: CHINESE AMBASSADOR COMMENTS ON KEY FOREIGN
POLICY ISSUES
REF: ASTANA 0678
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On June 5, Chinese Ambassador Cheng Guoping hosted the Ambassador for dinner at the restaurant on the 23rd floor of a striking new hotel built in Astana and owned by the Chinese National Petroleum Company. During a fascinating, wide-ranging, three-hour tour d’horizon, the Chinese Ambassador discussed his government’s policy -- and occasionally made personal comments -- on human rights, smart power, President Obama, Afghanistan’s reconstruction, Russia’s policy in Central Asia, Georgian President Saakashvili, Iran’s upcoming presidential elections, North Korea’s nuclear tests, Central Asia’s energy resources, the Manas air base, and the proposed international nuclear fuel bank. The Chinese Ambassador clearly enjoyed the free and easy, open-ended conversation and invited the Ambassador to meet again, at the restaurant, in the near future. Guoping was joined by an unidentified policy advisor and an interpreter, to whom he addressed his remarks in soft whispers throughout the evening. END SUMMARY.
CHINA’S MFA “SCARED” BY PELOSI’S VISIT
¶2. (SBU) Guoping was relaxed, wearing short sleeves and no jacket, and clearly eager to engage and entertain his American guests. He began the evening by referring to the recent visit to Beijing of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. Without openly acknowledging or discussing the twentieth anniversary of the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square protests, Guoping said the government was prepared, and also fearful, for the Speaker to raise human rights and democracy issues during her visit. “She had the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) scared to death on the eve of her visit,” Guoping said, half-jokingly.
PRAISE FOR SMART POWER
¶3. (SBU) Without prompting, Guoping praised President Obama’s leadership style and approach to foreign affairs. He singled out the President’s “effective management” of the financial crisis, for example, calling his decisions to stimulate the U.S. economy “bold and courageous.” He called the President’s June 4 speech in Cairo - which Guoping was able to download in Mandarin from the Department’s website - “a milestone for the use of smart power.” Guoping said the President’s willingness to employ both military and cultural assets would prove to be a “very effective” approach to foreign affairs. He observed that statesmen require both in order to achieve their policy objectives and said the Administration’s use of “smart power is a very good idea.”
IRANIAN ELECTIONS
¶4. (SBU) Guoping perceptively connected the Cairo speech to upcoming elections in Iran. “This speech is very timely,” he said. “I predict that it will influence Iran’s presidential elections, and will be particularly beneficial for reformers in Iran.” He said that President Obama has already played a positive role in rebuilding U.S. relations with Iran and again stressed the importance of the upcoming elections. “The reformists have a chance,” he said. Guoping suggested that it would be impossible for Iran to ignore President Obama’s overtures for long. “They cannot remain in the background of these global changes in foreign policy. If they do, they will become even more isolated than they already are. And ultimately, if Iran doesn’t respond, President Obama will have to change his policy. Iran might be the last country standing for extremism in the Muslim world,” he said.
FOCUS ON THE TALIBAN
¶5. (SBU) About Afghanistan, Guoping said the Taliban is the real enemy of the United States and the “basis for terrorism in South Asia.” He argued that the United States must first “eradicate the Taliban in order to defeat terror in Iraq” and said the Administration’s emphasis on Afghanistan was a shrewd policy. “You have enlisted the help of all governments in the region to assist
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with the rebuilding of Afghanistan, saying that to do so is to play a part in the war against terrorism. No one is able to say openly that they do not want to combat terrorism, so you have made it very difficult to refuse to help.”
NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
¶6. (C) In particular, Guoping said that the Northern Distribution Network to transport non-lethal supplies to U.S. troops in Afghanistan has enabled many countries to participate in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. He said that the Chinese government is aware of the U.S. government’s request to transit non-lethal supplies via China and said “we are actively researching this suggestion. In essence, it would mean that the People’s Republic of China would be supporting a NATO military operation, which would be an interesting development.” Guoping confided that China’s MFA and its Ministry of Defense have different opinions on the subject, although he said he expected a decision soon. “My own personal opinion,” he said, “is that we will do the right thing and cooperate with NATO and the U.S. government in Afghanistan.” Guoping said this would be an appropriate issue to raise in the context of the President’s visit to Beijing in July.
RUSSIA’S POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA
¶7. (C) Guoping said that Russia is experiencing “severe difficulty” now because of the global financial crisis. He suggested that the government of Russia is eager to improve relations with the United States now because Moscow is concerned that the economic downturn will begin to affect the political stability of the country, “even the stability of the Kremlin.” Guoping said that Russia does not want or need any foreign policy problems right now; “they need to focus on their domestic, economic affairs.” Guoping also said that Russia would like more support from the United States for its insistence on a privileged sphere of influence in Central Asia, in exchange for greater cooperation in Afghanistan. “Russia is convinced that they must dominate Central Asia and the Caucasus. They believe they have vital, strategic, historical interests in the region,” Guoping said. When pressed by the Ambassador to express his own opinion, Guoping said, “I personally do not agree that Russia should be granted a special sphere of influence in the region, but that is their view.”
ON GEORGIA
¶8. (C) On Georgia, Guoping said he expects Russia to use military force to overthrow Georgian President Saakashvili. He did not elaborate or offer any specifics, but merely observed that Russia has already established military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and is likely to remain there for the foreseeable future. Guoping worked in Georgia for four years and understands well the history and culture of its people. He observed that South Ossetia has strong cultural ties to Russia, but said it is likely that the Ossetians will ultimately press for greater independence from Russian influence.
¶9. (C) In unusually blunt language, Guoping said Saakashvili is “not a mature statesman. He overreacted to Russian provocations and gave Russia the opportunity to take Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” Guoping suggested that Secretary Rice’s July 2008 visit to Georgia before the war in August 2008, might have indirectly encouraged Saakashvili to take military action. He said his understanding was that Saakashvili briefed Secretary Rice on his plans to mobilize Georgian armed forces and when she did not directly object, Saakashvili mistook that as a sign of U.S. support. Guoping said, “Clearly, Russia baited and cheated Georgia. But Saakashvili was impressed with his earlier success in Batumi (Adjara) and he thought he could involve the United States in the war.” Guoping said he expects former Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze to become Georgia’s next president. “She is much more mature than Saakashvili. He won’t stay long,” he said.
NORTH KOREA’S nuclear TESTS, DOMESTIC POLITICS
¶10. (C) Guoping seemed genuinely concerned by North Korea’s recent
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nuclear missile tests. “We need to solve this problem. It is very troublesome,” he said, calling Korea’s nuclear activity a “threat to the whole world’s security.” China opposes North Korea’s nuclear testing and is working to achieve peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, according to Guoping. When asked about the reunification of Korea, Guoping said China hopes for peaceful reunification in the long-term, but he expects the two countries to remain separate in the short-term. Guoping said the domestic political situation in North Korea is “very complex” and suggested that Kim Jong-il’s reported decision to anoint his youngest son as his successor was driven more by Kim’s deteriorating health than any carefully planned strategy. “They had no time to plan for this,” he said. Guoping said the “military really governs” North Korea and controls domestic politics and foreign policy. He suggested that Kim Jong-il’s announcement was designed to send a message to the military and the great powers that he is really in charge and in control. Guoping said China’s objectives in North Korea were to ensure they honor their commitments on nonproliferation, maintain stability, and “don’t drive [Kim Jong-il] mad.”
CENTRAL ASIAN ENERGY
¶11. (SBU) Turning to a discussion of energy resources and energy security in Central Asia, Guoping said that Russia owns and controls most of Central Asia’s pipelines, “but it cannot prevent the ultimate diversification of export routes.” He said that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are close to Russia, but they nevertheless understand that they must seek and develop alternatives. He predicted that they will soon “break the Russian monopoly” on the export of hydrocarbons from the region and said the oil and gas pipelines to China now under construction will be “very important” in that regard. Guoping said that Kazakhstan’s oil pipeline from Atasu to Alashankou would be completed in July and will initially carry 200,000 barrels per day (bbl/d), but will soon be expanded to 400,000 bbl/d. He said China would encourage Western oil companies to ship their production eastward. He was aware of plans to ship Kazakhstani oil across the Caspian Sea by tanker and said China had no objections to the project, which they considered “strictly commercial.” When asked about China’s recent $10 billion loan to Kazakhstan, Guoping confirmed that $5 billion was earmarked for investments in the energy sector, including the purchase of 50% of MangistauMunaiGas, while the remaining $5 billion would be delivered to the Development Bank of Kazakhstan as a “soft loan that the government would be free to use as it likes.”
POTENTIAL PARTNERSHIP WITH U.S. OIL COMPANIES
¶12. (SBU) Guoping said China sees “great potential for an energy partnership with U.S. companies in Central Asia,” including the development of onshore resources in Turkmenistan. He said that the Chinese MFA is very interested in pursuing these opportunities and suggested that this would be worth including in the China-U.S. Strategic Economic Dialogue. “This is very reasonable,” he said, adding, “Our government would actively support such a proposal.” The Ambassador noted that Chevron is already working with Chinese companies in western China.
ON NAZARBAYEV
¶13. (SBU) Commenting on President Nazarbayev, Guoping called him a “wise and mature statesman,” who has presided over a period of remarkable stability and economic growth. He praised President Nazarbayev’s foreign policy skills and added that China’s MFA has “great respect” for President Nazarbayev and holds him in high regard.
MANAS AIR BASE
¶14. (C) Referring to the Manas air base, Guoping said that the government of Kyrgyzstan has tried to show similar sophistication in balancing the interests of the great powers in the neighborhood, but has been much less successful. He said that according to his information, the United States is prepared to pay an additional $50 million a year to the government of Kyrgyzstan “to make them think
ASTANA 00000982 004 OF 004
about” keeping the base open. He said he has seen a subtle shift in U.S. policy in the region, adding, “You’ve also made important progress in Uzbekistan. We ourselves have noticed a change in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy over the last year, especially toward Russia.”
nuclear FUEL BANK
¶15. (C) Guoping did not appear to be well briefed on the subject of the IAEA-administered international nuclear fuel bank proposed by the nuclear Threat Initiative. He was aware of Russia’s earlier proposal to host a fuel bank, but he seemed surprised when told that Kazakhstan has announced its intention to host an IAEA-administered fuel bank on its territory. Indeed, he went so far as to question the accuracy of the Ambassador’s information that Iranian President Ahmadinejad supported Kazakhstan’s proposal during his state visit to Astana in April. “We are still conducting research on this idea,” Guoping said, subtly indicating his unwillingness - or inability - to discuss the subject further.
¶16. (C) COMMENT: In the past six months, the Ambassador and Guoping have established a relaxed, open, and even frank relationship. Guoping prefers to meet the Ambassador in the U.S. Embassy or in a public place, having explained previously that he believes his own Embassy’s temporary quarters are thoroughly bugged -- by whom, he doesn’t say. CNPC built the high-rise, pagoda-roofed Beijing hotel as a gift to Astana. The marble lobby is impressive, if a bit too totalitarian-austere. The hotel was supposed to have opened in January, and we are not convinced that it is now fully open for business. We were the only guests in the restaurant, although an untouched full buffet was laid out. The revolving restaurant provides a spectacular panorama of Astana, and the empty steppe beyond, but it seems to revolve at varying speeds and sometimes can be a bit too fast on a full stomach and after a few glasses of wine. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND

09ANKARA1654     2009-11-17 17:05     2010-11-29 21:09     SECRET     Embassy Ankara
Appears in these articles:
nytimes.com

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS: KNNP PREL TU IR
SUBJECT: TURKEY: A/S GORDON PRESSES FM DAVUTOGLU ON IRAN

REF: ANKARA 1626

Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4(b,d)

¶1. (S) Iran dominated A/S Gordon's 40-minute meeting November
12 with Foreign Minister Davutoglu. The FM had just gotten
off the phone with El-Baradei and had discussed in detail the
IAEA proposal to send Iran's low enriched uranium to Turkey.
El-Baradei had said he would "call Washington" that same
morning. This had followed two long "harsh" sessions with
the Iranians in Istanbul on Sunday evening. The Iranians
have said they are willing to meet with Solana, but have told
the Turks that they have serious problems with Cooper and the
British. They have "more trust" in the U.S. The Iranians
would also prefer to get fuel from the U.S. rather than the
Russians.

¶2. (S) Davutoglu said the Iranians: a) are ready to send a
delegation to Vienna to work out the specifics on this
proposal; b) have given their "full trust" to Turkey; c)
continue to face serious domestic problems inside Iran. He
said the Turks actually see Ahmadinejad as "more flexible"
than others who are inside the Iranian Government.
Ahmadinejad is facing "huge pressure" after statements from
some P5 members to the effect that a nuclear deal would
succeed in weakening Iran,s nuclear capability -- which is
interpreted by some circles in Iran as a virtual defeat.

¶3. (S) Given this context, the Turks had asked Ahmadinejad if
the core of the issue is psychological rather than substance.
Ahmadinejad had said "yes," that the Iranians agree to the
proposal but need to manage the public perception.
Accordingly, the Iranians are proposing that the first 400
kilos be transferred to Kish Island -- thereby keeping it on
Iranian soil -- and would receive right away an equivalent
amount (30-50 kilos) of enriched fuel. The second stage
would focus on the management of Iranian public opinion,
after which Tehran would proceed with the Turkey option for
the remaining 800 kilos, probably in two tranches. Davutoglu
said Baradei agreed to consider this.

¶4. (S) Davutoglu noted that he had spoken to NSA General
Jones Wednesday, who had said that we should perhaps suggest
to the Iranians that they transfer 600 kilos to Kish Island
and 600 kilos to Turkey simultaneously. A/S Gordon said he
could not give an official response to the proposal as this
is the first time we heard it, but that he anticipates much
skepticism about providing fuel to Iran before all the LEU
has been taken out. It would be better to get all 1200 kilos
out right away.

¶5. (C) Davutoglu noted that these are two different
proposals. The first is Iran's request for fuel for its
nuclear reactor. Even if this takes place, he said, we still
need to work on limiting Iran's nuclear enrichment
capability. If we succeed with this proposal, he said, it
will create "confidence" and a "new momentum" and would allow
room for negotiation.

¶6. (C) Noting that Davutoglu had only addressed the negative
consequences of sanctions or the use of military force,
Gordon pressed Davutoglu on Ankara's assessment of the
consequences if Iran gets a nuclear weapon. Davutoglu gave a
spirited reply, that "of course" Turkey was aware of this
risk. This is precisely why Turkey is working so hard with
the Iranians. President Gul himself had spent two hours
Sunday with Ahmadinejad in Istanbul.

¶7. (C) Gordon noted that while we acknowledge that Turkey can
be helpful as a mediator, some of the Prime Minister's recent
public comments raise questions about how Turkey sees this
issue. Davutoglu said he is aware of these concerns, but
contended that the Guardian newspaper had not accurately
presented its recent interview with the Prime Minister. The
PM's comments had been taken out of context. Erdogan had
been asked if he views Iran as a friend. If he had said
"no," it would not have been possible to convince Tehran to
cooperate on this latest proposal. Only Turkey can speak
bluntly and critically to the Iranians, Davutoglu contended,
but only because Ankara is showing public messages of
friendship.

¶8. (C) Gordon pushed back that Ankara should give a stern
public message about the consequences if UN resolutions are
ignored. Davutoglu countered that Erdogan had given just
such a statement in Tehran when he visited. He emphasized
that Turkey's foreign policy is giving a "sense of justice"
and a "sense of vision" to the region. Turkey has provided a
"third option" in addition to Iran and the Saudis (who he
contended are viewed as "puppets" of the US). The result, he
said, is that we "limit Iranian influence in the region." We

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need a "pro-Western approach AND a sense of justice."

¶9. (C) A/S Gordon has cleared this cable.

JEFFREY

"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"

09BEIJING3313     2009-12-11 10:10     2010-11-29 21:09     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Beijing

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TAGS PREL, PARM, MNUC, PGOV, KN, IR, CH
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS MEETING WITH CCID DIRECTOR
WANG JIARUI ON IRAN, NORTH KOREA

Classified By: Political Minster Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

¶1. (C) Under Secretary Burns met with Director of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee International Liaison Department (CCID) Wang Jiarui December 9 to discuss U.S.-China cooperation on North Korea and Iran. Wang said that the “ideal outcome” of Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth’s current visit to Pyongyang would be a meeting with DPRK leader Kim Jong-il. The very fact of the visit, Wang emphasized, was important because it sent a signal to the DPRK that the United States was serious about negotiating a settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue. The DPRK would be unwilling in the short run to publicly announce denuclearization or an immediate return to the Six-Party talks, but would not want to lose the opportunity presented by Ambassador Bosworth’s visit. The important thing was to keep things moving in the right direction and prevent the situation spinning out of control.

¶2. (C) Wang praised U.S. policy on Iran, calling it a “practical” approach. He said China was in agreement with the United States “in principle” that Iran should not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons and that the consequences of such an event would have a negative impact on Chinese interests. He also said that China would cooperate in persuading Iran to live up to the commitments it made at the October meeting in Geneva with the P5-plus-1 to resume discussions on the nuclear issue and allow third countries to reprocess its nuclear fuel. However, Wang insisted, continued diplomacy, rather than military action or stronger sanctions, was the best option at present. U/S Burns stressed the importance of China’s cooperation and would not close the door on diplomacy but that U.S. patience was wearing thin and Iran had to soon show it was complying with international agreements or face real consequences. End Summary.

China Pleased With Bosworth Visit to DPRK
-----------------------------------------

¶3. (C) Asked his views on the North Korea nuclear situation, CCID Director Wang stated that China was very pleased that Ambassador Bosworth was in Pyongyang, noting that the visit would be “cost effective” because the North Koreans had made clear there could be no resuming the Six-Party Talks without first convening a bilateral U.S.-DPRK dialogue. Ambassador Bosworth’s visit effectively “kicked the ball” back to the North Koreans. When asked what the likely outcome of the talks would be, Wang said the ideal outcome would be a meeting with Kim Jong-il, which would send a very positive signal, but it was impossible to predict North Korean behavior through “normal” means of reading public indicators. Wang said that Ambassador Bosworth would likely meet with First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju, who was “a hardliner” with “strong views” and whose opinions were valued by the DPRK’s top leaders. However, Kang had to follow orders from above, Wang noted, and would not want to lose such an opportunity to improve relations with the United States. The negotiations with Ambassador Bosworth would be a bargaining process, with each side trying to discern the other’s bottom line.

¶4. (C) The North needed a breakthrough in its relations with the United States, Wang asserted, both because of its domestic situation and the current international environment, but it would not be easy for North Korea to make a specific promise regarding a return to the Six-Party Talks or to announce denuclearization. Ambassador Bosworth’s trip itself was important because it demonstrated that the United States was serious about preventing a nuclear Korean peninsula and was committed to a peaceful resolution of the issue. Wang said China was aware that the United States worried that it would be deceived by the North but in China’s view there was no need to worry because the current process of promoting dialogue and negotiations was quite transparent and the international community would know what the outcome would be.
¶5. (C) Wang reiterated China’s long-standing position that the key objective at this stage was to prevent the situation on the Korean peninsula from spinning out of control and to establish a positive direction through dialogue and negotiation. He said that Ambassador Bosworth should make clear to North Korea that it was not in U.S. interests to prolong the current state of hostility, that the United States had no intention of promoting regime change in the North, and that international sanctions and relations with the DPRK’s neighbors could be changed and they could help

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with North Korea’s economic development. This was contingent upon a change in North Korean behavior and an eventual North Korean pledge to the world that it would not embark on the road to nuclear weapons. U/S Burns responded that the United States understood the complexity of the situation and emphasized the great importance of joint U.S.-China and Five-Party efforts to bring North Korea back as soon as possible to the Six-Party Talks and its denuclearization commitments.

Unified U.S.-China Effort Needed on Iran
----------------------------------------

¶6. (C) U/S Burns emphasized that the nuclear weapons challenge in Iran required a similarly unified U.S.-China and international effort. The United States was profoundly concerned about Middle East stability, which was crucial to both U.S. and Chinese security and economic interests. If Iran continued developing a nuclear capability, Israel would “no doubt” act, and concern among the Arab states might trigger a regional arms race. President Obama had repeatedly reached out to Iran’s leaders, but had yet to receive a positive response. Moreover, Iran had not followed through on the understandings reached in Geneva in October, including Iran’s commitment to meet with the P5-plus-1 countries for talks focused on the nuclear issue and its initial acceptance of the IAEA’s TRR proposal. The United States would continue to take a diplomatic, creative and flexible approach working with our Russian, Chinese and European partners, but time was running short. By the end of the year, President Obama would have to evaluate Iran’s actions thus far. If Iran did not live up to its agreements, the United States would work with its international partners to make clear to Iran the consequences of its unwillingness to engage seriously.
Wang Pledges Chinese Support...

-------------------------------

¶7. (C) Wang had high praise for U.S. efforts in the Middle East in general and the approach to Iran in particular, stating that China viewed U.S. measures in Iran as very practical and as based on realities on the ground. China had economic interests in Iran, but, in principle, China had no differences with the United States on the nuclear weapons issue. China agreed that Iranian nuclear weapons would bring great instability to the Middle East, including possible warfare, even on a global scale, with consequences far greater than China’s economic interests. China agreed with the IAEA proposal and that Iran should live up to the commitments it made in Geneva, but unfortunately, Iran had not responded positively to this proposal despite many efforts by the United States, China, and the international community. China had consistently told Iran that China strongly opposed Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. This message, he claimed, has been conveyed in party-to-party and government-to-government meetings and in “all channels.” However, Iran maintained it had no nuclear weapons and was simply pursuing the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

...But Urges Continued Diplomacy
--------------------------------

¶8. (C) Wang pressed U/S Burns for details on when the limits of U.S. patience might be exhausted and counseled further efforts to find a diplomatic solution. Burns replied that U.S. patience was nearly exhausted. Wang acknowledged that there was a potential for an Israeli military strike were the situation not handled properly, which was of grave concern to China, but insisted that harsh actions were not yet warranted. Recent U.S. experience with a military option, he said, should teach some lessons, and the outcome of tougher sanctions was also unpredictable. The United States needed to understand that Iran was not Iraq, and the best way forward was to continue to pursue peaceful dialogue and negotiations and to carefully examine previous diplomatic efforts to see what changes needed to be made.

North Korea and Iran Similarities
---------------------------------

¶9. (C) Wang also claimed similarities between the North Korea and Iran nuclear issues. The solution in both cases was to persist over the long haul, continuing intensive efforts with the objective of ensuring that the situation did not spin out of control. Wang noted that in his several recent visits to Iran anti-American sentiment was strong, everywhere, and palpable, which, he said, was not conducive to resolving the issue.

¶10. (C) Wang asked U/S Burns for his views on who made final decisions in Iran, President Ahmadinejad or Supreme Leader
BEIJING 00003313 003 OF 003
Khamenei. He said it would be very helpful to China if the decision-making process in Iran could be sorted out. Wang appeared to agree with the Under Secretary that Khamenei was the final arbiter of Iranian policy and concluded by stating that there might be a way for direct communication with the Supreme Leader. He said direct engagement would avoid the distortions of message that occurred when communicating through an intermediary. Wang noted that there was not one country in the international arena that supported Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons and emphasized that there was a need for a unified international view on Iran.

¶11. (C) U/S Burns responded that the United States had made very clear its willingness for direct diplomacy, but that it took both sides to make direct communication work. He emphasized that this was a core national security issue for the United States, which could not abide greater Middle East instability, and said the United States would continue its diplomatic efforts in a creative and flexible manner. However, he stated, at some point there had to be results and U.S. patience was fast running out.

U.S.-China Cooperation
----------------------

¶12. (C) Wang said China would continue to make its own efforts on the issue but China was willing to do more to cooperate with the United States to facilitate a resolution to the Iran nuclear problem. He welcomed further U.S. suggestions on measures to achieve a breakthrough and asked what the United States would like China to do or whether there were areas in which China could make a contribution. U/S Burns emphasized that the United States would like to cooperate with China and needed to work closely with China to find a way to persuade Iran to make the right choices. The current focus was on persuading Iran to live up to the commitments it made at the Geneva meetings on the TRR proposal and by meeting again soon on the nuclear issue. The two P5-plus-1 tracks -- diplomacy and sanctions -- were not mutually exclusive. The United States had tried many approaches to Iran in the past 11 weeks, and none had borne fruit. The United States would not close the door on diplomacy, but as in the case of putting pressure on North Korea through UN Resolution 1874, we had to work together to apply pressure to get Iran back to the diplomatic track. Iran had to understand that it faced a clear choice. Iran could choose to pursue the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which the United States supported and would work to implement if Iran demonstrated the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program. But Iran had to understand there were costs to not following this path. Wang agreed that both sides should try very hard to resolve the problem.
HUNTSMAN

07PARIS159     2007-01-16 15:03     2010-11-29 12:12     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PRIMARY TAG)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2017
TAGS: KDEM LE PGOV PREL FR IR
SUBJECT: FRANCE SEEKS EU COVER ON IRAN CIVIL SOCIETY

REF: STATE 2659

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Poloff delivered reftel demarche on January 16 to MFA
Iran Desk Officer Arnaud Pescheux, who indicated that France
had not budgeted any funds for democracy promotion in Iran.
"If we were to do something, it would undoubtedly be via
Brussels," Pescheux said. He noted that France "anticipated
supporting" a proposal by Javier Solana for the EU to expand
its own Farsi broadcasting capabilities, although he said
that details of that proposal have yet to be worked out.
While the MFA does not currently partner with any French NGOs
operating in Iran, in the past a few NGOs (e.g., Reporters
Without Borders) had brought members of Iranian civil society
to France to participate in programs.

French Envoy to Tehran
----------------------

¶2. (C) Citing a press report in the January 16 edition of Le
Monde, Poloff asked whether it was true that France planned
to send a presidential envoy to Tehran in the near future.
Choosing his words with care, Pescheux said that the Le Monde
report was "not false" but stressed that a final decision had
not yet been taken. Pescheux said that the envoy would not
engage on the nuclear file but would instead discuss regional
issues and, in particular, would seek to "find a solution on
Lebanon."

¶3. (C) Poloff said he was shocked that France, which had
steadfastly rejected entreaties to negotiate Lebanon's future
with the Syrian regime, apparently found the prospect of
conducting similar negotiations with Tehran less
objectionable. Had the Iranians given the French some
indication that they would be more forthcoming than Damascus?
No, Pescheux admitted, the Iranians had not tipped their
hand; they had merely indicated that they were willing to
talk.

Supreme Leader Still on Top
---------------------------

¶4. (C) Turning to the results of Iran's recent elections,
Pescheux indicated that the French were pleasantly surprised
by the outcome (immediately prior to the election, their
reporting from Tehran suggested that President Ahmadinejad's
supporters were poised to make significant gains in the
Assembly of Experts). The Quai's interpretation of the
election results is that the axis between Supreme Leader
Khamenei and former President Rafsanjani (i.e., the
traditional conservatives) has been strengthened, with
Khamenei remaining the supreme arbiter of Iran's political
balance of power. In an aside, Pescheux claimed that
notwithstanding the French diplomatic presence in Tehran, the
MFA has virtually no insight into the inner workings of the
Pasdaran.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON

07PARIS170     2007-01-17 14:02     2010-11-29 12:12     SECRET     Embassy Paris

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EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T PARIS 000170

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017
TAGS: FR IR LE PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: CHIRAC'S ENVOY TO IRAN -- WHAT'S PROMPTING THIS
AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT


CLASSIFIED BY: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, REASONS



PAGE 02 RUEHFRA0170 S E C R E T
1.4 (B) AND (D).

¶1. (S) LE MONDE'S JAN. 17 EDITION RAN A FRONT-PAGE STORY ON
CHIRAC,S INTEREST IN PURSUING A DIALOGUE WITH IRAN ON
LEBANON, THUS CONFIRMING WHAT MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR GERARD
ARAUD TOLD THE AMBASSADOR DURING THEIR JAN. 15 MEETING. WE
FACE THE PROSPECT OF UNTOWARD POLICY INITIATIVES BY CHIRAC
DURING THE WANING MONTHS OF HIS PRESIDENCY. (THE FIRST ROUND
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WILL BE HELD APRIL 22; IT IS
WIDELY ASSUMED THAT CHIRAC WILL NOT BE IN A POSITION TO RUN
FOR A THIRD TERM.) WE MAY HAVE ENTERED A PERIOD IN WHICH THE
DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT WILL IMPACT DIRECTLY ON FOREIGN
POLICY DECISIONS, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO LEBANON AND
IRAN.

¶2. (S) FIRST OF ALL THE FACTS, AS WE KNOW THEM AND AS
CONVEYED TO AMBASSADOR STAPLETON BY ARAUD. CHIRAC FAVORED
ENLISTING IRAN IN AN EFFORT TO BREAK THE STALEMATE IN
LEBANON. TO THIS END, THE PRESIDENCY PROPOSED SENDING
FOREIGN MINISTER DOUSTE-BLAZY TO TEHRAN TO SOUND OUT THE



PAGE 03 RUEHFRA0170 S E C R E T
IRANIANS ON THEIR PLAYING A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN LEBANON --
WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE nuclear ISSUE. THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY, UNCONVINCED THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY IRANIAN
INTEREST, AND CONCERNED ABOUT APPROACHING IRAN AS A
DEMANDEUR, OPPOSED THE INITIATIVE. SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT
BOTH VOICED STRENUOUS OBJECTIONS. U/S BURNS RAISED USG
CONCERNS DIRECTLY WITH ARAUD. THE ELYSEE THEREFORE BACKED
OFF "FOR NOW" ACCORDING TO THE MFA SPOKESMAN YESTERDAY.
WHILE ARAUD DID NOT MENTION THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT TO
TEHRAN BY A LOWER-RANKING ENVOY, LE MONDE HINTED THAT MIDDLE
EAST TROUBLE-SHOOTER JEAN-CLAUDE COUSSERAN, WHO VISITED THE
IRANIAN CAPITAL IN JULY, DURING THE ISRAEL/HIZBALLAH WAR,
COULD BE DISPATCHED AGAIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

¶3. (S) REPORTING IN OTHER CHANNELS INDICATES THIS IS INDEED
POSSIBLE. THE DECISION NOT TO SEND DOUSTE-BLAZY COULD WELL
BE DEFINITIVE. EVEN IF A LOWER-LEVEL EMISSARY IS SENT TO
TEHRAN, THE MAKINGS OF A DEAL ON LEBANON ARE NOT OBVIOUS.
HOWEVER, THIS EPISODE HAS HIGHLIGHTED A NUMBER OF CONTEXTUAL
FACTORS AND HYPOTHESES THAT GIVE RISE TO A FEW CONCERNS.



PAGE 04 RUEHFRA0170 S E C R E T

¶4. (S) THE FIRST IS THAT THE DISTORTING EFFECT OF CHIRAC,S
"OBSESSION WITH LEBANON" (ARAUD,S WORDS) MIGHT ONLY BE
FURTHER ACCENTUATED AS HIS PRESIDENCY DRAWS TO A CLOSE.
CHIRAC,S FOCUS COULD BE NARROWING IN ON ONE SINGLE
OBJECTIVE: TO ENSURE THAT THE SYRIAN REGIME, WHICH HE REGARDS
AS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF RAFIK HARIRI, DOES
NOT GAIN A NEW FOOTHOLD IN LEBANON. THIS COULD TRANSLATE
INTO A WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH IRAN TO FIND SOME SORT OF
ACCOMMODATION WHICH STRENGTHENS HIZBOLLAH IN LEBANON, BUT
PREVENTS THE STRATEGIC RETURN OF SYRIA. NO MFA OR ELYSEE
INTERLOCUTOR HAS POINTED US TO SUCH A CONCLUSION, BUT WE ARE
LEFT WITH FEW OTHER EXPLANATIONS FOR CHIRAC'S APPARENT
DETERMINATION TO REACH OUT AT THIS TIME TO HIZBOLLAH,S MAIN
REGIONAL SPONSOR.

¶5. (S) MOREOVER, THIS ANALYSIS IS CONSISTENT WITH OTHER
INDICATIONS OF LATE THAT FRANCE IS FIXATED ON LOWERING
TENSIONS IN LEBANON. THESE INCLUDE, INTER ALIA: THE
RELUCTANCE (THUS FAR) TO OPERATE FRENCH UAVS OVER SOUTHERN



PAGE 05 RUEHFRA0170 S E C R E T
LEBANON; THE MFA'S DECISION IN LATE DECEMBER TO "TAKE A
BREAK" FROM PUSHING FOR THE RAPID ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON; AND THE FACT THAT MFA
DESK OFFICERS ARE CAREFULLY SCRUBBING PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S
PROPOSED INTERVENTION AT THE JANUARY 25 LEBANON CONFERENCE TO
ENSURE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE DOES NOT ANTAGONIZE THE
LEBANESE OPPOSITION. IN ADDITION, CHIRACS NEW-FOUND CAUTION
ON LEBANON AND HIS PROPOSED OVERTURE TO IRAN MAY BOTH REFLECT
THE FRENCH PRESIDENT'S FEAR OF INCURRING FRENCH CASUALTIES IN
LEBANON IN THE FINAL MONTHS OF HIS PRESIDENCY.

¶6. (S) ANOTHER CONCERN RELATES TO CHIRAC,S FOREIGN POLICY
LEGACY, WHICH HINGES SIGNIFICANTLY ON TWO ACHIEVEMENTS, HIS
LEADERSHIP IN OPPOSING THE U.S. OVER IRAQ, AND IN RESTORING
LEBANON,S INDEPENDENCE. THE LE MONDE REPORT WHICH BROKE THE
NEWS OF THE ABORTED DOUSTE-BLAZY MISSION CLOSES WITH
SPECULATION THAT CHIRAC IS INCREASINGLY ALARMED BY U.S.
INTENTIONS VIS A VIS IRAN. CHIRAC COULD BE TEMPTED BY POLICY
INITIATIVES THAT SERVE TO BOLSTER HIS LEGACY ON BOTH COUNTS:
PROTECTING LEBANON,S INDEPENDENCE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME



PAGE 06 RUEHFRA0170 S E C R E T
STANDING STRONG AGAINST ANY PERCEIVED DANGEROUS DRIFT IN U.S.
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, A REPRISE IN GENTLER FORM OF THE GLORY
DAYS OF 2003.

¶7. (S) FINALLY, CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HERE HAS IT THAT THE
ONLY CONCEIVABLE SCENARIO WHEREBY CHIRAC COULD BECOME A


VIABLE CANDIDATE TO SUCCEED WOULD BE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN



PAGE 02 RUEHFRA0170 S E C R E T
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS. MIGHT CHIRAC BE POSITIONING HIMSELF TO
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AN IRAN-CENTERED CRISIS THAT WOULD OFFER
HIS ONLY TICKET BACK TO THE ELYSEE?

¶8. (S) CHIRAC MAY CHOOSE TO MOVE FORWARD WITH HIS ENVOY IDEA
BEFORE WE CAN GET FULL CLARIFICATION. IF HE DOES, IT SEEMS
OBVIOUS (TO US AND TO MANY WITHIN THE FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY
ESTABLISHMENT) THAT THE IRANIANS WILL SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY
TO ADVANCE THEIR OWN AGENDA IN LEBANON WHILE TRYING TO DRIVE
A WEDGE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO IRAN'S nuclear PROGRAM. WE WILL
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OUR INTERACTIONS WITH SENIOR FRENCH LEADERS
OVER THE COMING DAYS TO MAKE CLEAR OUR CONCERNS, AS WE ASSUME
WASHINGTON AGENCIES WILL DO AS WELL. HAVING NOTED THE
COALITION RAID ON THE IRANIAN OFFICE IN IRBIL, THE DEPLOYMENT
OF A NEW CARRIER BATTLE GROUP TO THE PERSIAN GULF, AND RECENT
STATEMENTS ON IRAN BY SECDEF GATES AND OTHERS, THE FRENCH ARE
AWARE OF THE GROWING PRESSURE ON TEHRAN. MAINTAINING OUR
FULL AND FRANK EXCHANGES WITH THE FRENCH ON IRAN WILL BE
PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN THE COMING DAYS.



PAGE 03 RUEHFRA0170 S E C R E T


PLEASE VISIT PARIS' CLASSIFIED WEBSITE AT:
HTTP://WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/EUR/PARIS/INDEX.C FM

STAPLETON

07PARIS2440     2007-06-07 17:05     2010-11-29 12:12     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/7/2017
TAGS: PREL FR IR IZ PGOV
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA OFFICIAL SHARES VIEWS ON IRAN/IRAQ


CLASSIFIED BY: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT,
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: FRANCK GELLET, FRENCH DAS-EQUIVALENT FOR THE
PAGE 02 RUEHFRA2440 C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002440
PERSIAN GULF, SHARED HIS VIEWS ON IRAN AND IRAQ ON JUNE 7.
GELLET ASSESSED THAT THE IRANIANS ARE OVERCONFIDENT AND
VULNERABLE TO A BAN ON INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL. HIS
ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ WAS NOTABLY BLEAK. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) OVER LUNCH JUNE 7, THE MFAS DAS-EQUIVALENT FOR THE
PERSIAN GULF, FRANCK GELLET, SHARED HIS VIEWS ON IRAN AND
IRAQ. HAVING RECENTLY RETURNED FROM A 15-DAY TRIP TO IRAN,
GELLET SAID THAT HIS MOST SERIOUS AND USEFUL INTERLOCUTOR WAS
FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER VELAYATI, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS BEING
"LESS ROMANTIC" THAN THE REGIME'S OTHER FOREIGN POLICY
HEAVYWEIGHTS. GELLET SAID THAT VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE IRANIAN
OFFICIALS HE MET OVERESTIMATED THE REGIME'S STRENGTH, BOTH ON
THE REGIONAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE. "THE IRANIANS ARE
CONVINCED THAT NO ONE -- INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES -- CAN
TOUCH THEM ECONOMICALLY OR MILITARILY. THEY SIMPLY CAN'T
IMAGINE THAT THE U.S. HAS THE CAPACITY AND THE POLITICAL WILL
TO LAUNCH A MILITARY STRIKE AGAINST THEM AT A TIME WHEN THE
U.S. MILITARY APPEARS TO BE BOGGED DOWN IN IRAQ," SAID
GELLET.



PAGE 03 RUEHFRA2440 C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002440

¶3. (C) GELLET SAID HIS OWN VIEW (WHICH, HE CAUTIONED, IS NOT
SHARED BY EVERYONE AT THE MFA), IS THAT IF THE EUROPEANS
REALLY WANT TO AVOID A MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE
U.S. AND IRAN THEN THEY NEED TO SHOW THE IRANIANS THEY ARE
SERIOUS ABOUT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. "THE IRANIANS WILL NEVER
BLINK UNTIL THEY FEEL THAT THE REGIME'S SURVIVAL IS AT
STAKE," SAID GELLET. HE SUGGESTED THAT -- IN ADDITION TO A
FURTHER SANCTIONS ON THE BANKING SECTOR, A FULL ARMS EMBARGO,
AND A CUT IN EXPORT CREDITS -- THE IRANIANS MIGHT BE
VULNERABLE TO AN EMBARGO OF REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS. IN
ADDITION, HE SUGGESTED THAT WE NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DRAMATIC
ISOLATING EFFECT THAT A BAN ON INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL TO
AND FROM IRAN WOULD HAVE. GELLET NOTED THAT THESE WERE JUST
HIS PERSONAL VIEWS, AND SAID THAT HE HAS NOT YET RECEIVED ANY
GUIDANCE FROM THE NEW PRESIDENCY ON IRAN SANCTIONS. HE
OBSERVED THAT PRESIDENT SARKOZY TOOK A HARD LINE AGAINST THE
IRANIAN nuclear PROGRAM DURING HIS ELECTION CAMPAIGN, BUT
SAID IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHAT THAT WOULD TRANSLATE INTO IN
POLICY TERMS.



PAGE 04 RUEHFRA2440 C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002440

¶4. (C) GELLET, WHO SERVED FOR NEARLY THREE YEARS AT THE
FRENCH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD BEFORE ASSUMING HIS CURRENT
POSITION, HAD A PARTICULARLY GRIM VIEW OF IRAQ. "WE DON'T
HAVE THE SLIGHTEST HOPE IT CAN BE SALVAGED -- IT'S LOST," HE
SAID. HE PREDICTED THAT IRAQ WILL DESCEND INTO FULL-SCALE
CIVIL WAR WHETHER OR NOT MNF-I REMAINS. ON THE OTHER HAND,
HE PREDICTED THAT IF THE COALITION WERE TO WITHDRAW THERE
WOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE AND HORRIFIC SPIKE IN THE LEVEL OF
VIOLENCE. "YOUR DEPARTURE WOULD BE SEEN EVERYWHERE AS A SIGN
THAT IT'S TIME FOR THE GLOVES TO COME OFF," HE SAID. HE
FURTHER PREDICTED THAT, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE COALITION'S
DEPARTURE (WHENEVER THAT OCCURS), THE ENSUING CONFLICT WOULD
LAST MANY YEARS UNTIL IRAQ'S SUNNIS AND SHIITES (AND THEIR
RESPECTIVE PATRONS) WERE EXHAUSTED. AS FOR THE KURDS, GELLET
SAID THEY SERIOUSLY UNDERESTIMATED THE RISK THAT THEY WOULD
BE ANNIHILATED DURING THE COURSE OF A CIVIL WAR THAT WOULD
LIKELY PULL IN MOST OF IRAQ'S NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING TURKEY.

¶5. (C) NOTWITHSTANDING HIS BLEAK ANALYSIS, GELLET ENCOURAGED



PAGE 05 RUEHFRA2440 C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002440
THE U.S. TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO PROMOTE RECONCILIATION.
HE NOTED THAT ONE COMPLAINT HE OFTEN HEARD FROM HIS SUNNI
CONTACTS WAS THAT THEY RECEIVED CONFLICTING MESSAGES FROM THE
VARIOUS USG AGENCIES ON THE GROUND IN IRAQ, AND WERE NEVER
SURE WHICH OF THEM HAD THE ULTIMATE DECISION-MAKING
AUTHORITY. GELLET FINISHED BY WARNING THAT OUR TRIBAL ALLIES
IN ANBAR PROVINCE WOULD TURN ON US WHENEVER IT SUITED THEIR
INTERESTS TO DO SO.


PLEASE VISIT PARIS' CLASSIFIED WEBSITE AT:
HTTP://WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/EUR/PARIS/INDEX.C FM


STAPLETON

07PARIS3668     2007-09-05 12:12     2010-11-29 12:12     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR IR
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA READOUT ON AUGUST 23 TEHRAN VISIT BY
ELYSEE ADVISER RICHIER AND MFA DAS GELLET

REF: PARIS 3645 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosen
blatt for reasons 1.4. (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: The GOF took a hard line during an August
23 trip to Tehran by French presidency strategic affairs
adviser Richier and French MFA DAS-equivalent Gellet that
Iranian leader Khamanei's foreign policy adviser Velayati
hoped would open a new channel to Paris. Gellet explained
August 31 that Velayati was apparently operating from a
flawed premise that Nicolas Sarkozy would free France from
its "dependence" on the USG. Velayati further believed
France could be broken away from the P-5 over further
sanctions against Iran. Gellet said Richier previewed for
Velayati the line Sarkozy would use in a subsequent speech to
French ambassadors that the world faced a "catastrophic"
choice between Iran with a bomb or bombing Iran. Although
Velayati's hopes were shattered, Iran is still interested in
the channel; Gellet said that Richier has the lead in
deciding what the GOF will do next. Gellet expressed a
strong French desire to remain informed on U.S. plans
regarding Iran particularly should we decide to take military
action against Iran. End summary

¶2. (C) French MFA DAS-equivalent for Iran, Iraq, and the
Gulf Franck Gellet on August 31 provided a readout on his
August 23 visit to Tehran accompanying the French
presidency's strategic affairs adviser Francois Richier. The
visit followed an invitation from Ali Akbar Velayati, former
Iranian foreign minister and current foreign affairs adviser
to Supreme Leader Khamanei. Gellet confirmed information
that the French Embassy in Washington communicated to the
Department that Velayati wanted to establish a new direct
channel to Paris. Gellet elaborated that Velayati's
(apparently convoluted) thinking had been expressed in an
article he had written that took the view that the election
of Nicolas Sarkozy gave France a chance to break free of its
"dependence" on the U.S. in terms of its foreign policy.
Velayati, according to Gellet, believed that Chirac had been
entirely beholden to the U.S. during his presidency.
Sarkozy's election, therefore, offered Iran a chance to
appeal to France in a way that would allow France to follow
its independent line a la de Gaulle and thus pry France loose
from the coalition that now sought to impose tougher
sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program.

¶3. (C) Despite this clearly flawed analysis of France's
position and political dynamics, the GOF decided this opening
was important enough to explore. Gellet recounted how he and
Richier met Velayati, heard him out, and proceeded to burst
his bubble. Richier, according to Gellet, told Velayati that
Sarkozy was firm on the nuclear issue and previewed for him
the line that Sarkozy would use in his August 29 speech to
French ambassadors that under current circumstances the world
faced the stark alternative that Iran would obtain "the bomb"
or be bombed. Velayati was not happy to hear this but did
not close the door to further discussion. Gellet surmised
that Velayati believes the French are still susceptible to
Iranian blandishments and wants to keep some sort of
alternative line open to the Elysee.

¶4. (C) Gellet stressed that Velayati's initiative was not
taken without reference to others in the Iranian government.
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International
Affairs Abbas Araghchi sat in on the Velayati meeting just as
Velayati attended a meeting Gellet and Richier had with
Araghchi. Gellet did not indicate what other subjects came
up, but Velayati's pitch was the main one. When asked
whether France felt the visit had been worthwhile and what
sort of follow-up there might be, Gellet was vague. He said
that Richier, in his Elyse capacity, would decide what to
do, including whether to keep this dialogue going. Gellet
surmised that Richier would be willing to discuss this
further with USG officials, like PM A/S Rood, in future
meetings to discuss next steps in the nuclear fuel dispute.

¶5. (C) Gellet found the visit a bit surreal but quite
indicative of the bizarre way Iran functions. He noted the
diffusion of power among different entities and the
uncertainty that pervades Iranian decision making. Velayati
clearly sought to minimize or counterbalance President
Ahmadinejad's hard line but without actually taking a softer
line himself. Iran's core position, therefore, did not seem
to be shifting or subject to any flexibility. When asked how
France understood Sarkozy's either/or statement on Iran had
played in that country, Gellet replied that Iranian
authorities seem to have largely kept it out of the national
media. The implication that France sees Iran facing a
serious risk of military retaliation over its stance was thus
largely unreported. Gellet argued that this suits Velayati's
calculations because the impression remains that Iran can

PARIS 00003668 002 OF 002


somehow turn to France to blunt American pressure to impose
more sanctions and escalate the situation.

¶6. (C) On the issue of escalation, Gellet asked that the
USG keep France informed of its thinking as regards possible
military action against Iran. He claimed that the Elysee
worries about being blindsided if or when the time comes for
a strike. The timing and magnitude of such action, i.e., a
surgical strike or a more generalized campaign, could have
enormous stakes in terms of French interests. Gellet noted,
in this vein, French concerns about Iranian retaliation
against the Gulf States and their capacity to respond. He
surmised that a U.S./France dialogue, if it were to develop,
might occur at a much higher level than his. His hope, which
was personal as much as he said it reflected official
thinking, was that we would keep the French in the loop as we
moved into the next phase of high-tension diplomacy focused
on further UNSC sanctions.

¶7. (C) Comment: It appears that this latest Iranian
initiative to open a new channel to Paris is unlikely to
change the dynamics of Tehran's ongoing confrontation with
the world. The French seem keen to reassure us that they are
not wavering. President Sarkozy's tough words to the French
Ambassadors conference following the meetings in Tehran made
that point loud and clear. On whether to engage more
intensively with the French about the various contingencies
related to Iran, we believe we should continue to test
Sarkozy's apparent desire to deal with us differently than
his predecessors did. As an indication of different French
thinking, the newspaper "Le Monde" reported active discussion
in the Elysee of sanctions targeting Iran outside the UNSC
that France could impose alone or potentially with others in
the EU. The article made clear that, as "fissures" seem to
be appearing among the P-5 over Iran, France seems to be
toughening its position. We will follow up with Richier for
his take on this visit.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


STAPLETON

07PARIS3733     2007-09-07 18:06     2010-11-29 12:12     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR IR
SUBJECT: FRENCH ELYSEE NEA ADVISER RECOUNTS TOUGH LINE
TAKEN WITH IRANIANS

REF: PARIS 3668

Classified By: Classified by Polmincouns Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons
1.4.(b), (d)

¶1. (C) Following up on reftel, Polmincouns and poloff asked
French presidential adviser for NEA issues Boris Boillon
September 6 about the visit to Tehran by French Presidency
official Richier and MFA DAS Gellet. Polmincouns noted the
stark phrasing in President Sarkozy's speech to French
ambassadors (indicating the world faced the choice between
Iran with a bomb or bombing Iran) and wondered what it meant
in the context of the visit. Boillon was glad we raised the
subject and stated that Sarkozy had wanted to warn Iran in a
dramatic and public way that it must cooperate with the
international community with respect to its nuclear program
or face potential catastrophe in the form of military action.
This did not mean, as some media were misinterpreting the
statement, that France would be ready to participate in such
action. Far from it, Boillon continued; France vigorously
opposed a resort to force and preferred to resolve the
ongoing dispute diplomatically.

¶2. (C) Boillon echoed much of what MFA DAS Gellet had
related in reftel when he observed that the Iranians do not
seem to understand the gravity of the situation or France's
position. They suffer, he complained, from a closed mindset
that he later termed "autistic." Boillon recounted in the
same terms as Gellet the origin of the Iranian initiative
from Ali Akbar Velayati, foreign affairs adviser to supreme
leader Khamenei, to establish a special dialogue between
Tehran and Paris. Even before Richier and Gellet traveled,
the GOF told the Iranians to "forget it" if their intention
was to split France away from the P-5 plus one. Richier and
Gellet repeated this message in Tehran and indicated that
France might be willing to speak of other subjects (NFI).
Boillon believed the level was perfect in that the French
sent senior working level officials well below the "political
level," whereas Velayati clearly was at the political level.
This disparity gave the French considerable leeway in terms
of the frankness with which they could speak.

¶3. (C) Boillon repeated that it was clear the Iranians did
not understand or accept the blunt message they heard. In
his characteristic candor, Richier told Velayati and other
Iranian officials that, absent full compliance, sanctions
against Iran will only ratchet up. As he previewed the tough
line that Sarkozy would express in his speech, Richier added
that France wants to avoid military action against Iran but
might eventually have to accept it as the only recourse left
to the international community to prevent a nuclear-armed
Iran.

¶4. (C) Boillon stated that the GOF had not decided whether
to continue the dialogue that Richier and Gellet had started.
Diplomatic contacts, nevertheless, continue apace, and he
pointed to a then current visit to Paris by Iranian Deputy
Foreign Minister for European and American Affairs Jalili.
(Note: As reported by a staffer of KM Kouchner September 7,
Jalili had inexplicably not been briefed on Richier's and
Gellet's message to Velayati. End note) Boillon contended
that France had no problem pursuing a diplomatic dialogue per
se and kept its embassy in Tehran for just such a reason. As
Richier told the Iranians, however, there was no need for a
special channel if the Iranian aim was to pry France away
from the P-5 plus one. Richier was very direct that France
had no intention to deviate from the line it was on with its
partners. Boillon expanded his assessment of the Iranians as
"autistic like the Syrians. As with the Syrians, one must be
direct and not always 'diplomatic.'"

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


PEKALA

07PARIS3956     2007-09-21 09:09     2010-11-29 12:12     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM FR IR
SUBJECT: KOUCHNER EXPECTED TO MEET IRANIAN COUNTERPART AT
UNGA BUT NOT SARKOZY

REF: A. (A) PARIS POINTS 20 SEPTEMBER 2007

¶B. (B) PARIS 3668

Classified By: Acting Political Minister-Counselor Andrew Young for rea
sons 1.4. (b), (d).

¶1. (C) During a September 19 call on French MFA
DAS-equivalent for the Levant Ludovic Pouille, we asked
whether he had heard anything that might indicate FM Kouchner
or any other French officials planned to meet with Iranian
President Ahmadi Nejad in New York. Pouille shook his head
no on Ahmadi Nejad, but he stated that Kouchner is scheduled
to meet with his Iranian counterpart on the margins of the
UNGA.

¶2. (C) Although Pouille does not cover Iran, he stated that
posts throughout the NEA region had reported queries from
host governments about France,s policy in light of FM
Kouchner,s recent remarks about the possibility the
confrontation over Iran,s nuclear program could lead to war.
This had necessitated the drafting of &talking points8 to
be sent out worldwide to refocus attention on what Kouchner
said about the need to pursue diplomacy to the maximum extent
possible. Pouille (strictly protect) opined that Kouchner
had not for the first time allowed his tongue to get ahead of
his brain in terms of his public utterances. He has
struggled since to get the emphasis back on diplomatic
efforts to resolve the nuclear issue and to minimize the
importance of his reference to the possibility of war.

¶3. (C) We spoke September 20 to French MFA Iran desk
officer Arnaud Pescheux, who confirmed his understanding that
Kouchner was currently the most senior French official
expected to meet with the Iranians in New York, and then only
the foreign minister. He related that the Iranian mission in
New York had passed a formal written request to the French
mission for an Ahmadi Nejad/Sarkozy meeting. The GOF had
ignored the request in the same manner it ignored Ahmadi
Nejad,s congratulatory message to Sarkozy after his election
as president. Nonetheless, and as Kouchner has publicly
stated, Pescheux underscored that France continues to have a
normal relationship with Iran across the board, covering a
host of bilateral and regional issues (notably Lebanon).
This includes frequent visits to Paris by Iranian officials.
Tension over the nuclear issue has not changed this, even
though it has obviously complicated the bilateral dialogue
somewhat. In this respect, Pescheux stated that the French
embassy in Tehran has received numerous complaints about
recent public French statements despite the fact that few of
them have been replayed fully via the Iranian media to the
public at large. (Comment: This echoes what MFA
DAS-equivalent for Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf Franck Gellet and
others have told us per ref b. End comment)

¶4. (C) With respect to the new channel Velayati has tried
to open via Gellet and Presidency strategic affairs adviser
Francois Richier (also ref b), Pescheux said that it was not
closed off, just inactive until such time as France might
decide to make use of it. He repeated that the GOF is fully
aware that Tehran is trying to divide the P-5 1 by opening
such a channel. As for the idea, bruited by Pouille, that
French special envoy for Lebanon Jean-Claude Cousseran might
travel to Tehran with a larger mandate than the situation in
Lebanon, Pescheux said that was under discussion. Nothing
had been decided, either in terms of dispatching Cousseran on
such a mission or possible timing, although it was unlikely
to happen prior to the end of the ministerial portion of the
current UNGA. Pescheux reiterated the often expressed view
at the Quai that, unlike Syria, Iran is not presently
inclined to stir things up in Lebanon. He explained that for
Iran, the consequences of a renewed civil war that could
inter alia pit Sunnis against Shi,a would set Iranian
efforts to expand its regional influence back.

¶5. (C) Comment: As ref a demonstrates, Kouchner is not
only trying to recast his earlier remarks in a way that
downplays references to the possibility of war with Iran but
to underscore his readiness to engage with Iran including via
a trip to Tehran. We are not aware of any plans for Kouchner
to travel there, however, and he was very careful when he
responded to a reporter,s question on this that he kept it
limited to whether in principle he was prepared to go.
Despite the rhetoric and the furor surrounding Kouchner,s
remarks, the French have not closed any doors to continued
engagement. We think it unlikely, given the charged
atmosphere and the French determination to keep Ahmadi Nejad
at arms length, that President Sarkozy will meet formally
with him on the margins of UNGA, although we would not rule
out the possibility of an impromptu pull-aside should the two
find themselves at a group event organized by the UN.
Sarkozy was unwavering in a national television interview

PARIS 00003956 002 OF 002


September 21 that Iran must not be allowed to develop nuclear
weapons.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


Pekala

07PARIS4685     2007-12-11 15:03     2010-11-29 12:12     SECRET     Embassy Paris

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR CRAIG STAPLETON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017
TAGS: OVIP PREL PGOV PINR KPAL EU FR LG SY IS IR
SUBJECT: YOUR DECEMBER 16-18 VISIT TO FRANCE

PARIS 00004685 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (
d)

SUMMARY
-------

¶1. (C) That the first international follow-on to Annapolis
is taking place in Paris reflects the new confidence and
greater cooperation that characterize our relationship with
France seven months into the Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy.
France's support for our efforts to achieve peace in the
Middle East contrasts sharply with its previous preferred
role as a side-line critic. It is just one example of the
broader re-positioning of France vis-a-vis the U.S. which we
have been quick to recognize and take advantage of.
Sarkozy's desire to maximize France's influence by working
with the U.S. to address common challenges is the
international component of a larger ambition for his
five-year Presidency: to renew France though deep reform at
home and resumption of its leadership in Europe. With an
exceptionally long political honeymoon behind him, Sarkozy is
now pressing ahead with his domestic reform agenda. He has
met with predictable opposition (most dramatically in the
form of transport strikes), and some questioning among
political allies of his strategy of undertaking sequential,
calibrated reform rather than a Thatcherite big bang at the
outset of his term. Despite the difficulty of the challenge,
including an unsettled international economic context, and
little budgetary room for maneuver, Sarkozy remains
determined to see his program through. Given his dominant
political position, that remains a realistic prospect. An
activist on the international scene, with an opportunistic
eye for grabbing attention and credit, Sarkozy will remain a
challenging partner despite his desire to improve the
bilateral relationship. He has concentrated responsibility
for foreign affairs in the Presidency to an unprecedented
degree, while Foreign Minister Kouchner has focused on
selected policy issues. This message also addresses the
specifics of France's Middle East policies. While under
Sarkozy the French are more supportive, our collaboration
(and intra-GOF coordination) on Lebanon has of late not been
as close as it should be, as Sarkozy's team in the Elysee has
focused single-mindedly on electing a President while
squeezing the democratically-elected majority and weakening
its ability to deal with post-election challenges. End
Summary

THE RELATIONSHIP
----------------

¶2. (C) Madame Secretary, The seven months since Nicolas
Sarkozy became President of France -- and the six months
since your last visit -- has been a remarkable period in
three respects. First, our relationship with France has
undergone a significant qualitative change. Sarkozy has set
in place a new paradigm for French foreign policy, one more
favorable to our interests. Scrapping Chirac's worldview,
which equated French leadership with containing U.S.
hegemony, Sarkozy has articulated the need for France to work
closely with the U.S. -- in order to address common
challenges, but also as the surest way to increase France's
global influence. France's increased involvement in and
commitment to Afghanistan, the beginning of a French interest
in Iraq, and France's consideration of a full return to NATO,
are the most symbolically powerful examples of France's
policy reorientation. Second, we have ratcheted up our
cooperation with France across our foreign policy agenda,
particularly on Middle East issues, but also on Kosovo,
Burma, Sudan/Darfur and elsewhere. In Lebanon, Sarkozy's
more activist foreign policy has already put the new
cooperative relationship to the test. Third, over the past
seven months, Sarkozy has begun to implement the ambitious
platform of domestic reform he had promised as a candidate.

SARKOZY
-------

¶3. (C) Before addressing the Middle East issues that will
be the focus of your visit here, a word on the domestic
context. Sarkozy enjoyed an exceptionally long political
honeymoon, one which extended well into the Fall. His
election -- representing the victory of a new-generation
leader, one with unmatched communication skills and a
detailed and ambitious program for renewing France -- led to
a season of national elan and optimism. The return to normal

PARIS 00004685 002.2 OF 004


in the political life of the country over the past two months
was predictable, as Sarkozy's efforts to implement difficult
domestic changes have run into opposition from those -- such
as rail workers -- who stand to lose, and many others who
fear change of any kind. Sarkozy has disappointed some in
his own camp for not immediately embarking on radical,
deep-rooted, pervasive reform, taking advantage of his
electoral mandate. Instead, Sarkozy has decided to carefully
pick his battles, gaining momentum from each piecemeal
victory. All in all, Sarkozy remains in a politically
powerful position, operating as the hands-on leader of a
largely unchecked executive branch, unencumbered for now by a
political opposition worthy of the name. He is determined to
make his mark during his five year term (which he insists may
be his single term of office), but has demonstrated greater
caution than might have been expected, mindful of the
international economic and financial environment, and severe
budgetary constraints at home.

KOUCHNER
--------

¶4. (C) Sarkozy's foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, was
the prize catch in Sarkozy's opportunistic effort to appoint
figures of the center and center-left to his government,
thereby increasing its legitimacy and political heft (and
depleting that of the opposition) as he waged the domestic
reform battle. While rumors circulate of a cabinet
re-shuffle early in the new year or following municipal
elections in March, Kouchner's position appears secure for
now. (Defense Minister Morin and Interior Minister
Alliot-Marie are among those thought most imperiled.) He
enjoys a personal chemistry with the President based on
Sarkozy's long-time admiration of Kouchner's personal and
political courage and humanitarian accomplishments. Kouchner
remains very popular -- consistently scoring at or near the
top of the polls measuring the popularity of France's
political leaders. But even his star quality (that he alone
in the government can claim) has not kept him from being
eclipsed by his hyper-active and media-savvy president.
Surely more of a concern to Kouchner, Sarkozy has
concentrated foreign policy decision-making and
implementation to an unprecedented degree in the Elysee, with
Secretary-General Claude Gueant and Diplomatic Advisor

SIPDIS
Jean-David Levitte accruing as much if not more influence
than Kouchner. Kouchner has largely focused on the issues
with which he has the greatest experience and level of
comfort -- Lebanon, Kosovo, and Darfur among them. While he
has of late curbed his penchant for off-the-cuff,
undiplomatic public comments, the thin-skinned Kouchner has
shown irritation over the involvement of Elysee officials in
the delicate negotiations over Lebanon's presidential
elections, and he may be uncomfortable with Sarkozy's
increasing willingness to downgrade human rights
considerations in his dealings foreign leaders, as
demonstrated by the way he has kept his distance from the
ongoing five-day visit to Paris of Mu'ammar Qadhafi.

Middle East
-----------

¶5. (S) Under Sarkozy, France's Middle East policies have
become more supportive of and congruent with U.S. interests,
but we are concerned that in the past few weeks our
collaboration (and intra-GOF coordination) on Lebanon has not
been what it should be, as Sarkozy's Presidency team has
focused single-mindedly on electing a President in such a way
that squeezes the democratically-elected majority and weakens
its ability to deal with post-election challenges.

--Arab/Israeli peace: The French remain major supporters of
our efforts focused on supporting the Israeli/Palestinian
negotiations. Their eagerness to make Annapolis a success
and to host the Paris conference on assistance to the
Palestinians underscored this. Sarkozy and Kouchner both
want France to be a key player in what they hope will be a
strong and successful push in 2008 to the creation of a
Palestinian state. In many ways, France aspires to be a
favored additional partner to the Quartet. Syrian
participation at Annapolis has also sparked hopeful
commentary in the French media that a larger dynamic -- in
which France can participate -- is underway that inter alia
would foster an unraveling of the Syrian/Iranian relationship
and halt Iranian inroads through support of Hizballah in
Lebanon. Sarkozy and Kouchner will listen attentively to any

PARIS 00004685 003.2 OF 004


vision you may outline of how you expect the negotiations to
unfold and whether there is a reasonable expectation of them
broadening to include Syria.

--Lebanon: Even as the French have become a positive force
behind our efforts on behalf of Arab-Israeli peace, the close
collaboration with the GOF under former President Chirac,
with his single-minded focus on supporting Saad Hariri and
isolating Syria, has suffered. This is partly due to the
extremely fluid situation in Lebanon. But it also results
from the tug of war between Kouchner and the Elysee over who
is in charge of the issue, one that developed after it became
clear the deadline for electing a new president would pass
without a new candidate chosen. There is abundant evidence
that the Syrians, possibly with help from the Amir of Qatar
(a friend of Sarkozy and President Bashar al-Asad), lured the
Elysee into leading a process with far different objectives
than the one Kouchner began last summer. Whereas Kouchner
was focused on helping the Lebanese get out of their
political deadlock, Levitte and the Elysee have sought a
resolution of the presidential crisis that would satisfy
larger geopolitical aims involving Syria. It is also clear
to us that the Elysee, given Sarkozy,s obsession with
achieving results, is focused on electing a president so that
it can be considered another French diplomatic triumph. The
unfortunate net result continues to be the impression that
French pressure for a deal falls exclusively on the March 14
majority and not where it belongs -- on the March 8
opposition that is acting in close coordination with Syria
intent on wringing key concessions from the democratically
elected majority. Even if the presidential crisis is
resolved by December 17, we would recommend that you discuss
with Kouchner and Sarkozy how we can more effectively work
together as we address the multitude of difficult challenges
facing Lebanon, of which the Presidential election is only
the first.

--Iran: The public release of the recent NIE on Iranian
nuclear capabilities was a shock to all but the highest
levels of the GOF, which was briefed on its conclusions.
Although the French have publicly backed our view that Iran
continues to pose a serious threat and further international
sanctions are warranted (a line echoed in most of the French
press), the GOF anticipates a major "communication problem"
with its EU partners, the Iranians, China, and Russia. There
is further the delicate diplomacy France is undertaking with
different elements in the Iranian regime in order to maintain
a viable channel that bypasses President Ahmadinejad (who
appeared to complain about this in a recent letter to
Sarkozy). In geostrategic terms, the French see Iran as the
primary threat to the Middle East and worry about inroads it
has made in Lebanon and Iraq. As noted above, there is also
some thinking, at least among analysts outside the GOF, that
Annapolis and the NIE betoken a significant shift of U.S.
strategy in the Bush Administration's last year that involves
new U.S. thinking about Iran. Sarkozy and Kouchner would
welcome anything you could share with respect to how we
regard Iran in a post-Annapolis Middle East.

--Iraq: French follow-up to Kouchner's visit to Baghdad last
August and Iraqi President Talabani's subsequent visit to
Paris has been slow. Concern about the security situation,
despite what the French acknowledge to be marginal
improvements in some areas of Iraq, lack of coordination at
the working level among French ministries, and the failure so
far to achieve a breakthrough on national reconciliation have
slowed or prevented follow-on French engagement. Kouchner,
however, did ask SecDef Gates for a list of specific areas in
which we thought France could be helpful. We should use that
opening to engage the French in a more active dialogue
between representatives of our respective interagencies. We
recommend that you use the opportunity to inquire about
Kouchner's current thinking about French assistance to Iraq
and let him know we would like to send an interagency team to
Paris early in the New Year to begin these discussions. We
would further recommend that you ask Kouchner about his
efforts to rally EU support for and to promote meaningful
engagement with the Iraqi government. You might also praise
his personal commitment to Iraq's success, as demonstrated in
part by his participation in the recent Istanbul summit. We
understand Kouchner may next visit Iraq in February when
France is expected to open an embassy office in Irbil.




PARIS 00004685 004.2 OF 004



Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


STAPLETON

08PARIS114     2008-01-23 14:02     2010-11-29 12:12     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR NATO FR RU IR GG UP AG
SUBJECT: SARKOZY, KOUCHNER ADVISERS ON NATO, RUSSIA, IRAN,
AND SARKOZY

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4 b and d.

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 16, Joseph Wood, Deputy
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security
Affairs, met with Philippe Errera, strategic affairs adviser
to FM Kouchner, and Francois Richier, strategic affairs
adviser to President Sarkozy. Errera and Richier provided
their views on NATO, ESDP, Russia, the Iran NIE, and
President Sarkozy's own guiding principles. Both advisers
emphasized that French reintegration into NATO needs thorough
consideration and is unlikely to take place before 2009.
They shared their concerns about recent signals from Russia
and described the "disastrous" consequences of the Iran NIE
on international efforts. Finally, they shared their
perspectives on the principles that underlie President
Sarkozy's dynamic administration, including France's desire
to be influential on the world scene while maintaining close
relations with its allies. END SUMMARY.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NATO Reintegration -- Not Before 2009
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶2. (C) Both Richier and Errera noted that President Sarkozy
has publicly accepted the principle of French reintegration
into NATO. Furthermore, according to Richier, he is the
first elected president in France to go on the record as
supportive of NATO. The U.S. should not underestimate the
attitude shifts that have made reintegration politically
feasible today. At the same time, both interlocutors
stressed that the GOF will not "rush" into a final decision
on reintegration into the military command structure.
Richier observed that the 2009 NATO summit would be a
reasonable timeframe for the announcement of a final
decision, noting the need for a thorough evaluation of the
implications of the decision. He added that France's defense
white paper will include a vision for French and collective
security, but that the exercise will conclude no sooner than
the end of April 2008.

¶3. (C) Errera said the GOF prefers the term "normalization"
to "reintegration," in part to underscore for domestic
political reasons that the NATO of today is not the NATO of
previous eras. Errera said that President Sarkozy wants to
work for a "new" NATO, and that France needs to be on the
inside to work for reform. He stressed that use of the
correct terminology should help frame the public dialogue
that is certain to ensue in France, despite the lack of
public outcry responding to Sarkozy's initial expressions of
interest. Richier noted that there is much ignorance in
France today about what NATO does; for example, many think
ISAF is under UN auspices. Errera pointed out that the
defense white paper commission, which is conducting a broad
review of defense and security policy, includes people who
are skeptical of NATO.

¶4. (C) Errera characterized this moment as "awkward," given
that formal discussions about the form of French
reintegration have not yet started. He noted that political
commitment and practical considerations had to be developed
simultaneously and incrementally, adding that the Joint
Chiefs must have a sense for where in NATO French officers
would be posted, for example, before a decision is made.
Most importantly, he said that France (including Sarkozy's
diplomatic adviser Jean-David Levitte) wants to avoid the
same mistakes that were made in the 1990s when reintegration
was last on the table. To avoid repeating those mistakes,
Errera said smaller, practical questions should not be
permitted to become pressure points that could block a
political decision. Richier said that it would be a mistake
to set firm goals today on what had to be achieved before a
political decision could be made, and that the overall
direction is more important than the specifics. He
acknowledged that there is suspicion in Europe regarding
France's motivations, and suspicion in France regarding NATO,
that will need to be overcome. He pointed to President
Sarkozy's scheduled February 1 meeting with NATO SYG Jaap de
Hoop Scheffer as one important step to alleviate some
concerns.

¶5. (C) Errera said that generally, newer members of NATO
will view French reintegration positively, reducing their
current suspicion of France for its non-normalized NATO
membership. On the other hand, newer members of NATO use
NATO jobs to reward their top leadership, and French

PARIS 00000114 002 OF 004


reintegration would put a tight squeeze on command structures
and high-level posts. High-level positions are also an issue
with Germany and the U.K.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NATO and ESDP: Inseparably Linked
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶6. (C) Errera stated that during France's upcoming EU
Presidency, President Sarkozy will push hard to strengthen
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), while working
for a revitalized NATO. Richier called this a transatlantic
effort to strengthen European security, while noting that
billing it as an "alternative" to NATO would be both
politically and financially absurd. Errera observed that
substantive progress on ESDP will be very difficult, partly
due to British concerns. Richier expressed hope that
European defense budgets could increase, noting that the gap
vis--vis the U.S. is growing, but added that if budgets
cannot be increased in the short term, efficiency must be
increased.

- - - - - - - - -
NATO Enlargement
- - - - - - - - -

¶7. (C) Adriatic 3: Errera said that France is comfortable
in principle with each of the Adriatic 3 candidates. In
particular, France has "no problems" with Croatian
membership. However, Errera said Albania seems to be taking
acceptance for granted, and needs to make more of an effort
to "clean up" corruption issues. Regarding Macedonia, Errera
said the GOM underestimates the seriousness of the name issue
for Greece and that the U.S. should not make the same
mistake. France will not pressure Greece on this issue.
Furthermore, if Athens were to give in on the name issue, the
Greek government could fall, thus bringing in a new
government which would be responsible for -- and presumably
hostile to -- the NATO enlargement ratification progress.

¶8. (C) Georgia and Ukraine: Errera said that the GOF does
not want a public dispute with the U.S. on these issues
before Bucharest, adding that European allies are hedging
because Washington is not sending clear signals. Errera
expects that new Ukrainian PM Tymoshenko will come out soon
publicly in favor of MAP for Ukraine, a step for which France
will "not have a great appetite." Errera said MAP is not
just one more step in closer relations, but a serious
decision in light of Article 5 commitments. Regarding
Georgia, he said Saakashvili "pulled off the election
somehow" but still not under ideal circumstances, and that
NATO may not be ready for Article 5 guarantees to Georgia
either. That said, the GOF has systematically made clear to
Russia that there is no Russian redline or veto regarding
Ukraine and Georgia. In response, Wood noted that France's
hesitation regarding Article 5 commitments implies a de facto
"sphere of influence," because Russia is the only possible
menace to Ukraine or Georgia.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
Russia: Negative Trends
- - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶9. (C) Richier characterized the current Russian regime as
revisionist, saying that Putin made much-needed improvements
to Russian infrastructure but has gone too far in seeking to
restore Russia's grandeur at the expense of international
cooperation and development. Among the Russian population,
many are culturally and economically oriented towards the
West, but remain politically tied to Putin. According to
Errera, Russian judgment on important issues is worsening.
In the past, Russia has been difficult to work with, but has
ultimately made the right decisions -- until recently. As an
example, in President Sarkozy's private meeting in Moscow
with President Putin, Putin was very hardline on Iran
(notwithstanding Russia's exports of fuel for Bushehr), but
that in the subsequent press conference, Putin distanced
himself on this issue, to Sarkozy's surprise and chagrin.
Errera said that in the past, Russia did not mind hurting
Iran as long as Russia was not hurt as well; now Russia seems
not to want to hurt the Iranians.

- - - - - - - - -
Energy Dependence
- - - - - - - - -


PARIS 00000114 003 OF 004


¶10. (C) Both interlocutors noted that France's use of
nuclear energy makes it less dependent than some other
European countries on Russian oil and gas. That said,
Richier expressed concern that Russia is "grabbing" gas
infrastructure and supply at a time of military buildup and
strong rhetoric. He said that it will be difficult for
Europe to agree on a common energy policy, as there is
currently no consensus, nor any great ideas, on how to solve
the problem. Richier described Russian policies as motivated
to obtain short-term profit for individuals, rather than to
build long-term, worldwide power. Errera observed that
dependence on Russia for energy is better than dependence on
Iran, which is the only other real option. He said that
Sarkozy had made overtures to Algeria on gas before and
during his visit to Algiers, but that France was "stiffed."
Nor is there any sense that there will be progress with
Algeria on gas in the near term. Errera said that while
France seeks a commercial relationship, Algeria views energy
cooperation as complicated by history and tinged with a sense
of nationalism.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-
NIE: "The Best Christmas Gift Ahmadinejad Could Have
Imagined"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-

¶11. (C) Both interlocutors called the NIE a "disaster" that
has "substantially jeopardized" progress on Iran in the short
term and will have lasting consequences, including
eliminating France's ability to build consensus in Europe.
French views are unchanged, but many others have been
affected, and the NIE destroyed not just the momentum of the
international community but also what little leverage France
and the international community had on less radical Iranian
elements. Errera noted that the timing of the release of the
NIE was especially bad, with EU Political Directors having
been poised for a new UNSC resolution just before the NIE
release. He said at the IISS Manama Dialogue in December,
speculation was rampant about why the current U.S.
administration did not better manage the report's fallout by
postponing its release or changing the characterization of
Iran's enrichment activities as exclusively civil.

¶12. (C) Both interlocutors said quick passage of a new UNSC
resolution, although likely to be a weak, is key. Richier
said that Iran has no incentive to negotiate and that the
international community's most effective mechanism has been
creating a financially difficult operating environment for
Iran. If the perception declines in the financial community
that investment in Iran is dangerous, this will change.
Errera noted the EU might be able to go farther than the
Security Council will, perhaps with Gulf countries and/or the
G7, to pressure Iran on continued uranium enrichment by
raising the price for doing so.

¶13. (C) Errera also said that an intelligence team from the
French DGSE traveled to the U.S. recently to meet with their
U.S. counterparts regarding the NIE, and was disappointed
that the information shared was "even less" than has been
reported in the press. This reception did not help the
perception shared by some in the GOF that France has not been
treated as a full partner by the U.S., despite working
side-by-side and fielding criticism following the NIE
release.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Sarkozy's Governing Philosophy
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶14. (C) Errera said that two clear priorities underlie
Sarkozy's administration. The first is realigning French
presence with French objectives, and reestablishing French
influence where it had been diminished (for example, within
the EU, by giving momentum to the simplified EU treaty).
Errera said France will maintain its influence in Africa but
seeks to rebalance its overseas investments, for example by
creating a military base in the UAE. Errera said that France
cannot say Iran is a key threat without investing more in the
Gulf and that the Iranians will "get the message." He noted
that the new base in the UAE will be the first French
military installation not in a former colony. Secondly,
Errera said that Sarkozy believes in the concept of "the
West," making him the first non-Gaullist French president not
to consider France an exclusively independent actor. This

PARIS 00000114 004 OF 004


identification provides Sarkozy a clear course for steering
French policy even on difficult questions like dealing with
Libyan President Qadhafi.

¶15. (C) Richier suggested that Sarkozy's core conviction is
that France must be pulled into the 21st century. He said
Sarkozy likes to use the metaphor of a person who exercises
for the first time in a while -- many muscles may be sore
afterwards, but the exercise has done them good. Richier
said he sees new energy in French diplomacy, focused on
bringing diversity and reconciliation to the global stage.
Sarkozy wishes to encourage countries to accept the diversity
(ethnic, religious, etc.) within their own societies, as
tolerance for others is key to democracy. Sarkozy also
recognizes a need for reconciliation and believes the effort
to correct the course of a "bad guy" is worthwhile (COMMENT:
In public Sarkozy has defended his outreach to Qadhafi and
Hugo Chavez along these lines.) According to Richier,
Sarkozy believes the short-term costs of talking to rogue
actors by using carrots and helping them move forward are
less than the long-term costs of inaction. However, he also
recognizes the importance of not creating gaps between the
U.S. and Europe in reaching out to "bad guys," marking a
departure from previous French governments. Finally, Richier
noted that "relations with Islam" and climate change were two
immediate priorities of President Sarkozy's that would
nevertheless remain on the French agenda.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


PEKALA

10PARIS71     2010-01-22 17:05     2010-11-29 12:12     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Paris

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DE RUEHFR #0071/01 0221744
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R 221744Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8101

S E C R E T PARIS 000071

NOFORN
SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION
H PASS TO HOUSE STAFFER KESSLER'S OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR AF PK FR
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL KESSLER ENGAGES THE FRENCH ON IRAN,
SANCTIONS AND AFGHANISTAN

REF: 09 PARIS 1671

Classified By: Pol M/C Allegrone for Reasons 1.4 b and d.

¶1. (C) Staffdel Kessler, representing the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, visited Paris January 12-14 to engage French
officials, non-government entities and the private sector
regarding Iran, sanctions, non-proliferation and Afghanistan.
With a main focus of discussing potential U.S. sanctions
legislation related to Iranian efforts to develop weapons of
mass destruction, the staffdel heard from a wide spectrum of
French players. Most of the opinions supported USG efforts
as France has been a strong ally, especially regarding Iran
and Afghanistan. While the usefulness of sanctions continues
to be debated, French officials said their government was
moving forward with haste, and bringing the European Union
(EU) with it, to prepare enhanced sanctions against Iran.
Even the French political opposition appears on board with
this plan. While challenges abound in Afghanistan, the
Government of France (GOF) remains firmly committed to NATO's
mission there. Total company senior representatives
explained to the staffdel members that its activities in Iran
are completely legal, small in scope and that it has not been
able to complete its buy out program there due to
foot-dragging by the Tehran regime. Highlights of Staffdel
Kessler's meetings in Paris are as follows. End summary.

IRAN: OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW
------------------------------------

¶2. (S/NF) In a January 13 meeting with members of Staffdel
Kessler, Francois Richier, Strategic Affairs Advisor to
President Sarkozy, addressed the issue of imposing enhanced
sanctions against Iran. Richier explained that the GOF was
developing a package of measures that largely targeted the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps because of its economic
holdings and its role as a weapons proliferator. This
package would include:

--Finance - The GOF is willing to include the Iranian Central
Bank in targeted sanctions, most likely through some of its
subsidiary bodies. Paris is also trying to target an Iranian
Sovereign Wealth Fund which it recently learned has a branch
in Germany. France would also seek to impose sanctions that
would cut Iran's ability to conduct "correspondent banking."

--Transport - These sanctions would ban Iranian ships from
ports and harbors in Europe. The French envision the
possibility of enhanced sanctions that would trace Iranian
ships that have been re-flagged to obscure their origin. In
addition, Iranian air cargo planes would be banned from EU
airports.

--Insurance and re-insurance - Given the limited number of
actors in the re-insurance industry, France believes
prohibiting re-insurance coverage in Iran would be an
effective sanction.

--Oil and Gas - Paris proposes a ban on technical cooperation
and investment in Iran, a well as prohibiting exports of
refinery equipment and spare parts for oil and gas
industries.

¶3. (S/NF) Richier said he expects the EU will agree to
"complement" any eventual UN Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) and France hopes for a short timeline to secure a new
UNSCR in early February before securing approval at the
Council of EU Foreign Ministers later that month. Richier
said that we will have to decide whether to accept grudging
Russian concessions in order to get a UNSCR that may be weak
and limited, or whether to "waste time" trying to lobby for a
UNSCR that will be, at best, only marginally better. Richier
noted that it would be helpful if the U.S. Congress did not
act on sanctions legislation at least until the UNSCR debate
is concluded and he said it might be best to have U.S.
sanctions legislation reference the new UN resolution.
Regarding potential Chinese opposition, he hoped for
agreement on a new UNSCR (as the prior ones were unanimous),
but would accept a simple abstention. Richier expects Russia
will support the measure because the Russians were "shocked"
by the discovery of the uranium enrichment site in Qom.
Nevertheless, the Russians still need time to adjust their
thinking to this reality.

¶4. (S/NF) European countries face three main difficulties in
deciding on sanctions against Iran, according to Richier, and
he outlined them as follows:

--Most European countries want a UN framework, including a
new UNSCR. Richier pointed out that a signal from the Obama
administration that we are also prepared to move forward

would be very helpful.

--Determining the nature of sanctions: Some EU countries want
to put the UN decision into EU law, but the French want to go
beyond that and target different sanctions that we are
unlikely to get from the next UNSCR.

--Some countries simply hesitate to support sanctions for a
variety of reasons, whether protecting their own economic
interests, or on ideological grounds. This is manageable,
but complicated by individual circumstances, according to
Richier.

¶5. (S/NF) The GOF remains concerned about enforcing
sanctions with Brazil and Turkey, said Richier, because both
have considerable ties to Iran. He said that Turkey has made
clear it does not want to suffer economically, as it has in
the past. Richier noted France's concern over Turkey's
"regional policy" towards Iran, whereas it views Brazil's
engagement as being more nave and possibly based on
misinterpretation of the Obama decision to try engagement
first (without Brazil knowing what limits on that engagement
should be).

¶6. (S/NF) Richier was skeptical that sanctions aimed at
exporters of refined oil to Iran would be effective, although
the GOF has pushed for this, because such a policy would
require a verification mechanism requiring an investment of
military ships along Iran's long coastline and other
resources. Richier believes such a policy would send a
signal to exporters worldwide, but it would be too hard to
implement, and would likely only dissuade the honest
exporters. When asked about French oil company Total and
pending U.S. congressional legislation, Richier replied Total
has not made new investments in Iran, although it is involved
in a buy-back arrangement and said sales of Total's refined
products in Iran are declining.

IRAN: MFA SHARES ELYSEE'S VIEWS
-------------------------------

¶7. (S/NF) On January 14, Martin Briens, the Foreign
Ministry's DAS-equivalent for Non-Proliferation, largely
confirmed what Richier had said, but he provided additional
information. Briens also highlighted French ambitions to get
a new UNSCR approved and implemented at the February 25
Foreign Ministers meeting. However he said "tough and fast"
in the UNSC was unlikely, so we would probably have to settle
for fast. A total arms embargo, which Russia had previously
opposed but China had not, would be a major victory, assuming
Russia actually supported it.

¶8. (S/NF) Briens asserted that the June election in Iran and
its aftermath had "changed the equation" within the EU with
respect to Iran. He allowed that pending U.S. measures will
"also enter into the equation." Several countries besides
France, including Spain, have come to the conclusion that it
is time to move from sanctions that specifically target
proliferation activities to ones that have a broader impact.
Given the delays in implementing the last UNSCR on Iran,
France and close partners had received EU approval to prepare
modalities of implementation "in parallel" to negotiations in
the UN. The GOF has come to the view that the EU should take
"autonomous" measures that are not merely a magnified
application of UNSCRs, but it is still unclear how far EU
partners would go in this direction. France has noted the
UKs adoption of a process to designate individual foreign
entities for sanctions and it is now considering doing the
same. The GOF also believes that national governments can do
more through Financial Action Task Force decisions made by
the G8.

¶9. (S/NF) In addition to the potential package of sanctions
outlined by Richier (para 2), Briens said the GOF wants the
EU to:

--Impose a "prior authorization" approach on all Iran Central
Bank transactions which would allow truly sovereign
operations by the Central Bank to be approved, but it would
allow greater scrutiny and control, and would slowdown the
processing of transactions.

--Cast a wide net in banning/targeting IRGC persons and
entities.

--Ban trade in equipment for internal repression and identify
people involved.

Briens shared Richier's doubts on the efficacy of trying to
block refined petroleum products ("the bad guys will just get
rich") but the technology and parts for the oil and gas

sectors, especially for refining should also be denied to
Iran. Finally, on the issue of gaining China's
participation, he suggested emphasizing regional stability
and recruiting countries in the region to put pressure on
China as well.

AFGHANISTAN: KARZAI NEEDS TO
FOLLOW UP ON INAUGURATION SPEECH
--------------------------------

¶10. (C) On January 14 Jasmine Zerinini, head of the GOF's
interagency Afghanistan-Pakistan cell, acknowledged that
public opposition in France to the troop presence in
Afghanistan has grown steadily over the past several years,
but that this has not resulted in calls for withdrawal or
even a significant change in strategy. Regarding
coordination between the International Security Assistance
Forces, Zerinini said that there had been a great deal of
improvement, but that the approach was still too fragmented.
She said that France has recognized for the past year that
the forces stationed in the north of the country were unable
to handle the growing insurgency there. General McChrystal
understands this, she added, but this has not translated into
action.

¶11. (C) On civilian assistance, Zerinini said U.S. and French
plans to deploy more civilians are unlikely to bear fruit,
because ultimately only the Afghans themselves can bring
effective development. However, she opined, the Karzai
administration has not shown that it is capable of doing
this. Although Karzai's inauguration speech in November was
a good first step, he has done nothing since then.
Therefore, she said, the London conference is coming far too
early - the goal of London was to renew our partnership with
Karzai, but this is difficult without a real roadmap for
progress from the Afghans.

PAKISTAN: REINFORCING POLITICAL RELATIONS
-----------------------------------------

¶12. (C) Zerinini said France is working to reinforce its
political relations with Pakistan, and was expecting
President Sarkozy to visit Pakistan "early in the second
quarter" of 2010. The GOF does not want to return to a
relationship based on military equipment sales, as in the
1980s, and is instead focusing on counter terrorism in
addition to economic and trade links. France is also trying
to support an EU-Pakistan dialogue, but she said Pakistan
makes it difficult by rejecting conditionality and attempting
to focus exclusively on economic issues. Zerinini said the
Pakistani government is eager for trade concessions, but does
not want any political dialogue unless it is focused on
Kashmir.

¶13. (C) On the role of the Pakistani military, Zerinini said
General Kayani has "learned the lesson of Musharraf" and was
staying behind the scenes. However, he is manipulating the
government and parliament, including to prevent change on
Pakistan's policy towards Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) along the Afghan border, and also to stir up
controversy regarding the Kerry-Lugar bill that ties
continued U.S. aid to increased civilian control of the
military. Zerinini also argued that the west had missed its
opportunity to push the Pakistani military to crush the
Afghan Taliban taking refuge in Pakistan. Citing Jalaladin
Haqqani as an example, Zerinini said in 2004 he had standing
as a leader in the jihadi community, but did not have the
organization to represent a significant military threat.
However, since then, large amounts of funding, predominately
from Gulf donors, have allowed Haqqani to create a network
that would be difficult for the Pakistani military to defeat,
even if it had the will to do so.

¶14. (C) Zerinini said that bilateral measures alone to
strengthen civilian government were unlikely to be effective,
and that more coordination was needed among donors,
especially the United States. She said the Group of Friends
of Democratic Pakistan, while imperfect, was designed to
transform Pakistan's political elite and give them more
leverage over the military. However, Zerinini said it is not
being utilized. She said the U.S. was making significant
efforts to help develop Pakistan's energy sector, but she
added "I have not seen any of this in the energy working
group of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan."

THE FRENCH LEFTIST OPPOSITION
-----------------------------

¶15. (C) Staffdel members met opposition figures from the
French Parliament and Senate including Deputy Pierre
Moscovici (former Minister of European Affairs), Senator

Jean-Pierre Chevenement (former Minister of Defense), Senator
Monique Cerisier ben Guiga (author of "Going nuclear in the
Middle East"), and Deputy Jean-Michel Boucheron to learn
their views on Iran and the Middle East Peace Process. With
respect to Iran, the group generally thought President
Sarkozy's tone had been too harsh and they supported giving
dialogue more time to bear fruit. Moscovici was the most
alarmed at the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons
capability and he emphasized that he would not rule out any
means in dealing with it. Boucheron and Cerisier ben Guiga
accepted the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran with equanimity
because they felt Iran was only seeking to enhance its power
rather than seeking to use nuclear weapons for hostile
purposes, while Boucheron was more concerned that the West's
focus on this issue was preventing movement on a host of
other issues where Iran might be helpful, including Iraq,
Afghanistan, Lebanon and Gaza. Chevenement said he was
prepared to support sanctions on Iran, but he argued that
achieving progress towards peace between the Israelis and
Palestinians would be the most effective way of improving
relations with the Iranian regime.

¶16. (C) The group generally agreed that the USG was not
moving fast enough on the Middle East peace process.
Moscovici thought President Obama could both be a friend to
Israel, as well as being firm when necessary. The opposition
members said the USG was not putting enough pressure on
Israel and that the temporary settlement freeze announced by
the Nentanyahu government is inadequate. The group's
expectations for what the Obama Administration could
accomplish in the Middle East were high, and the perceived
absence of concrete results could lead to disappointment on
the French left.

FRENCH ENERGY MAJOR TOTAL IN IRAN
---------------------------------

¶17. (C) Total's Vice President for International Relations
Hubert des Longchamps told staffdel members that the
company's current activities in Iran are legal. Much in line
with recent statements (see reftel), Longchamps said Total's
focus is on recouping funds, in the form of cash payments,
from previous investments in the development of Iran's oil
and gas blocks. He added that Total has no operational
responsibility in the South Pars field, and talks to finalize
buy-back arrangements to reimburse Total a "few hundred
thousand dollars" should have ended in 2008. In addition,
Total provides limited technical services to the Iranians to
safeguard its remaining property interest. Longchamps said
to walk away from these interests would only reward the
Tehran regime. He added that Total from "time to time" sells
excess gasoline supplies to Iran when demand drops in Europe.
Longchamps did not quantify the value of this trade, but he
said if such deals carried a high political risk, Total was
willing to forego the business. He reiterated that there is
no existing regulation prohibiting such sales, and if Total
withdrew entirely from the refined petroleum product markets,
the Indians, Koreans, and Chinese would remain active
players.

18 (C) Like other energy companies, Total plans to return to
Iran in the future when the political situation improves,
Longchamps explained. Therefore, Total offers financial
support to local communities to develop social and medical
projects. These programs help maintain a dialogue with the
Iranian society and is a channel of communication that Total
wants to keep open. He pointed out that Total has not
violated any U.N., EU or French laws. Longchamps cautioned
the U.S. against imposing sanctions in Iran because they
would hurt typical Iranians without impacting the political
leadership. When the Total Vice President asked the staffdel
if pending U.S. legislation could penalize energy companies
for selling refined petroleum to Iran, staffdel members
responded the legislation could possibly impact Total's
recent shale-gas investments in the U.S.

THINK TANK: EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS
--------------------------------------

¶19. (C) French officials are divided over the effectiveness
of sanctions as a response to Iran's continued pursuit of
nuclear enrichment, according to Bruno Tertrais, senior
researcher at the Foundation for Strategic Research (a think
tank focusing on international security and defense issues
whose main client is the GOF). Tertrais told staffdel
members that he believes sanctions can be efficient, but he
noted the importance of defining the end goal. He stated the
purpose of sanctions on Iran is not to stop the nuclear
program immediately but to exert pressure on the regime and
to elicit a gradual change. He listed the successful use of
sanctions in the past on four different countries -- South

Africa, Libya, Iraq, and North Korea -- the fact that
sanctions on Iran have put a strain on its imports, and the
accelerated debate within Iranian leadership as factors that
back the argument that sanctions can be effective. He
caveated his statements throughout the meeting by saying
sanctions would be ineffective if nothing was done to address
the black market and business circuits to Dubai. Regarding
the GOF's stance on sanctions, Tertrais noted that the Office
of the Presidency (Elysee) was more supportive of further
sanctions and mindful of strategic issues than the MFA, which
tended to take a regional approach and be more dovish.
Tetrais stated that the history of the late 1980s showed that
the more pressure foreign governments placed on the Tehran
regime, the more the Iranians backed down.

¶20. (C) Embassy comment: Staffdel Kessler's engagement with a
broad audience on these issues helped advance our mutual
understanding of the challenges and strategies to advance our
common interests in Iran and Afghanistan, and on the
effectiveness of sanctions.

¶21. (U) Staffdel Kessler did not clear this cable.
RIVKIN

10PARIS174     2010-02-12 16:04     2010-11-29 12:12     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Paris

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RR RUEHSL
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RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0959
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RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000174

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O 12958: DECL: 02/08/20
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR FR IR AF NATO
SUBJECT: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES'S MEETING WITH FRENCH FOREIGN
MINISTER KOUCHNER, FEBRUARY 8, 2010

Classified By: Alexander Vershbow, ASD/ISA. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: At the request of the French Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (SecDef) met with French FM
Bernard Kouchner in Paris on February 8, 2010. Discussions included
how to persuade the Chinese and others to support sanctions against
Iran, and the importance of targeting the Iranian government rather
than the people. On Afghanistan, Kouchner confirmed that France would
maintain its position that it could not add additional combat troops
for the time being but was open to the possibility of sending
additional trainers. Both Kouchner and SecDef lauded recent progress
in Pakistan. Discussing NATO, Kouchner argued for a stronger European
pillar, which SecDef supported with the caution that pursuit of an
independent European security role risked reducing the already limited
capabilities available to the Alliance. SecDef also raised the need
for reform and for examination of future NATO missions, which he would
define narrowly rather than broadly. END SUMMARY

----
Iran
----

¶2. (S/NF) Kouchner said that the U.S. and France were working well
together in New York on an Iran sanctions resolution - all the problems
now are with the Chinese. Kouchner had met Chinese FM Yang twice the
previous week, but said that right now it was difficult to predict
whether the Chinese would veto or abstain. He noted that the Chinese
were furious over the U.S.-Taiwan arms deal, which would make it
difficult to get a resolution passed in February.

¶3. (S/NF) SecDef observed that Russia usually followed China's lead on
North Korea, whereas China usually followed Russia on Iran. Therefore
we should try to get the Russians to persuade the Chinese to support
the Iran sanctions resolution. MFA political director Jacques Audibert
remarked that the Russians had been helpful during the last P5-plus-one
teleconference, but he worried that the Russians would water down the
content of the resolution. Kouchner said that President Medvedev seemed
strongly on board, and there was daylight between his position and that
of Foreign Minister Lavrov. SecDef said he suspected that China
ultimately would not want to be isolated and would abstain.

¶4. (S/NF) SecDef urged Kouchner not to exaggerate the Chinese concern
over Taiwan - they would need a little more time and, in the end, an
abstention might be a good enough result for us. He added that we
should urge the Saudis to weigh in with Beijing since China has more at
stake in its relations with Saudi Arabia than Iran. He commented that
the Saudis always want to "fight the Iranians to the last American,"
but that now it is time for them to get into the game.

¶5. (S/NF) Raising his concerns about bringing non-permanent UNSC
members on board, SecDef reported that in Ankara he had impressed upon
PM Erdogan the dangers of proliferation to other Middle East countries
or an Israeli strike if the Iranian nuclear program couldn't be
stopped. Kouchner expressed his doubts about Turkey's desire for a
constructive role in region, describing Erdogan's comments to
Ahmadinejad defending the Iranian nuclear program as dangerous.

¶6. (S/NF) Kouchner then asked SecDef for his perspectives on the
popular protests in Iran. In the French view, the internal
developments were very important - the most significant change in
decades. He urged careful thought about how to avoid discouraging the
protesters with sanctions, bearing in mind that the protesters did not
support Tehran's ambitions for nuclear weapons. He further emphasized
his belief that human rights issues should receive attention as well.

¶7. (S/NF) SecDef said that Kouchner's argument underscored the need to
focus sanctions on the IRGC and companies it owns, in order to minimize
the hardship for the Iranian people. He remarked that Iranians across
the political spectrum support a peaceful nuclear program, but it was
not clear whether they favored acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Therefore, our political strategy should reaffirm Iran's right to have
a civilian nuclear program as long as it is safeguarded and in
compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

¶8. (S/NF) Further explaining the U.S. position, SecDef said that while
our understanding of the Iranian leadership was opaque, we do know that
they do not like to be isolated. The USG would soon be designating
several IRGC companies under the Iran Sanctions Act. His own view was
that it was important to get the UNSCR passed quickly, even if it were
not as harsh as we might wish. Once a resolution is passed, he
explained, it will offer a legal platform on which the EU and
individual states can impose harsher sanctions.

PARIS 00000174 002 OF 003



¶9. (S/NF) Kouchner agreed, but added that another problem was to get
the nine votes needed in the UNSC. He said that Lebanon was one of
France's prime targets in this respect, but he doubted that France
would be able to bring the resolution to a vote during its presidency,
as February is a very short month. Gabon, which takes the chair in
March, is a "good asset for France," he commented. Audibert
interjected that the Russians had supported deleting some sections of
the draft UNSCR, but had approved including sanctions on the IRGC.
Kouchner said that France had to proceed carefully since a French woman
had been taken hostage in Tehran. He disparaged FM Mottaki's
duplicitous performance in Munich.

-----------
Afghanistan
-----------

¶10. (S/NF) On Afghanistan, Kouchner confirmed that France would
maintain its position that it could not add additional combat troops
for the time being. Pledging that France would stay "until the very
end," he said that the French would send 80 French trainers to Kabul on
their own, but were also looking into joint training opportunities with
Germany - possibly an OMLT.

¶11. (S/NF) Kouchner solicited SecDef's reaction to Karzai's idea of
local non-combat zones. Gates said that he was not familiar with this
proposal but was skeptical about declaring zones where the government
could not use force since we could not enforce similar restraint on the
Taliban.

¶12. (S/NF) The U.S., SecDef said, supports reintegration and has money
in its military budget to support short-term efforts at integration
similar to the Sons of Iraq initiative in Anbar province. Kouchner
commented that a key was to provide higher salaries to the ANA and ANP.
SecDef agreed, noting that salary increases in late 2009 had led to an
increase in recruits. Kouchner said that this made sense as we were
fighting misery as well as terrorism.

--------
Pakistan
--------

¶13. (S/NF) Turning to Pakistan, SecDef described the dramatic changes
that had taken place over the past year. It was astonishing that
President Zadari had remained in power and that the Pakistanis had
conducted such effective COIN operations. He noted that coordination
between ISAF and Pakistan's armed forces was improving - and this was
creating a more difficult situation for the Taliban along the border.
The Pakistan operation in South Waziristan had flushed out Taliban and
Al Qaeda elements; they were more vulnerable on the move. Moreover,
Pakistan's aggressive campaign against the insurgency had won broad
political support among all political parties. Operations in the West
and North-West had begun to accrue respect for Pakistan Army that
Musharraf had squandered. It is important for all of us to talk to the
Pakistanis and provide economic assistance. SecDef commented that one
can never be an optimist about Pakistan, but that the changes had been
striking. Kouchner agreed with SecDef's analysis that the changes in
both the political and military spheres were "nothing short of a
miracle."

-----
NATO
-----

¶14. (C) Kouchner then raised NATO, declaring that France was ready to
play its role in defining the Alliance's future strategy. He said that
General Abrial (Supreme Allied Commander - Transformation) has offered
input, but emphasized that it was critical to come up with real
strategy that we could explain in debates in Parliament. Kouchner
stressed that we needed to clarify NATO's roles and missions, as well
as its role in combating the threats of terrorism, poverty and
oppression. SecDef agreed that the Strategic Concept should deal with
21st century security threats Q with an emphasis on the word
"security." He said the Strategic Concept should also incorporate
lessons learned from Afghanistan - particularly the need for
comprehensive civil-military strategies and better partnership between
NATO and the EU and UN.

¶15. (C) SecDef said that NATO reform should proceed hand-in-hand with
an examination of Alliance threats and missions, either as a parallel
process or as a part of the Strategic Concept itself. In this regard,
the Alliance cannot afford so many headquarters and needs to take steps

PARIS 00000174 003 OF 003


to reduce overhead.

¶16. (C) SecDef also stated that the Alliance should be clear as to
what NATO's limits are -- for example, it does not have role in the
Pacific. We should adhere to the basic principle that NATO is about
the security of its member states. We all face terrorist risks, and
there are many other new threats, but SecDef would be inclined to
define future missions narrowly rather than broadly.

¶17. (S/NF) Kouchner highlighted piracy as an emerging issue on which
the EU and NATO were working together, although the real problem was
inside Somalia. As an aside, he mentioned that France was willing to
support the training of additional troops for the TFG.

¶18. (C) Kouchner argued that strengthening the European pillar in NATO
was necessary: the EU cannot exist without defense, the U.S. needs
strong European Allies, and a strong European pillar was not in
contradiction with NATO. SecDef replied that during his time as
SecDef, he has felt the need for a better way for EU and NATO to work
together. While NATO is primarily a security alliance, it can't do its
job without a civilian component. The EU is primarily a
political-economic organization, but he was willing to acknowledge that
it had some security role -- such as counterpiracy or peacekeeping in
Chad. SecDef said that while each organization might have its primary
role and mission, they could both perform both functions.

¶19. (C) Interpreting SecDef's latter comment as prohibiting an EU
security role, Kouchner dissented and said that since 500 million
people live in the European Union, the EU needed to be able to
adequately protect them. Gates observed that France was just one of 5
or 6 nations that spent more than 2 percent of GDP on defense, and that
if the EU decided it needed an independent security role, it could
reduce number of forces available to NATO and cripple the Alliance.
Even now, NATO had insufficient resources. Kouchner said that we needed
to share burdens among all nations, and that it was hard to make people
spend more on defense in the midst of an economic crisis.

¶20. (U) This cable has been cleared by SecDef. Drafted by OSD staff.


RIVKIN

Reference ID     Created     Released     Classification     Origin
10STATE13750     2010-02-17 03:03     2010-11-29 12:12     SECRET//NOFORN     Secretary of State

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TO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 8385
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1309
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 6409
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 6148
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0360
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7288
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 013750

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/26/20
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO RS FR IR TU
SUBJECT: READOUT OF JANUARY 20 U.S.-FRANCE STRATEGIC DIALOGUE
IN WASHINGTON

Classified By: Under Secretary Bill Burns for reasons 1.4(b,
d).

¶1. (S/NF) Summary. On January 20, 2010, Under Secretary Bill
Burns and Defense Under Secretary for Policy Michele Flournoy
hosted the third U.S.-France Strategic Dialogue with
counterparts Jacques Audibert and Michel Miraillet.
Discussions focused on Afghanistan, Pakistan, NATO Reform,
Missile Defense, Turkey, Russia, Iran, and the Middle East
Peace Process. The French indicated an announcement of
further civilian contributions to Afghanistan would be made at
the London Conference, but hedged on a decision regarding
additional combat troops. On NATO's new Strategic Concept,
the French highlighted the potential for a split in the
Alliance between old and new members, and agreed that a
document that linked to NATO reform measures was needed. The
French requested more information on the U.S. proposal to make
Missile Defense a mission for NATO. Both U/S Burns and USD(P)
Flournoy underscored that the potential sale of a French
Mistral-class Helicopter carrier to Russia would be unhelpful
in terms of regional stability. Next steps on Iran were
discussed with the French agreeing that the European Union
(EU) was more unified than ever on the need for increased
pressure and welcoming U.S. efforts to engage the EU as a
whole on this issue. End Summary.



------------------------
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
------------------------

¶2. (S/NF) U/S Burns praised the French contributions and
previewed U.S. goals for the London Conference on Afghanistan,
which included agreement on growing the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF), reintegration, and choosing a new UN
Senior Representative for Afghanistan. USD(P) reviewed the
POTUS decision and highlighted that July 11, 2011 was an
inflection point -- the beginning of a process. She noted
that POTUS was careful to not create an artificial timeline
for transition to Afghan responsibility and that the U.S.
message to the region is that "we are not leaving." Deputy
SRAP Jones described the new U.S. regional stability strategy
and our efforts to align Karzai with the international
community's civilian priorities.

¶3. (S/NF) Audibert remarked on France's "special" commitment
to Afghanistan based on France leading the invocation of
NATO's Article 5 after 9/11. Nine years later, the French
cite Allied unity as the mission's principal success. France
believes the President's announcement of 30,000 more troops
substantively changed the operation. While the London
conference is a chance to impress upon Afghan President Hamid
Karzai that he must implement the commitments in his
inauguration speech, the French are concerned it might be too
early to put too much political pressure on Karzai. Audibert
suggested a second international conference on Afghanistan in
the spring would be helpful and was pleased to hear about
plans for an April conference in Kabul. Audibert also stated
that France will make an announcement about its "civilian
surge" at the London conference, but that commitments on
further troop deployments were not ready. Miraillet lamented
French public opposition to the war in Afghanistan, but
believed that the government was making progress in convincing
the French people of the necessity for the operation. He also
explained that the military staff had developed several plans
for additional contributions, which were now with President
Sarkozy for action.

----------------------
NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT
----------------------

¶4. (C/NF) Audibert noted that the Strategic Concept (SC) was
"not a redrafting of the Washington Treaty," and should not
open troublesome issues such as new missions and redefining
Article 5. He further emphasized that France wanted to stay
as close to the 1999 Strategic Concept as possible on language

STATE 00013750 002 OF 004


relating to NATO nuclear issues. Audibert highlighted the
risk of a split between old and newer members of the Alliance
on these questions and advocated for a short, simple document.
The French want to use the Strategic Concept to drive reform
at NATO. He noted that France had submitted several proposals
on reform and that France was keen for U.S. support.
Miraillet added that with the dire state of NATO financing, it
was important to stress financial reform even before the
drafting of the Strategic Concept. Miraillet also warned that
SecGen Rasmussen might put a tight grip on drafting the
concept and cautioned that Turkey would play a stronger role
in drafting than in 1999.

¶5. (C/NF) USD(P) asserted that the U.S. has played a leading
role in the Senior Officials Group (SOG) because of our strong
commitment to NATO reform. On the SC, she said it was
important that the key Allies make their input to the SecGen
before pen was put to paper. Further, USD(P) clarified that
the U.S. did not believe Alliance transformation could happen
without financial reform and that it was a priority for the
U.S. State Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian
Affairs Phil Gordon agreed; any misperception that the U.S.
did not want to link the Strategic Concept to reform must be
corrected. OSD Assistant Secretary for International Security
Affairs Alexander Vershbow added that the new concept must put
a public face on the Alliance and address issues for the
future, such as Article 4 and crisis management capacity. He
agreed that reform of financing was critical as the current
budget crisis evidenced. ASD Vershbow stressed that we must
work with the UK to solve the financial crisis at NATO and
suggested that the idea of "zero real growth" be put aside.
Audibert was pleased to hear that the U.S. was on the same
page as France regarding reform and that this was a priority
goal for the French side during the Strategic Dialogue.

---------------
Missile Defense
---------------

¶6. (S/NF) USD(P) briefed the French on the current state of
play regarding worldwide U.S. missile defense plans. She
noted that the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) would
soon be submitted to Congress and noted the Phased Adaptive
Approach (PAA) would be a U.S. contribution to a NATO Missile
Defense project. This plan would protect both U.S. forces and
interests in Europe and our NATO Allies. USD(P) requested
French support for securing NATO approval for the Active
Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program to
become the Command and Control (C2) backbone of a wider
European Missile Defense program. USD(P) stressed that NATO
approval for the C2 relationship between ALTBMD and the PAA
was important as Turkey was unlikely to approve participation
unless it was part of a larger NATO enterprise.

¶7. (S/NF) Miraillet conveyed that France was pleased with
the Obama administration's swift action on Missile Defense and
welcomed the U.S. development of the PAA. France shared the
U.S. perception of the threat and had ideas on ways it could
participate in the U.S.-proposed system. However, Miraillet
emphasized that France needed more information before the
government could endorse a NATO-PAA linkage through ALTBMD,
and argued that the Lisbon Summit may be too early for a NATO
decision. He said that France wanted information on phases
three and four of the PAA and whether the SM-3 Block 2B could
be perceived as a threat by the Russians. Audibert added that
France needed much more detail on the potential costs to NATO
Allies before endorsing ALTBMD as the C2 for the European
Missile Defense system. He also asked how the C2
relationships in the system would work in a NATO context.
Audibert concluded by underscoring that French hesitation on
accepting a NATO role for European-wide Missile Defense is not
reluctance, but a reflection of the need for greater clarity
on what was being proposed.

¶8. (S/NF) In response, USD(P) Flournoy said we would soon
share additional details on C2 arrangements, noting that
authorities would need to be delegated given the short
decision time for a response. She and ASD Vershbow pressed
the importance of a political decision at Lisbon to adopt
territorial Missile Defense as a NATO mission, both to secure
Turkish agreement to host the forward-based radar and to
demonstrate that NATO was addressing real Article 5 threats.


STATE 00013750 003 OF 004


------
Turkey
------

¶9. (S/NF) Miraillet and Audibert were remarkably downbeat on
Turkey and lamented poor French bilateral relations with
Turkish leadership, though they believed ties were slowly
improving. Miraillet believed the military leaders were no
longer what they once were as the recent Ergenekon scandal had
weakened the influence of the Generals in Turkish politics.
Miraillet asserted that FM Ahmet Davutoglu had kept with his
theory of "strategic depth," which he had described in his
previously published books, through Turkey's continued
engagement with neighbors like Syria and Iran and in Turkey's
proactive approach to the Caucasus and recognition of the
Iraqi Kurds. Miraillet, in noting that the Turkish military
had of late established a better relationship with the
Pakistani military, stated that Turkey was a nuclear threshold
country and that France did not know if there were similar
civilian nuclear cooperation linkages with Pakistan. In
highlighting Turkey's unwillingness to engage in combat in
Afghanistan, its improved relationships with Syria and Hamas,
its willingness to negotiate with Iran outside the P5-plus-1
process, and its position on selecting a new NATO Secretary
General at the April 2009 Strasbourg Summit, Miraillet summed
up that Turkey was becoming more of a global actor, but not
always a positive actor in the international system.

¶10. (S/NF) USD(P) asked whether the EU was closer to
identifying a way that it could signal to Turkey that the door
was open to a closer relationship, such as observer status in
the European Defense Agency. Audibert noted that President
Sarkozy had been particularly upset with the Turkish position
on Rasmussen at Strasbourg and that Sarkozy's objection to
Turkish membership in the EU was one of five pillars on his
political campaign that the public still remembered. Further,
when France tried to move forward with closer NATO-EU ties
during its 2008 EU presidency, Turkey rejected every plan that
was put on the table. For these reasons, it would be
difficult for France to see any opening on EU membership for
Turkey in the near future. All French interlocutors agreed
that a "more arrogant" Turkey could present a problem during
NATO Strategic Concept discussions this year. In response,
Flournoy, Vershbow and Gordon reiterated that by closing the
door on the Turks, the EU was creating a vicious circle that
fueled Turkish obstructionism at NATO.

------
Russia
------

¶11. (S/NF) Audibert began by stating that France was taking
pragmatic approach to Russia, but that President Sarkozy had a
"problem of confidence" and did not fully trust Russia.
Audibert said Russia's two treaty proposals on new European
Security Architecture were unacceptable and mere provocations,
but that the French position was to use the proposals to
engage the Russians on new approaches to crisis management,
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, and on the
adoption of the Open Skies/verification measures. However, he
noted, these issues will continually be bogged down over the
situation in Georgia, which Audibert saw as intractable as
Russia will never "derecognize" the sovereignty of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia while also never recognizing Georgian
sovereignty over its territory, including the two enclaves.

¶12. (S/NF) Audibert, noting he was raising his "if-raised"
point, brought up the issue of France's potential sale of a
helicopter carrier Mistral-class ship to Russia. He asserted
that the French had merely agreed to negotiate with Russia on
the potential sale, but then argued that sale would be only
for the ship without armament systems. Audibert also said
that while France understood U.S. concerns over the potential
for Russia to use the ship for projection of power, it was
important to note that any decision on the issue would, in the
end, be political in nature. Miraillet stated that this sale
would be a gesture of good will to Russia as France assessed
the Russian Navy was in dire condition. In any case,
concluded Miraillet, if France did not make the sale, the
Netherlands and Spain would likely sell similar technology.

¶13. (S/NF) On Mistral, USD(P) observed the optics and policy
behind the sale were perplexing as it would "fly in the face"

STATE 00013750 004 OF 004


of President Sarkozy's personal engagement on resolving the
Georgia crisis in 2008. She asserted that this sale would
send a confusing political signal to Russia as well as to
other Europeans. U/S Burns concurred with USD(P), noting the
sale would feed Georgia's fears and could lead to an arms
race, increasing the chance of miscalculation by one or both
sides. USD(P) concluded that while we understood that France
wanted to actively engage Russia, the U.S. would prefer that
France find a different confidence-building measure than a
Mistral sale.

----
Iran
----

¶14. (S/NF) U/S Burns stated that the international community
had reached a point where it had to begin looking for further
consequences for Iran as the credibility of our efforts was at
stake. U/S Burns noted that other actors were watching
Western actions on Iran. He cautioned that moving China
toward greater sanctions would not be easy, but that we need
to continue engaging them.

¶15. (S/NF) Audibert noted that France was using every means
possible to bring the EU together on Iran. He noted a
recently EU Council decision to task Foreign Ministers with
developing new ideas on the way forward with Iran. Briens
stated that since the Iranian regime cracked down following
the June 2009 elections, the EU was more solid as a block on
sanctions. In particular, Spain and Sweden, who were
reluctant to support sanctions in the past, were more
supportive because of recent gross human rights violations.

-------------------------
Middle East Peace Process
-------------------------

¶16. (S/NF) Audibert hailed U.S. efforts to reestablish peace
talks between Israel and the Palestinians. He asked pointedly
where the U.S. saw the process in the next six months, and how
to further involve Europe, especially regarding a possible
settlement. Notably, the French did not advocate for a Middle
East summit in Paris.

¶17. (U) Participants:

United States:

Department of State
William Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Phil Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs
Paul Jones, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan
Maureen Cormack, Director for Western Europe
Tamir Waser, Special Assistant to U/S Burns
Andrew Lorenz, Senior France Desk Officer

Department of Defense
Michele Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
Jim Townsend, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
European and NATO Policy
Andrew Winternitz, Deputy Director for European Policy

France:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Jacques Audibert, Under Secretary for Political and Strategic
Affairs
Martin Briens, Deputy Assistant Secretary for nuclear
Nonproliferation
Nicolas Roche, Political Counselor, Embassy of France

Ministry of Defense
Michel Miraillet, Director for Strategic Affairs
Gen Gratien Maire, French Defense Attache to the U.S.
Gen Emmanuel de Romemont, Deputy Director for Disarmament and
Proliferation
Col Cyrille Claver, Deputy Director for European and NATO
Affairs
Col Frederic Pesme, Director for North America

18.This cable was cleared by U/S Burns and USD(P) Flournoy.
CLINTON

72TEHRAN1164     1972-02-25 09:09     2010-11-28 18:06     UNCLASSIFIED     Embassy Tehran

R 250930Z FEB 72
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7561
INFO SECDEF
EUCOM
CSAF

UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 01 OF 01 TEHRAN 1164

E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006
TAGS: MASS MARR IR
SUBJECT: ACCELERATION OF F-4ES FOR IRAN

REF: TEHRAN 1091: TEHRAN 263: MOSCOW 1603

COUNTRY TEAM. MESSAGE


BEGIN SUMMARY

GENERAL AZIMI, MINISTER OF WAR, ON INSTRUCTION OF SHAH ASKS THAT WE TAKE ANOTHER HARD LOOK AT F-4E PRODUCTION LINE IN ORDER ACCELERATE DELIVERY OF ONE SQUADRON OF F-4ES TO IRAN IN 1972. REQUEST REFLECTS SHAH'S INCREASING CONCERN OVER SOVIET AMBITIONS IN AREA AND ESPECIALLY THREAT SHAH SEES TO IRAN OF FRIENDSHIP TREATY UNDER CONSIDERATION BY IRAQ AND USSR. SHAH RECOGNIZES PROBLEMS THIS POSES FOR US BUT IS TURNING TO USG WITH THIS REQUEST TO GIVE IRAN HIGHER PRIORITY ON FA-4E PRODUCTION SCHEDULE BECAUSE HE REGARDS US AS MOST DEPENDABLE FRIEND. END SUMMARY

ACTION REQUESTED: COUNTRY TEAM RECOMMENDS US REVIEW F-4E PRODUCTION LINE AND RESPOND FAVORABLY TO SHAH'S REQUEST FOR 16 F-4ES IN 1972 FROM WHATEVER SOURCE MAY BE AVAILABLE.

¶1. ON FEB 24 CHARGE WAS CONVOKED BY MINSTER OF WAR, GEN. REZANUZIMI, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM SHAH. AZIMI SAID SHAH MOST DEEPLY CONCERNED AT TRENDS IN SECURITY SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST AND EXPECIALLY ON HIS WESTERN BORDERS. US OFFICALS ALREADY AWARE OF SHAH'S CONCERN THROUGH DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND OTHER GOI OFFICIALS (SEE REFTELS), BUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ SOVIET RELATIONS INCLUDING AGREEMENT TO DELIVER MORE MIGS AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT PLUS INDICATION THAT RECENT IRAQI-SOVIET TALKS IN MOSCOW INCLUDED CONSIDERATION OF FRIENDSHIP TREATY AS WELL AS INCREASED MILITARY COOPERATION INJECT NEW SENSE OF URGENCY IN SHAH'S TIMETABLE FOR MODERNINZING AND STRENTHENING HIS ARMED FORCES. MOST SPECIFICALLY, SITUATION REQUIRED IRAN ACCELERATE ITS MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND HOST PARTICULARLY DELIVERY OF F-4E AIRCRAFT.

¶2. AZIMI RECALLED THAT GOI HAD REQUESTED DELIVERY OF 16 OF F-4E AIRCRAFT NOW ON ORDER BY IRAN (FIRST OF WHICH WAS NOT SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY UNTIL AUGUST 1973) BE ADVANCED TO CY 1972. HOWEVER, GOI HAD RECENTLY BEEN INFORMED BY USG AND MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS THAT PRODUCTION LINE FOR IRAN COULD NOT RPT NOT BE ADVANCED TO MEET 1972 DELIVERY DATES DESIRED. SHAH WAS MOST DISTURBED, AS ADDITION OF F-4ES IN 1972 WAS VITAL TO IRAN'S SECURITY AT THIS TIME. SHAH HAD DIRECTED THAT USG BE ASKED, IF PRODUCTION FOR IRAN COULD NOT IN FACT BE ADVANCED, TO MAKE REQUESTED F-4ES AVAILABLE FROM OTHER SOURCES. SHAH'S DESIRE IS FOR DELIIVERY OF F-4FS IN LOTS OF FOUR DURING JUNE TO DECEMBER TIME-FRAME.

¶3. CHARGE REVIEWED RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN US-IRAN MILITARY COOPERATION, INCLUDING EQUIPMENT AND CREDIT, AND STRESSED THAT RECORD INDICATED WE UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED SHAH'S CONCERNS AND DESIRES AND HAD BEEN EXCEPTIONALLY RESPONSIVE TO SHAH'S WISHES. CURRENTLY, AZIMI'S DEPUTY GEN. TOUFANS, WAS IN US DISCUSSING VERY QUESTION OF ACCLERATED EQUIPMENT ACQUISIION INCLUDING F-4E. ACCELERATION OF F-4E DELIVERY RAISED DIFFICULT TECHNICAL AND COST PROBLEMS AS WELL AS QUESTIONS OF OTHER COMMITMENTS AND PRIORITIES. UNDOUBTEDLY THESE ISSUES WERE BEING DISCUSSED IN FULL WITH GEN. TOUFANIAN TO ENSURE THAT HE WAS COMPLETELY INFORMED OF POSSIBILITIES AND PROBLEMS AND REASONS FOR ANY LIMITATIONS ON MEETING GOI REQUEST THAT MIGHT EXIST. GEN. TOUFANIAN PROBABLY WOULD HAVE FULLER PICTURE OF SITUATION THAN WE NOW HAD IN IRAN.

¶4. AZIMI RESPONDED THAT GOI WAS BEING KEPT INFORMED OF TOUFANIAN DISCUSSIONS, BUT DECISON ON F-4E COULD NOT BE DELAYED. AZIMI MADE CLEAR SHAH FELT AQUISITION OF 16 F-4E AIRCRAFT IN 1972 WAS MOST IMPORTANT IMMEDIATE MILITARY PROBLEM OUTSTANDING. HE STRESSED SHAH BELIEVED THAT NUMBER REQUIRED WAS SMALL IN RELATION TO US INVENTORY, AND THAT UNSETTLED SITUATION CONFRONTING IRAN WARRANTED ACCELERATED DELIVERY TO IRAN AS AGAINST OTHER POSSIBLE DISPOSITIONS (AS TO EUROPE OR EVEN USAF) IN SAME TIME FRAME.

¶5. CHARGE NOTED WE WOULD TRANSMIT SHAHS REQUEST TO, WASHINGTON AND THAT USG IN SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP WHICH MARKED OUR RELATIONS WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO BE RESPONSIVE. CHARGE SAID THIS SAME FRIENDSHIP REQUIRED HIM TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT ALTHOUGH WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MEET SHAH'S NEEDS AS SHAH SAW THEM, OUR MILITARY ADVISERS, AS GOI KNEW, WERE CONCERNED THAT ACCELERATION OF AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION WOULD STRAIN SUPPORT AND OPERATIONAL MANPOWER OF IIAF AND COULD LEAD TO DECREASE RATHER THAN INCREASE IN IIAF EFFECTIVENESS. AZIMI REPLIED THAT NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT TO BE DELIVERED HAD BEEN, CLOSELY STUDIED BY IlAF WITH MAAG ASSISTANCE, AND IIAF WAS SATISFIED THAT SIXTEEN AIRCRAFT REQUESTED COULD BE EFFECTIVELY INTEGRATED INTO PRESENT FORCE STRUCTURE. AZIMI CLOSED MEETING BY ASKING THAT USG ANSWER SHAH'S REQUEST AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

¶6. COMMENT. SHAH IS DEEPLY CONCERN AT DEVELOPMENTS OVER PAST YEARS STRENGTHENING SOVIET INFLUENCE AND PRESENCE IN MIDEAST AND INDIAN OCEAN AND APPEARING TO INDICATE SUBSTANTIALLY ENLARGED SOVIET COMMITMENT, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY, TO IRAQ. HE HAS CONCLUDED THAT INCREASED PRESENT DANGER REQIRES IRAN'S FIRST LINE AIR DEFENSE TO BE BEEFED-UP NOW RATHER THAN IN PREVIOUSLY PROGRAMMED SCHEDULE STARTING IN EIGHTEEN MONTHS. THE NUMBER, FREQUENCY AND TONE OF DEMARCHES ON SUBJECT WE HAVE RECEIVED IS VIRTUALLY UNPARALLELLED, AND CAN LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT HIM CONSIDERS ISSUE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE.

¶7. WHETHER WE FULLY AGREE WITH SHAH'S CONCERN, WE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT REQUEST --LIKE USG DECISION IN 1970 ON SALE TO IRAN OF SEVENTH AND EIGHTH SQUADRONS OF F-4E --HAS BECOME ANOTHER GUT ISSUE IN SHAH'S MIND. SHAH IS AGAIN TURNING TO USG BECAUSE IN PERIODS OF ANXIETY SHAH FEELS HE CAN LOOK TO US FOR COOPERATION AND HE HOPES THAT US AS RELIABLE FRIEND WILL FIND CHANCE BE RESPONSIVE ON MATTER HE CONSIDERS IMPORTANT AND VITAL TO IRAN'S SECURITY. THUS USG CONSIDERATION OF REQUEST MUST RECOGNIZE THAT DECISION INVOLVES UNUSUAL DEGREE OF POLITICAL IMPORTANCE RELATED TO FABRIC OF USG-GOI RELATIONS. DECISION SHOULD ALSO NOT OVERLOOK OR UNDERESTIMATE IMPORTANCE OF IRAN FOR VITAL US NATIONAL INTERESTS.

¶8. ACTION REQUESTED. COUNRY TEAM URGES THAT USG GIVE PROMPT AND SYMPATHETIC ATTENTION TO SHAH'S REQUEST FOR 1972 DELIVERY OF F-4E AIRCRAFT, FROM WHATEVER SOURCES MAY BE AVAILABLE TO BE TAPPED (INCLUDING DELIVERIES TO USAF). WE RECOGNIZE THAT REQUEST MAY RAISE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS, BUT URGE THAT EVERY AVENUE BE EXPLORED TO REACH POSITIVE RESPONSE. IT IS ALSO MOST IMPORTANT THAT COUNTRY TEAM BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED OF PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS TO ENABLE US CONTINUE TO MEET AND TEMPER SENSE OF URGENCY ON SUBJECT WHICH PREVAILS WITHIN GOI. IF DELAYS OR BARRIERS TO FULLY FAVORABLE RESPONSE MATERIALIZE, WE TRUST THAT EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE (E.G. PARTIAL DELIVERY IN 1972) AND THAT PERSUASIVE RATIONALE CAN BE DEVELOPED TO FULLY EXPLAIN TO SHAH REASONS FOR ANY SHORTCOMING. IN ORDER TO DIMINISH AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE NEGATIVE IMPACT.

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